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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Scenario planning has steadily grown to become a significant part of business and 
organisational foresight processes, particularly where planning situations demand 
approaches beyond traditional forecasting, due to extent of uncertainty variables or 
length of future time under consideration. However, despite general consensus as to 
the importance of the scenario approach in general, and rapid growth in both theory 
and practice in the field, fundamental questions remain over which situations are 
most tractable to scenario planning and why; and, in the face of uneven success in 
application, which among an apparent myriad scenario planning approaches best 
serves different planning situations, or organisations holding different goals. This 
dissertation makes an intervention into this problem, investigating to what extent 
scenario planning projects can be separated by underlying project purpose, and, 
based on original primary case studies and case-based structured interviews, finds 
that two meta-categories of purpose exist, which are here referred to as “adaptive” 
and “visionary-advocacy” purposes. It is argued that a purpose-based distinction of 
scenario modes provides part-explanation of the effective basis, or absence thereof, 
of scenario work for different situations—a basis which is achieved via congruence 
of scenario project purpose with (a) underlying organisational planning purpose, 
and (b) the extent of organisational influence over external conditions, including 
macro-variables of change, that constrain it. These findings suggest additions to 
scenario method as currently understood, particularly pre-project analysis (audits) 
of both an organisation’s planning purpose and its external constraint conditions, to 
ascertain the presence of absence of necessary congruencies, so as to inform 
adoption of the purpose platform (and allied methodology) more likely to produce 
successful outcomes in application.    
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“Only the fool, fixed in his folly, may think 
   he can turn the wheel on which he turns.” 
—Thomas Becket (T.S. Eliot).  
[Dator, 2009b] 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Methodology 
 
 
1.1 Purpose and Significance of the Study 
The set of industry foresight methodologies collectively known as “scenario 
planning” has become increasingly explored and used by businesses, governments 
and social enterprises, both in South Africa and the world. This adoption has been 
so significant that scenario planning has over time come to be the key method 
(more exactly, cluster of methods) challenging and in many cases replacing, 
“strategic planning” as a foresight and planning framework, because it is better 
suited to the fast-changing, uncertain, unpredictable operating environment that 
most institutions face in the 21st century. Overall, as detailed in this dissertation 
via spread of projects studied, the utility of scenario-based methodology in 
business and social enterprise foresight is established, and there is no longer any 
real debate that scenario planning offers many merits in helping organisations 
navigate key mid- and long-term future decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
and unpredictability. 
At the same time, the adoption, use of, and benefit from scenario planning, 
particularly by businesses has been chequered at best; its perceived benefits vs. 
costs are unclear to many managers, and with good reason. As explored below, 
and in the next chapter, the approach has faced fundamental criticism, particularly 
in that it returns results that are heavily imbued with naiveté or idealism, or 
outputs from the process are not of a type or in a form usable to decision-makers, 
and therefore the implications for real-world management are not evident. This 
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directly prevents adoption of scenario methods by business or institutional 
leaders, even in situations that would otherwise be manifestly appropriate; or 
leads to adoption only as “window dressing”, while in fact strategic decisions are 
being determined elsewhere, via other planning processes. The cost to 
organisations is that best available practices for making decisions that take 
advantage of, or are robust to, unpredictable future circumstances are often 
ignored by management: a prime tool for improving management decision-making 
towards future change is not used, or blunted in use, which leads to a significant 
reduction in organisational ability to navigate uncertainty, or manage threats, or 
to fully grasp and leverage the opportunities that a changing world presents, 
leading to lost revenue (or alternative value damage to a company or its 
stakeholders).  
 
1.2 Definitions 
The definition of scenarios will, for the purposes of this dissertation, only be fully 
dealt with in Chapter 2, in fuller discussion of scenario benefits and typologies—
because every definition implies a position as to key merits or best use of the 
scenario technique. In other words, definition in this field, as in many fields, is a 
contested space. At this point the intention is to offer some common-purpose 
understanding to provide context for what follows below. 
The term “scenario” derives from the dramatic arts and film, where it refers to an 
outline of a plot or a summary or set of directions for the sequence of action. For 
businesses or policy organisations, a scenario is by analogy an outline of a plausible 
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future world (or steps towards it) in which the organisation or its representatives 
may consider their situation and potential actions by others on them, and them on 
others, in an unfolding drama. It is a description of the outcome of a constellation of 
important variables at a particular time in the future, or the described evolution 
from the present to the anticipated situation. From these definitional origins, a 
scenario is taken to include sufficient detail as to hypothetical events and actors so 
that decision-makers can visualise and viscerally comprehend the specific problems, 
challenges and opportunities that such a contextual landscape would present, were 
it to come to pass. Also flowing from these definitional origins, while scenarios 
usually have a quantitative underpinning, they exist a-priori in story form, narrating 
possible future situations, and placing key actors, events and challenges within a 
chain of causality and overall thematic congruence. 
Within the academic literature, scenarios have been described and defined variously 
as: “a tool for ordering one's perceptions about alternative future environments in 
which one's decisions might be played out” (Schwartz 1991, 4); “focused 
descriptions of fundamentally different futures presented in a coherent script-like 
or narrative fashion” (Schoemaker 1993, 195); “alternative stories about the future, 
with many improbable and dramatic twists, to develop strategy” (Kleiner 2003, 1); 
“complex elements weaved into a story which is coherent, systematic, 
comprehensive, and plausible” (Coates 2000, 116); or “internally consistent and 
challenging narrative descriptions of possible futures” (van der Heijden 2005, 14). 
Glenn & Gordon (2003, 4) define a scenario as “a story that connects a description of 
specific future to present realities in a series of causal links that illustrate decisions 
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and consequences… a way of organizing many statements about the future.” 
Scenarios are distinguished from other foresight approaches, such as forecasting 
and risk assessment, by being non-predictive: the defining attribute of the scenario 
method is scenarios never come singly, they are always in sets of at least two, or 
more. The essence of the method lies specifically the consideration of a variety of 
possible outcomes, rather than to attempt to accurately predict a single outcome 
(Biggs et al., 2007; Bennett et al., 2003). A scenario functions by being set against 
other scenarios, or against a linear extrapolation of present conditions, in order to 
broaden and articulate the full spectrum of alternative future conditions, none of 
which is predicted. Desmerais (2000) states that where traditional strategic 
planning concentrates on the task environment, scenario planning concentrates on 
macro-environmental forces that drive change in the context around any 
organisation. In this, it is generally seen to be applicable to planning in situations 
characterised by high complexity and uncertainty—across both business and policy 
environments—that is, situations undergoing (at least in the perception of 
managers) significant or rapid technological, market or legislative change. Faced 
with these situations, rather than predict, scenario planning sets out to describe 
trends and uncertainties as they might evolve, allowing the planner or decision-
maker to perceive and comprehend the problems, challenges, and opportunities that 
such an environment would present. Rather than attempting to narrow possible 
permutations to a “most probable” outcome, that is, giving in to managers’ 
understandable preference for “certainty” in decision-making, the scenario method 
specifically retains the possibility of many outcomes, keeping planning perspectives 
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open to less probable eventualities, which enhances decision robustness when 
conditions evolve in an unexpected way. 
 
1.3 Research Motivation 
The problem for research and resolution in this dissertation crystallised for the 
researcher at the time of writing the book Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight 
(American Management Association Press, 2009)1 when, investigating issues 
relating to forecast quality, the book determined implications for quality in the 
difference between (a) forecast situations where an individual or organisation’s 
forecast intention was to influence outcomes, that is, make an intervention into or 
against external drivers of change so as to influence the contextual environment 
conditions the entity would face in the future, in other words, to change it so as to 
make a better future context for an agent or company or community or the world-
at-large, vs. (b) situations where the agent or organisation’s future-investigating 
intention was to anticipate what would happen in its contextual environment as 
early and accurately as possible in order to align its responses, that is, investigate 
changing circumstances in markets, technologies, regulation, and industry 
conditions in order to profitably adapt to these changes without significantly 
influencing them. 
The discovery, in researching for Future Savvy, was that while there is extensive 
academic and consultant literature on the role and benefits of industry or strategic 
foresight—essentially to do with competitive fitness in the face of change and 
                                                 
1 Gordon, A. (2009). Future Savvy: Quality in Foresight, New York: American Management Association 
Press.  
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uncertainty—there has been inadequate academic research that properly 
acknowledges and investigates the validity of a purpose-based distinction in 
foresight work in general or scenario planning in particular. Within the academic 
literature on scenario planning there has been a recent, small, but consistent effort 
to create a “typology” of scenarios (Van Notten, 2003; Bishop et al, 2007; Biggs, 
2007, Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008) as presented in Chapter 2, but this is still an 
embryonic debate which deserves more contribution, for the various reasons 
elaborated below. Within the broader strategic foresight literature, the idea of so-
called visionary, or aspirational, or “normative”2 foresight, that seeks better 
outcomes or a “better world” is a fairly well-understood concept, but what this 
stands in contrast to, or the limits and terrain of each, or the implications of 
inadequately delineating between them, is lacking in clarity. The idea that 
business or policy foresight perspectives and intentions (and therein alternative 
practices) can be defined in terms of purpose or constraint conditions is also 
inadequately unelaborated. In fact, the area is so under-theorized, that the terms 
“future-influencing,” “future-aligning,” and “future-adaptive” had to be coined by 
the author when writing Future Savvy in 2009.  
While I was able to go some way in formulating this distinction, and defining terms 
based on work I reviewed (and my own work), I suspected the matter to be of 
                                                 
2 Ogilvy, J., (1992) Future Studies and the Human Sciences: The Case for Normative Scenarios. 
Futures Research Quarterly, 8(2), 5-65, provides the definition, elaboration and defence of 
normative scenarios — that is, scenarios norming to (proposing congruence with) a defined 
(preferred) future state. This use of the term “normative” in scenario planning is more commonly 
associated with the French practitioners of foresight, as presented in Chapter 2. Due to inherent 
definitional slippage and confusion over the term “normative” in English, this dissertation uses the 
compound term “visionary-advocacy” to refer to this kind of scenario work.  
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such importance to industry foresight approaches in general, and to the effective 
use of scenario planning in particular, that I was motivated to research the 
matter—via the body of research here presented—to see if the academic basis for 
this distinction was valid, and if so, what the implications of this might be. In order 
to proceed towards this, the research question I posed myself was in the 
“sceptical” format: is it in fact empirically verifiable that the array of current 
scenario planning practices may be classified into two broad categories—based on 
purpose, each implying a different necessary relationship with exter al constraint 
conditions? If so, what is the nature and extent of these purposes and constraint-
condition situations, and how should this insight guide best use of scenario 
method? How might a “constraint-based” purpose perspective improve 
understanding of scenario practices and guide us to best use of the method, if at 
all? Investigating and contributing to these questions were the motivations of this 
study, and making progress towards solving them forms the basis of the 
contribution to knowledge proposed.  
As elaborated in the “Purpose and Significance of Study” section (1.1) above, the 
most acute of problems that scenario planning faces is that the method appears to 
managers to be not useful or unusable as a business planning tool in the real 
world, and-or it creates outputs that demand a strategic response towards 
“changing the world” when this may not at all be managers’ intention. It appears, 
in other words, that management misgivings or confusion over applicability of 
outcomes may be related to the adequacy or inadequacy of context oriented and-
or purpose-based discriminations (towards congruence with the underlying 
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purpose and situational context of the organisation itself). Therefore the 
contribution to knowledge at stake, assuming purpose-based categorisation of 
scenario method can be validated, would be to revalidate the place and utility of 
scenario planning via establishing the importance of scenario macro-purpose 
distinctions, towards achieving congruence of method purpose with the 
underlying purpose of the organisation, all towards establishing a solid base for 
productive use of the scenario method in real-world planning.  
 
1.4 Statement of Objective 
This thesis therefore sets out to academically identify, validate, research, and 
provide theoretical and practical solutions advancing the understanding and use 
of scenario planning, as defined above. The primary purpose of the research 
proposed was first to examine and validity of the distinction anticipated in the 
research question, by way of focused research into scenario planning project (case 
study) experience, as elaborated below. The second purpose, assuming the first 
emerged as valid, was to fully investigate the implications of the distinction in 
terms of academic and practical contribution to the field. Further, given the home 
institution for the research degree (the University of Cape Town Graduate School 
of Business), and the author’s own personal and professional experience in South 
Africa, the specific aim has been to include African scenarios projects as a base for 
the research—while closely cross-referencing this against international work—
with the particular intention of creating models of understanding that are 
appropriate both locally and internationally. 
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1.5 Research Question: Assumptions and Delimitations 
A full description of research considerations and options, and choices made in 
fulfilling the research path of the dissertation, is provided in Section 1.7. In the 
section immediately below, an overview of the research question and its 
predetermination of the theory-generating nature and direction of the research, is 
provided.  
 
1.5.1 The Research Question 
As anticipated in the statement of objective, above, the research question of the 
dissertation investigates the validity of creating a “meta-typology” of scenario 
categorisation, based on the alternative meta-purposes implied in future-aligning 
vs. future-influencing interventions, each with associated constraint conditions. 
The research question asks to what extent alternative purpose platforms are valid, 
and if valid, to what extent each demands congruence with the organisational 
purpose at large, and also demand justifiable inferences as to an organisation’s 
real influence over its contextual constraints in order to be valid and fit for 
purpose, and whether failure to do this diminishes the efficacy of the tool for 
either purpose. 
 
1.5.2 Use of a Research Question in Theory-Generating Enquiry 
Eisenhardt (1989) distinguishes between theory-generating vs. theory-testing 
modes of research inquiry, the former building a new theory that validly accounts 
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for the phenomena observed and studied in response to a research question 
posed; the latter testing the validity of an existing theory (e.g. hypothesis testing).  
Eisenhardt (1989, 548) comments on the applicability of conducting theory-
building research—specifically from case studies—as follows:  
“There are times when little is known about a phenomenon; current 
perspectives seem inadequate because they have little empirical 
substantiation, or they conflict with each other or common sense. Or, 
sometimes, serendipitous findings in a theory-testing study suggest the 
need for a new perspective. In these situations, theory building from case 
study research is particularly appropriate (and) likely to generate the kind 
of novel theory which is desirable when extant theory seems inadequate. In 
sum, building theory from case study research is most appropriate in the 
early stages of research on a topic or to provide freshness in perspective to 
an already researched topic.”3 
 
This form of enquiry is sometimes also known as “evidence assembly”, where data 
or findings are gathered without an a-priori goal definition, and insights are induced 
from what is discovered. Where a hypothesis is not forthcoming or achievable for 
any reason, evidence assembly or goal-free evaluation will provide a basis for 
intellectual advancement. Scriven's "goal-free evaluation" (1991) is an example of 
an evidence-based approach. 
The state of the scenario field and situation of the academic literature well 
satisfies the condition: “little is known about a phenomenon, current perspectives 
                                                 
3 Eisenhardt (1989, 536) further states: “Most importantly, theory-building research is begun as 
close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test. Admittedly, 
it is impossible to achieve this ideal of a clean theoretical slate. Nonetheless, attempting to approach 
this ideal is important because preordained theoretical perspectives or propositions may bias and 
limit the findings.” 
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seem inadequate because they have little empirical substantiation, or they conflict 
with each other or common sense,” and, as described in the writing of Future 
Savvy, above, this was a case where in-practice findings suggested the need for an 
improved theoretical perspective. Therefore adoption of a theory-building mode 
of research along the lines specified by Eisenhardt above, was considered valid 
and appropriate in this dissertation. Its implications, with particular reference to 
case studies, are discussed in the research section below.  
It is observed that theory in scenarios work has routinely and consistently been 
extracted from practice—insights into scenario planning approaches, expectations, 
best practices, etc., emerge most commonly from practitioners out of their own 
experiences, as many observers including Chermack (2011) have pointed out. This 
research project aims to continue in this tradition of the field, in extracting theory 
from (observation of) practice, and providing theoretical underpinning to improve 
future practice. 
 
1.5.3 Research Assumptions and Delimitations 
The research here proceeds without major underlying assumptions. However it is 
pertinent to observe that the assumption of scenario purpose rests on a “benefit” 
assumption: the assumption that every institution which investigates the future—
invests in greater understanding of trends, drivers of change, and anticipation of 
probable or possible outcomes—does so in order to benefit themselves (or 
mitigate loss). The choices that have been made in research path and methods 
considered and approach finally chosen is discussed fully below (Section 1.7). 
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Briefly it should here be mentioned that the research proceeds by qualitative 
analysis; and that there is little valid basis for quantitative research analysis of 
scenario work. The primary tool used was the case study: nothing else would 
create the immersion in real project work required to make valid comparative 
inferences. At the same time, case studies are necessarily focused but may not be 
broadly representative, so this limitation was overcome by broadening the base of 
deep case studies with a wider interview-based case-study survey of the work of 
key practitioners and clients. While such broad spectrum of sce ario work is 
demanded for valid scope of research—scenarios are presented on topics that 
span both local and international dimensions, and on content matter that varies 
widely, from HIV-Aids to Arctic marine policy to digital libraries—the research is 
tightly delimited by relevance to its core topic area: issues pertaining to purpose, 
method, and constraint conditions in building and using scenarios.   
 
1.6 Research Path: Chapter Outline 
Following the introduction to the origination, motivation and scope of the research 
project, and outline of the contribution to knowledge sought, that has been provided 
above, this chapter continues below to identify the research choices faced and 
describe and defend the research methods adopted. All this forms Chapter 1.  
Chapter 2, Theoretical Overview, lays the groundwork for the study, investigating 
the pertinent literature and theory in scenario planning, and between scenario 
planning and other foresight approaches. The key debates in the academic literature 
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applicable to the research terrain are elaborated, and issues relating to classification 
and typology of scenario practices are presented.  
Chapter 3, History and Evolution, continues the literature review to register the 
history and origins of the scenario field, with particular attention to foundational 
development and emergence which strongly shapes the field to this day, including 
genesis of understanding of the purposes and limits of the scenario method, which 
the dissertation seeks to contribute to.  
Chapter 4 presents an overview of the research conducted, describi g the terrain of 
the research as conducted. This is divided into two parts, 4A where two primary 
case studies are presented in depth; and 4B where 13 supplementary case studies 
are investigated via structured interviews. (The schedule of structured interviews is 
presented in Appendix 1.)  
Chapter 5, Research Analysis, develops the various strands of analysis that are 
elaborated from the research findings.  
Chapter 6, Conclusion and Argument, consolidates the argument of the dissertation 
with reference to the original research question, and presents the contribution to 
knowledge that emerges for academic consideration. 
 
1.7 Research Methodology and Justification 
The following section outlines and defends the research methodology chosen for 
this thesis of study. It considers the possible ways of approaching the research 
question posed above, describes the chosen set of methods and why they were 
chosen, and builds the argument for why the research path arrived at is the most 
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effective and reasonable way to investigate the research question. It discusses the 
perspectives that underpin the study, introduces the methods and procedures used 
within the methodology, and how provisions for rigour in research have been made. 
Further, this section explains the philosophical and methodological base of the 
research path, and demonstrates how consideration has gone into choosing aspects 
of the framework that are consistent with each other and with the research task 
objectives, and which fully cover the demands of the research task. 
 
1.7.1 Structure of Research Section 
This research methodology and justification section is structured into various parts. 
In the first part, background issues informing the research are discussed. In the 
next, the question of quantitative vs. qualitative research approaches and how this 
relates to the present study is considered, followed by a section which outlines the 
qualitative research design, and describes each of the major methodologies used 
and how they interact. This is followed by a concluding section, considering issues 
relating to interpretation of findings, particularly the reliability and validity of the 
information and conclusions drawn. 
 
1.7.2 Background to Research Methodology Decisions 
As indicated in setting out the research terrain and research question above, and 
further explained in explaining choice of case study subjects (below, Section 1.7.6.3), 
this endeavour began with the author’s attention to a professional problem of 
theoretical and practical interest in the field of business scenario planning, which 
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motivated the pursuit of solving it in academic terms for the purpose of providing 
practical benefit: improving the practice of managers and practitioners in this field. 
This has implications for the research methodology path chosen in that great care 
has been taken to align the research work within theoretical fields not only of 
rigorous research methodology, but also that of scenario planning, which means 
grounding the research approach in the study of case practice, and deriving theory 
from the successes and failure of case practice and the perspectives of practitioners. 
In this regard the study consciously bridges the worlds of theory a d practice, and 
uses, in part, a “pragmatic” research philosophy, as outlined below.   
  
1.7.2.1 Research Location 
The research topic is international and applies to industry foresight and scenario 
situations everywhere, without exception. However the decision was taken to orient 
and locate the research in Africa, and for this reason to develop the dissertation 
through the University of Cape Town. This is for two reasons. First, as is outlined 
further in Chapter 3, South Africa has produced many of the pioneers developing 
and adopting scenario methodology, and has provided location for projects for 
leading practitioners of the methodology, so it has in various respects led and 
remains one of the world leaders in the use of this methodology. It is therefore a 
particularly rich site of research. Second, South Africa, and Africa as a whole, has 
been at the forefront of developing the visionary-advocacy mode of scenario 
planning that this study in part orients itself towards, of which the Mont-Fleur 
project, 1992 (Kahane, 1997), the most famous, is one among many. The research 
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terrain and the location of study are therefore directly in alignment.  
 
1.7.2.2 Special Skills of the Researcher 
The researcher is a reasonably well-known practitioner, university lecturer, and 
published academic and professional author in the field of industry foresight and 
scenario planning. This has potential advantages and disadvantages for developing a 
methodological basis for the research that follows. The advantages are that the 
researcher proceeds from a high base in both theory (including an MS In Strategic 
Foresight from the University of Houston, 1996) and practice in the field, and is 
familiar not only with every international scenario project of note done in the last 
15 years, but also with the analytical discussions that have surrounded and 
informed them, and the evolution of the field in general over during this period. The 
researcher therefore has considerable advantages in being able to bring this 
background to bear in choosing research methodologies, appropriate case studies, 
and potentially fertile project-interview candidates. On the other hand it is 
recognised that this level of advancement and immersion in the field could result in 
the researcher being bound by the theories and practices of the field, including its 
learned mental models and practice preferences. For this reason, considerable 
attention has been made to validate the findings via multiple and triangulated 
methods in the research approach and methodology, as detailed below. There is 
benefit to be had in the translation of professional experiences into new theory in 
the field, but only if this has external justification, which is sought via the academic 
research path.  
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1.7.2.3 Practical Knowledge and Benefit  
As noted above, the aim of the researcher was to develop useful, practical, beneficial 
intellectual knowledge to inform practice in a field in which he himself has been 
working, and will continue to research, teach and work. In discussing practical 
benefit from theory in this field, it is important to note first that most knowledge in 
the field of scenario planning has come from the study of real-world projects and 
practices, and the reflections of practitioners on their own work (Chermack, 2011). 
The research in this document continues this tradition in both spirit and method: 
studying what practitioners do, what has worked and what has not, and reflecting 
on this, and relating it to academic theory and insights in the field to develop solid 
theory on which to base future practice. Therefore the research follows, in part, the 
principles of “pragmatism,” which supports the concept of practical knowledge 
(Patton, 1990) and sees research as a practical activity aimed at producing useful 
knowledge, rather than merely understanding the world (Mingers, 2000). In this the 
research also meets the injunction from Chia (2004) and Johnson et al. (2003) to 
more closely examine and base research in the actual practices of managers.  
Implied in this choice is the resolution of one original question of research 
methodology for this study: did the research require empirical observation or could 
it be resolved theoretically? As Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000) observe, empirical 
analysis is not necessary for the development of a theory. But, given the practical 
orientation of the field, and the research, and following McAllister (1996), it was 
determined that significant issues and problems would be missed in a theory-only 
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approach. On the other hand, contribution to knowledge of course cannot be 
developed without relating empirical findings to existing theory, and developing 
new theory where required; so the research has consciously followed a trajectory 
that moves between empirical analysis and theoretical frameworks and seeks an 
integration of thinking in the theoretical literature and insight from the views of 
practitioners.  
 
1.7.2.4 Going Beyond Existing Studies 
Given that pragmatism demands integration with real-world practice, empirical 
research was clearly necessary. The next question was whether existing studies 
could be used, or whether new primary data or empirical observations had to be 
gathered. Although much material exists in secondary sources (and this was 
extensively consulted in the theory review, Chapter 2; history review, Chapter 3; 
and existing-project analysis preparatory to Chapters 4A and 4B), the specific need 
to investigate producer and client purpose in scenario building made it obvious that 
new empirical findings would have to be gained from primary resources, such as 
case studies and interviews as described below. 
 
1.7.2.5 Summative vs. Formative Analysis 
Scriven (1967) makes a distinction between summative evaluation, which sums up 
the accomplishment of a programme or process on completion, and formative 
evaluation, which evaluates a program or process during development. A 
summative evaluation would ask and answer the question: “How good is/was this 
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process?” (with reference to previous processes, or comparable processes, or ideal 
criteria), while a formative evaluation would answer the question “How can this 
process be improved?” When a method is recently developed or in development, the 
formative evaluation is more pertinent.4 This is relevant for the research that 
follows because of the pragmatic benefit sought: the goal is to provide research that 
improves practical use of scenario planning, a form of planning that is only 45 years 
old at most generous count, that is, with much potential, but in many ways still in its 
formative phase. Much has been achieved, but there is still far to go. We are well 
beyond the stage where the driving question could be or should be whether 
scenarios are useful or not; we are at the point where the important question can be 
framed as “how can its processes be improved?” 
Scriven’s original definition of formative evaluation was simply “outcome evaluation 
of an intermediate stage” (Scriven, 1967, 51), but Chen (1996) has developed the 
distinction, separating summative vs. formative further, into process vs. outcome, 
and improvement vs. assessment. In these terms, the rationale of the research that 
follows is one of process improvement. Tessmer (1993) notes that formative 
research does not rule out quantitative methods, but qualitative research modes are 
more common. Conversely, summative research more frequently uses quantitative 
methods. This is one of the motivations for the choice of a qualitative research path, 
as described further in the next section.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Flagg (1990, 5) defines formative evaluation as “any kind of feedback … intended to improve the 
product during design, production, and initial implementation.”  
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1.7.3 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Research Approaches 
A primary decision in research method for research of this type was whether to 
proceed via quantitative or qualitative methods, or a combination of these, that is to 
say, a “mixed method” approach. This question has both academic and practical 
dimensions. Academically, the issue relates to which type of approach will lead to 
most comprehensive investigation of the research terrain and investigation of the 
research question at hand. Practically the question has to do with whether both 
approaches are sensible and achievable, if indeed they are both possible. These 
questions are answered below.  
 
1.7.3.1 Limits of Positivism 
Positivism (sometimes called “logical positivism”) refers to a set of methods for 
testing hypotheses or inferences about the world by collecting empirical 
observations and quantitatively or statistically measuring them to determine the 
validity of the proposed conclusions. The approaches involved in this have been 
developed based on traditional research in the physical and natural sciences, 
associated with scientists such as Compte and Durkheim, and was given the 
umbrella label “positivism” in the early 20th century in Whitehead and Russell’s 
Principia Mathematica (1910). In this tradition, the researcher attempts to be an 
objective, neutral observer, emphasising measurement of “external” events and 
deducing knowledge from this.  
The advantages of a positivist approach are in its orientation to empirical findings, 
“hard” data, and perceived lack of bias or interpretation. This has made positivism 
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the basic mode of scientific research, in fact synonymous with the concept of 
scientific research. Such research assumes and promotes the neutrality of the 
researcher and therefore validity of claim towards objectivity, although there are 
increasingly agreed limits to this view (Astley, 1985), as discussed below. It is to be 
noted that quantification is only part of the positivist approach: statistical analysis is 
typically preceded by the development of one or more hypotheses to be 
quantitatively tested, and by gathering of data, and may be followed by the attempt 
to generalise the statistically valid case to wider situations or general theory. 
The formal logic, apparent rigour and low-bias benefits of the positivist approach 
have caused it to become not only the essence of scientific enquiry, but also to be 
adopted widely in economics and across the human, social and linguistic sciences. 
But here its adoption has been mired in controversy and growing criticism. In the 
past 25 years, with the failure of positivist modes to adequately account for or 
predict behaviour particularly in the complex or “chaotic” situations that evidently 
pertain in social domains where language and communication are central elements, 
or where the role of causal variables is hard to determine and therefore more 
subject to greater interpretation than in the physical sciences, positivism has 
gathered critics. A body of intellectual opinion as to the limitations of positivist 
methods in general, and the severe limitation of their validity in the study of human 
and social situations that are often inherently unmeasurable or uncodifiable without 
the entry of researcher interpretation, has grown up.  
There has thus been a notable rise of “post-positivist” sensibilities in research 
theory, particularly setting itself to adequately acknowledge and incorporate the 
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active, interpretive role of the researcher in determining research inputs, outputs, 
and construction of meaning from them. Sarantakos (1998) comments that 
positivism spuriously assumes that science is free of personal, political or religious 
values, predicated on an “objective reality” that pre-exists observers. Knights (1992) 
holds that elements of positivist research—experiments, hypothesis-testing, and 
quantification—are often practiced unreflexively due to their origin in hard sciences 
where it is commonly considered that the researcher is separate from the research 
object (and that this is a desirable situation). Dey (1993) comments that the 
knowledge produced by positivism is limited by predefined boundaries, including 
mental models of the researchers and the process they follow. Steffy & Grimes 
(1986) make the case that researchers are constricted by beliefs and values 
obtained through training, or peer influences, and are swayed by the goals of the 
research itself, but that this remains largely hidden from the consciousness of 
unreflective researchers.  
 
1.7.3.2 Interpretative Research Approaches 
“Qualitative research” is the commonly applied umbrella term for non-quantitative 
information collection and analysis techniques. In this mode of research, verbally 
oriented tools are paramount, for example in interviews—which stand at the core of 
qualitative scholarship. But qualitative analysis has to do with more than 
prioritising verbal techniques over data-driven approaches. Traditional scientific 
and positivist scholarship conceptualises knowledge as external “fact” and therein 
independent of values. “Post-positivist” research philosophy rejects the externality 
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(external to the perceiver) of knowledge, and acknowledges interpretative values as 
affecting all inquiry, including scientific inquiry (Bell, 1996). In other words, 
qualitative research is inherently phenomenological, that is, seeking to interpret 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people assign to them. In this, qualitative 
approaches offer the researcher a research orientation that is decisively not value-
free or theory-free; a base in research towards understanding how reality is not pre-
existing or external to the research, but in fact socially constructed, negotiated, 
managed and sustained (Gubrium & Holstein, 2000; Phillips, 1990) or actively 
interpreted (Sarantakos, 1998) and so reflects the standpoint of the researchers as 
much as the researched. Silverman (1993) reflects that qualitative research locates 
the observer in the observed world. Such value-laden research requires researchers 
to be aware of how their own backgrounds, socialisation, and mental models 
influence their research—in choosing what to research, how to pursue it, in deciding 
what counts as significant evidence or data, and how to interpret results. Eisenhardt 
(1989) holds that qualitative assessment is particularly useful for understanding 
why or why not emergent relationships hold. When a relationship is indicated, the 
qualitative assessment often provides an understanding of the dynamics underlying 
the relationship, that is, the “why” of what is happening.  
 
1.7.4 The Qualitative-Interpretive Research Basis Decision  
It is evident that both quantitative and qualitative research methods have validity, 
and so in determining which path to take (or whether to follow a “mixed-methods” 
approach, see below) it was necessary to examine the topic of research to see which 
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approach made theoretical and practical sense. As Creswell (1998) notes, the nature 
of the research problem is a key factor in the choice of research methodology. In 
making this estimation, the first thing of note is that the field of scenario planning 
is—by its very definition and orientation—the place where formal, positivist, 
analysis of the future for companies (quantitative, data-driven, trend-extrapolative 
forecasting) is forced (by length of view into the future, that is necessarily always 
both complex and uncertain) to give way to qualitative analysis. In other words, 
scenario planning is a qualitative method that “takes over” from quantitative 
forecasting where problems are too complex or too long-term to be validly assessed 
quantitatively (Gordon, 2011). As discussed at more length in Chapter 3, business 
adoption of scenario planning has proceeded quickly and decisively, particularly 
were it was found that positivist frameworks produce poorly when tasked with 
anticipating the complex, multi-causal, unpredictable factors shaping the future 
(Wack, 1985a). Better foresight was judged to occur when the assumptions of the 
planner or executive team a e probed, via the forms of qualitative, interpretative 
forms of analysis that scenario work promotes, prior to quantitative forecasting 
methods (where used). 
The implication for the research in this dissertation could not be clearer: the 
qualitative and interpretative critique of quantitative corporate prediction modes 
that scenario planning embodies matches up directly with qualitative research 
caveat towards positivist research methods, as described and sourced above. Like 
scenarios themselves, qualitative academic research deals with concepts that are 
often not clearly definable, or for which there exist a range of interpretations, and 
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enables a rich, in-depth exploration of multiple possibilities and different 
experiences.  
 
1.7.4.1 Consideration of ‘Mixed Methods’ 
Some theorists, for example Cupchik (2001) in discussing constructivist realism, 
and Kleining and Witt (2001) on heuristics, hold that quantitative and qualitative 
approaches can be integrated in one research project, in a so-called “mixed-
methods” approach. To consider whether this would be possible or make sense in 
the current research demands a thought-experiment as to whether and how a 
quantitative approach might be possible. One would need to set up a formal 
experiment to test the “hypothesis” (that visionary and adaptive scenario situations 
are different scenario methodologies each appropriate to different purpose, and that 
purpose is related to constraint conditions). The first problem is an absence of data 
in the scenario process. Although data is used in constructing scenarios, and 
hypothetical data is produced in fleshing out scenario worlds, the scenario process 
is itself not subject to any quantifiable output measure that would validly point to 
presence or absence of success. That is, one may measure length of time taken, or 
money spent or saved, or number of people producing or using the work, and so on, 
but none of these correlates with success or failure. As will be seen in the research 
results themselves and analysis thereof, success in business scenario building and 
use is a subjective (but not random) measure and therefore must be qualitatively 
researched. Further, to validate causal links or test a hypothesis, or both, demands 
an experiment of the type outlined by Light, Singer & Willett (1990), including 
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reference to a control group. This means it would demand setting up situations 
where some organisations are put through a (repeatable) scenario process and 
others form the control or “placebo” group. Not only is the scenario process never 
identically repeatable in itself, due to the fairly free-form interactive workshops that 
lie at its heart, but it is effectively unimaginable that any organisation or company 
would participate as a control group, even just for experimental purposes.  
In sum, any form of positivist approach appeared unhelpful for developing a 
research process for the topic at hand, or researching the companies and projects 
under study, and for this reason the researcher looked for a research path beyond 
the bounds of either a quantitative or a mixed-method approach. By contrast, it is 
well understood that qualitative research is considered appropriate for an analysis 
of concepts and themes that require rich analysis and in-depth understanding, and 
that qualitative methods are most appropriate when researching dynamic processes 
construed by individual and collective interpretations, as was the case here. 
Therefore, while the limitations of qualitative and interpretative research are 
acknowledged, particularly in its reliance on the interpretative assumptions of the 
researcher, it was decided to follow a qualitative academic research path. 
 
1.7.5 Research Design 
With debates about quantitative and-or mixed methods based research out of the 
way, what remained was to decide what form of, or mix of, qualitative research 
methods would be appropriate to the task at hand. Noting that such approaches are 
mostly not clear alternatives to each other, but overlap in intent and process a fair 
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amount, the question is which “mix” of qualitative approaches would be appropriate 
and necessary, and in what order should they be applied, given the objectives of the 
research and the type of knowledge sought. Various theorists advocate the use of 
mixed qualitative methods, including Mingers and Gill (1997) in a book that argues 
that methodological pluralism is not only valid but preferable, due to its 
encouragement of multiple perspectives. This also has direct bearing on the 
promotion of triangulation in the research approach, as discussed below.  
 
1.7.5.1 Choosing Among Qualitative Research Options 
Creswell (1998) defines five major qualitative research approaches: Narrative 
Research, Phenomenology, Grounded Theory, Ethnography, and Case Study. After 
becoming familiar with each type and how they overlap, the researcher decided on 
Case Study as a base, to be augmented by narrative research, and phenomenology 
which in practice would take the form of semi-structured interviews of subsidiary 
cases, after project (document) assessment, for reasons that follow. First it is noted 
that the most common qualitative research methods are interviews, observation, 
and document studies. Rapley (2001) estimates that interviews are the primary data 
collection tool in 90% of all social science research. As action-observation (as would 
be, in this case, observation of “live” scenario workshops) was not directly material 
to the topic—and the part of this that was relevant could be more than adequately 
captured via project write-ups, that is documented action—the researcher 
determined that project-document analysis and interviews based thereon (that 
further probed and questioned the perceptions and practices as reported in the 
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project documents) would be the most effective planks of the research method. 
Further clarifications on issues relating to the merits of interviews vs. surveys; and 
structured vs. semi-structured interviews; as well as in-depth discussion of the role 
of each major tool (case study, interview, project-document analysis) used, proceeds 
below. 
 
1.7.5.2 Sequential vs. Simultaneous Application of Methods 
Given that case studies, and interviews and project document assessment were to be 
used, the question then became whether the methods should be followed 
sequentially (if so, which first?) or simultaneously. On this question, Pope, Ziebland, 
and Mays (2000, 114) offer the following perspective: 
“In much qualitative research the analytical process begins during the data 
collection phase as the data already gathered are analysed and fed into, or 
shape, the on-going data collection... It allows the researcher to check and 
interpret the data she/he is collecting continually and to develop tentative 
conclusions based on the data already collected, or hypotheses for subsequent 
investigation in further data collection. Compared with quantitative methods, 
this has the advantage of allowing the researcher to go back and refine 
questions and to pursue emerging avenues of inquiry in further depth. Crucially, 
it also enables the researcher to look for deviant or negative cases; that is, 
examples of talk or events that run counter to the emerging propositions or 
hypotheses, in order to refine them. This type of continuous analysis is almost 
inevitable in qualitative research; because the researcher is ‘in the field’ 
collecting the data, it is impossible not to start thinking about what is being 
heard and seen.” 
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Similarly, Eisenhardt (1989, 546) suggests the need for a similar framework of 
continuous, iterative research, describing the efficacy of a process that is 
“iterative, reflective, (generating) new questions, revisiting… intimately tied with 
empirical evidence.” Alvesson & Sköldberg (2000) observe that, not only are 
research findings an outcome of interpretation and construction, but the acts of 
constructing and analysing data often take place symbiotically, with mental 
relational activity going on in the background, making for a “reflexive” process. 
Similarly, it should be noted, the analysis here involved iteratively returning to the 
information during the writing-up phase of this document as fresh insight was 
developed through the digestive process of writing itself. 
As it was accepted that the iterative research process was both in itself highly 
valuable, and highly adapted to the terrain of the scenario field in general, and to 
the research question in particular, so sequential, iterative use of qualitative 
methods, was endorsed. Once it was established, for reasons discussed above and 
below, that the primary case studies would lay out the terrain of the research (to 
be endorsed or tempered by the project interviews) the sequence more or less 
defined itself: first the cases studies, then further project interviews, all subject to 
continuous revisitation. In the event, through the research process as it occurred 
(between project-document research, case studies, and interviews; and within the 
interview process itself), the iterative nature of qualitative research was 
recognised. That is, the researcher expected and indeed found that information 
collection and assessment activities were not and could not be cleanly 
demarcated, and that themes, concepts and relationships between variables 
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emerged productively in the iterative construction of an emergent theoretical 
framework from the growing observation base gathered in primary research.  
 
1.7.6 Case Studies 
A case study implies in-depth study of a situation, event, or process. It involves 
gathering detailed information about a group or individual, sometimes over a long 
period, to obtain in-depth knowledge of target subjects in context. MacPherson, et 
al. (2000) comment that the study of a single case indicates an interest in its 
uniqueness, and what makes it both alike and dissimilar to comparative examples. 
Van Maanen (1998) determines that instrumental case studies are an “epistemology 
of the particular”, contributing uniquely to knowledge through their description of 
particular actions and specific situations. Hussey & Hussey (1997) describe the case 
study as a detailed examination of a single instance of a phenomenon of interest. It 
is therein an example of a phenomenological methodology, as mentioned above.  
As this depth of description and analysis was required for describing scenario 
process and therein drawing out the themes of the research question (and framing 
the correct questions for the project-document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews that were to follow), the research situation clearly called for the case 
study method. To have carried out the research project without using case studies 
would have left it groundless in describing in meaningful detail how each of the 
observed scenario purpose platforms works in practice, and the methodological 
choices that underpin each. It should be noted that while case studies sometimes 
imply immersion of the researcher on-site and over a long period in the researched 
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environment (along the lines of classic anthropology), this is not necessarily 
required for effective case study. Van Maanen (1998) notes that case study 
researchers may rely on secondary data sources and may make only brief forays 
into field locations, rather than the extensive periods commonly associated with 
ethnography. 
 
1.7.6.1 Types of Case Study 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) define five different types of case study:  
• Exploratory case study: relevant where there are few extant theories or a low 
level of existing knowledge.  
• Descriptive case study: relevant where the objective is restricted to describing 
the current practice.  
• Illustrative case study: relevant where there is need to illustrate new or special 
practices or responses to situations manifested by the studied object or group.  
• Experimental case study: relevant where the researcher examines the difficulties 
in implementing new procedures or techniques in an organisation.  
• Explanatory case study: relevant where the case is used to explain and 
disseminate understanding about the nature of a situation or how a process works.  
 
Within this framework, the case study type used in this research is (a) exploratory, 
(b) illustrative, specifically looking to illustrate scenario purposes and methods in 
practice, and (c) explanatory, looking to disseminate understanding about the 
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nature of each case study’s situation and choices, and how each different process 
works.  
 
1.7.6.2 A Single Case Study vs. Multiple Cases  
There was a further decision to be made, as to whether a single case was required, 
or more than one, and it was clear from the outset that the multiple-case approach 
was more appropriate to this research situation. Given theory-building purpose of 
using the case study method here, and the specific objective of exploring, illustrating 
and analysing two apparently contrasting approaches to scenario building, using a 
single case study (providing no basis for comparison) would not take the research 
forward in any meaningful way. On the other hand, given the illustrative and 
explanatory purpose, there was no need for more than two primary cases, each 
chosen to provide a base for exploring one of the two suspected purpose platforms 
in scenario work. Noting section 1.5.2 above, where the mode of research proposed 
and to be followed in this dissertation is theory-generating in terms of Eisenhardt 
(1989), that is oriented towards building a theory that validly accounts for the 
phenomena observed and studied in response to the research question posed, the 
aim of investigating the case studies was to arrive at theoretical inferences in terms 
of the research question using the in-practice case material—therefore exploratory, 
illustrative and explanatory use of case studies in terms of Hussey and Hussey is 
appropriate. Further corroboration, as necessary, was achieved through comparison 
of the cases with other projects (supplementary cases) via project-document study 
and through expert interviews, as presented in Chapter 4B. 
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1.7.6.3 Choice of Case Study Subjects 
As noted in Section 1.4 above, the researcher had a commitment to using African 
studies (in addition to a mix of international studies) in this research, not only 
because this is appropriate given the background of the researcher and institution 
of study, but also because South African organisations were among the earliest, 
and have been among the most consistent users of scenario work in the world. It 
had also come to the researcher’s notice, while lecturing at the University of Cape 
Town Graduate School of Business, that The Metropolitan Life Foundation had in 
2005 produced an extensive, well-documented and generally meritorious set of 
scenarios (collectively called “Live the Future”) to do with HIV-Aids and the future 
of South Africa.5 At more-or-less the same time (November 2008) the researcher 
was a presenter and participant at an industry foresight conference in London 
where Arup Foresight, a branch of the international firm Arup, presented a report 
on scenarios they had then-recently (mid-2008) developed for a company in 
Tanzania.6 It was apparent to the researcher that these two projects, although 
similar in key ways, and each excellent representations of the scenario method in 
themselves, appeared to manifest different orientations to purpose and contextual 
constraints, and that this difference could be important for theory and practice in 
the field. It made sense therefore to use these two studies as the primary case 
studies.  
                                                 
5 Metropolitan Life (2006). Live the Future: HIV and AIDS Scenarios for South Africa: 2005-2025, Cape 
Town. This is a cluster of documents, including Project Overview; Methodology; and Respond to the 
Challenge, as well as various forms of multimedia, Web, and other forms of public messaging. 
6  Arup Foresight (2008). Eco-Resorts of the Future, Ngurdoto Mountain Lodge, Tanzania. 
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Eisenhardt (1989, 541) comments that building theory from case studies benefits 
from productive juxtaposition: “constant juxtaposition of conflicting realities tends 
to ‘unfreeze’ thinking’”. That is, attempts to reconcile evidence across cases, types 
of data, and different investigators, and between cases and literature, increases 
the likelihood of creative reframing into a new theoretical vision.  
“(One) tactic is to select pairs of cases and then to list the similarities and 
differences between each pair. This tactic forces researchers to look for the 
subtle similarities and differences cases. The juxtaposition of seemingly 
similar cases by a researcher looking for differences can break simplistic 
frames. In the same way, the search for similarity in a seemingly different 
pair also can lead to more sophisticated understanding. The result of these 
forced comparisons can be new categories and concepts which the 
investigators did not anticipate.” 
 
In a similar vein, Pettigrew (1988) comments that it is productive to choose cases 
such as “extreme situations” and “polar types”. In this spirit, cases were chosen 
here for the (theory) generative effect to be achieved via productive juxtaposition. 
In this active selection of primary cases studies, it is noted that cases where not 
chosen randomly. Eisenhardt (1989) adds that random selection is neither 
necessary, nor even preferable (as in traditional, experiment-based, hypothesis-
testing studies which rely on statistical sampling, in which researchers randomly 
select the sample from the population); it is more productive of theory to choose 
cases that are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory. The primary case 
study subjects, as presented in Chapter 4A, were therefore chosen on the basis of 
their methodological excellence, general equivalence, and suggestion of 
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theoretically productive differences, and therein their suitability for the purpose 
of the study.  
In choosing these cases, and carefully studying them, the researcher presents them 
as representative and authentic accounts of the situations studied from which 
theoretical generalisations may be drawn. It is noted that the object of using the 
cases is to develop the theory and practice of scenario planning, rather than to 
develop knowledge about Aids or insurance in South Africa or tourism in Tanzania: 
the cases are not presented or analysed in terms of their underlying topic content. 
They are studied to see if and how apparently equivalent projects differ in ways that 
may be productively understood and applied by scenario planners in organisations 
going forward. It should be noted that an analysis of these contrasting scenario case 
studies was published by the author of this dissertation as “The Uses and Limits of 
Visionary Scenarios: Learning from the African Experience”, in the management 
strategy journal Foresight (Emerald).7  
 
1.7.6.4 Project-document Analysis  
Following the case studies, project-document study of similar alternative scenario 
projects across business, government, and non-profit domains was necessary for a 
number of reasons. Particularly it was necessary to examine a broader archive of 
documented projects in scenario planning (this is over-and-above the methodology 
and history literature surveys presented Chapters 2 and 3 respectively) to see how 
well, if at all, they reflected the comparative paradigm set out by the case studies. 
                                                 
7 Gordon, A. (2011). The Uses and Limits of Visionary Scenarios: Learning from the African 
Experience, Foresight, 13(4), 64–81. 
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Second, the project-document analysis was required to identify appropriate 
candidates for the subsidiary cases studies (studied by semi-structured interview) 
that were to follow. This is a case of, as mentioned above, how the research path of 
the dissertation follows an iterative journey backwards and forwards across case 
studies, project analysis, and interviews.  
As in all research, knowledge of the “population” set of entities from which the 
research sample is drawn, is crucial, as is basis for selection of the sample from it. 
Selection of an appropriate sample controls extraneous variation and frames the 
limits for generalising the findings into theory. The researcher has knowledge of 
(and document possession of) most of the estimated 100+ substantial, documented 
scenario projects to have been undertaken around the world in the last 20 years. 
Where the researcher has not been directly involved, these projects have been 
located primarily through journals, conference proceedings, Internet sources and 
word-of-mouth. In a self-driven research mode that long preceded this specific 
dissertation, the author has collected and continues to collect electronic copies of 
every scenario project write-up document publicly available. For this research 
project, these were gathered, reviewed, and sorted based on apparent purpose 
manifestation, to prioritise those that might further the research question, and 
which would therefore be fertile ground subsidiary case study, and therefore for 
structured interviews. 
 
1.7.6.5 Hermeneutics of the Text 
It is recognised that project-document study is not without its own problems of 
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cognition and interpretation. In this regard the field of hermeneutics, which tackles 
the role of the text in mediating the reader’s encoding and decoding of meaning, is 
relevant, particularly in that it alerts the researcher to the “production” of meaning 
in the negotiation between the reader and the text. Bruner (1990 & 1991), resting 
on a well-established tradition in philosophical hermeneutics that goes back at least 
to Roland Barthes (1975), alerts us to the differences between what may be 
intended in the text and how it may be read. This researcher, who has a strong 
foundational intellectual base in hermeneutics and “discourse theory”, was himself 
well aware of these potential problems and sought to ameliorate them through 
comparative structured interviews with key participants in documented projects, 
and via the triangulation between interpretation of document studies, the primary 
case studies and the semi-structured interviews. 
 
1.7.7 Interviews 
As explained above, interviews were needed as a third source of qualitative study, to 
clarify and corroborate information gathered from project documents with 
reference to subsidiary case studies, and to verify the principal findings of the 
primary case studies. It is to be noted that the primary case studies themselves 
required interviews, so the discussion that follows here incorporates both forms of 
interviews.  
 
1.7.7.1 Survey Method: Advantages and Disadvantages 
One of the key questions of the research project was how best to gather information 
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from field experts about their documented projects, or about experience 
observations they may have in general, that could shed light on the research 
question. One of the time-tested modes of participant (general or expert) 
consultation is the formal survey or questionnaire. This has many advantages as a 
data collection instrument, principle among them being ease and breadth of 
distribution at relatively low cost (even easier and cheaper these days given on-line 
technologies) with subsequent reduction in distribution bias; potential anonymity 
of respondent and subsequent reduction in response bias; sta dardisation of 
questions and subsequent reduction of researcher bias or error; and advantages in 
terms of speed (the researcher can gain many responses simultaneously); allowing, 
for all these reasons, research that evidences the benefits of large sample size. 
In other words, the standardised survey or questionnaire provides an ideal way to 
gather the perceptions of a group of individuals or organisations, particularly where 
a large sample is warranted and possible. However, the research here proceeded 
from an almost diametrically opposite base. Based on project-document write-ups, 
the number of interviewees was a theoretical maximum of about 40, and would 
likely be winnowed down further by the vagaries of who would agree to be 
surveyed or interviewed, such that a large sample was never anticipated. What was 
possible, and highly required, was in-depth discussions with project experts who 
could be asked to intelligently and specifically share their case experience or 
experiences, and in doing so shed light on the research question. This suggested that 
interviews would be more productive that surveys.  
Further, Johns and Lee-Ross (1998) comment that the survey technique generally 
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asks “who, what, how many or where” questions, that is, fact-oriented questions 
(although to some extent simple-form opinions can be gathered, for example via 
Likert-scale analysis). However, what was required in this research project was not 
primarily the facts—which were mostly known or documented already, but an 
understanding of a research subject’s specific professional experience, and his-her 
professional insights into it. It was determined by the researcher that no survey, 
however carefully constructed, could provide the process-introspection that a one-
on-one, in-depth interview would provide, which was essential for generating the 
insights the research project sought. In other words, what was required was not 
static fact data but a dynamic understanding of field professionals as they engaged 
in action, and interaction within the contexts and settings of the projects they had 
developed. Only through eliciting respondents’ rich reflections and perspectives 
could the researcher come to understand how and what kind of interventions 
determined the purpose of field experts in process, and the fit of methods to 
purpose and constraint that the research question seek insight into, so as to derive 
the full benefit of the project expert’s field expertise for research ends. Further, 
Creswell (2002, 206) comments: "One-on-one interviews are ideal for interviewing 
participants who are not hesitant to speak, are articulate, and who can share ideas 
comfortably”, and this condition was certainly fulfilled by the likely interviewees 
who are all high-functioning, successful professionals in the field of scenario 
planning or related fields. All this suggested that interviews would be more 
productive than surveys, and following the logic of the argument, what would be 
most beneficial would be not merely “structured” interviews of the style that asked 
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preconceived questions in a given order (effectively a “live” survey), but interviews 
that had freedom to probe respondents on points of interest as necessary.  
 
1.7.7.2 Structured vs. Unstructured Interviews 
For these reasons it was decided that interviews would be far more productive than 
a survey. Further it was decided that the interviews undertaken would followed a 
semi-structured format, as elaborated below. In this is implied a decision not to use 
completely unstructured interviews. Unstructured interviews are most helpful 
when the research purpose is truly exploratory (unguided by a research question), 
or the interviewer is attempting to map the terrain of a field prior to entering it. As 
this was not the case here, and as the purpose of the interview process was to 
analyse interview responses and compare them to each other, and compare each to 
the project document that originated it, and to the framework of the research 
question itself, it was clear that unstructured interviews would be unhelpful. As 
Leedy and Ormrod (2009) observe, unstructured interviews run the risk of covering 
widely different topic areas, and therein gaining no instructive or usable 
comparative overlap in ground covered, and therefore compromise the ability to 
compare viewpoints to each other and to the terrain under discussion.  
 
1.7.7.3 Semi-structured Interviews 
Counting out both the structured-survey approach and the unstructured interview 
approach, left the researcher with a semi-structured interview framework, where 
the interviewee would be asked to address a standard set of questions, but the 
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interview could follow less structured lines of questioning and interpretation as the 
situation demanded, as outlined by Kvale (1996). The structure, of each interview 
and across the interview process, would be provided by core questions (see Chapter 
4B for question list) but beyond that, the interview would encourage enrichment 
from the interviewee regarding further understanding of the research topic. A 
structure was necessary to make the interviews broadly comparative to each other 
and the research topic, but the possibility of situationally unique questions was 
equally necessary, to allow the interviewer to probe and gather value from areas of 
importance which may not have been evident in advance.  
In this spirit it is noted that Creswell (2002, 208) advises that the interviewer must 
“Have a plan, but be flexible”, and be allowed to follow specific issues from initial 
general questions. Leedy & Ormrod (2010) say it is to be expected that specific 
issues can be raised as the study progresses (from interview to interview) and the 
research issues become better understood. Also, following Feyerabend (1993) who 
says methodological constancy might appear rigorous but can in fact limit the 
penetration of the analysis, the interview question path was adapted where 
necessary, and sometimes improvised, based on the responses of participants to 
gain the highest value from the interview.  
The research presented in this dissertation broadly follows the seven stages of an 
interview investigation (Kvale 1996, 88):   
1. Thematising: Formulate the purpose of the investigation and describe the 
concept of the topic to be investigated before the interviews start.  
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2. Designing: Plan the design of the study, taking into consideration all seven 
stages, before the interview starts.  
3. Interviewing: Conduct the interviews based on an interview guide and 
with a reflective approach to the knowledge sought.  
4. Transcribing: Prepare the interview material for analysis, which 
commonly includes a transcription from oral speech to written text.  
5. Analysing: Decide, on the basis of the purpose and topic of the 
investigation, and on the nature of the interview material, which methods of 
analysis are appropriate.  
6. Verifying: Ascertain the generalisability, reliability, and validity of the 
interview findings. Reliability refers to how consistent the results are, and 
validity means whether an interview study investigates what is intended to 
be investigated.  
7. Reporting: Communicate the findings of the study and the methods 
applied in a form that lives up to scientific criteria, takes the ethical aspects 
of the investigation into consideration, and results in a readable product.  
 
In the event, a framework of standard questions was posed during the interview, in 
the same order, during which, and-or after which, further questions were asked and 
individually tailored as appropriate to the dynamic of the interview and the special 
knowledge and experience of each interviewee. Respondents were specifically 
encouraged to approach the topic through their own methods and concepts (rather 
than respond to the interviewer’s concepts or terminology) and this further 
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suggested a need for a certain question-and-answer freedom and manoeuvrability 
in the interview, as allowed for by the semi-structured interview framework. The 
interviews varied in length, but were on average 45-60 minutes each, including 
setup and post-interview descriptions and clarifications.  
It should be noted that scrupulous efforts were made to mitigate inherent 
limitations to structured-interview findings, throughout the orientation, collection 
and analysis of empirical information interview sessions—by broad selection of 
different types of expert, and attention to respondents’ likely sources of or reasons 
for bias. It was not assumed that practitioners are necessarily able or willing to 
honestly evaluate the validity of their own work, or their own or others' successes 
and failures, or that there are not other obstacles to valid qualitative interview 
findings (for example confidentiality), and attention has been paid to mitigating 
these problems, particularly in formulating a semi-structured approach so as not 
to confront the practitioner with research-positive or -negative loaded questions, 
nor with the direct framewo k of the research question (which could anchor or 
otherwise persuade responses), but rather to elicit interviewees’ views in their 
own words and frameworks, and incorporate this into the broader findings in an 
academically rigorous way.  
 
1.7.7.4 Choice of Interview Participants: Purposive Sampling 
As is discussed above (Section 1.7.6.4), and in the introduction to the interviews in 
Chapter 4B (Section 4.6.), document study preceded choice of interview 
participants. As the interviewees would be selected because of their involvement as 
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patrons or facilitators of representative scenario projects, the selection of 
interviewees in fact devolved to the selection of scenario projects worth 
comparative study (relevant to the cases studied and research question) as 
determined via document analysis. Once a project document suggested the project 
would yield productive study, one or more interviewees who could talk in depth 
about that project was searched for.  
As motivated above, survey-style interviews were not appropriate given (a) the 
small pool of qualified respondents, and (b) the depth of interview required. For the 
same reason, probability-based sampling to find appropriate projects for study was 
also deemed inappropriate, and non-probability sampling, that is, specifically 
“purposive sampling”, was adopted. Purposive sampling is a process in which 
decisions concerning the sample are taken by the researcher, based upon 
judgemental criteria, particularly in judging which study or which interviewee 
would be most likely to contribute valuable data and insights with reference to the 
goal of the research. Patton (1990) states that purposive sampling offers 
researchers a degree of control, particularly in the selection of participants who 
have knowledge or experience of the area being investigated, and so allows focus of 
the research on the most valid and productive sample. It is noted that criticism of 
purposive sampling is, similarly, that it relies on the judgement of the researcher 
and therefore can be prone to researcher bias, especially when compared with 
probability sampling techniques that are designed to reduce such bias. However this 
problem is most apparent when judgements are ill-conceived or poorly adapted to 
the research question. In this case great care was taken to create a sample of 
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projects which (a) offered pertinent insight to the research question and (b) covered 
a broad spectrum of iterations of the method. 
Common types of purposive sampling (Patton, 1990; Kuzel, 1999) suggest 
determining cases to included based on the following criteria: 
 Extreme or deviant cases, used to focus on cases that are special or unusual 
manifestations of the phenomenon of interest 
 Information-rich cases that highlight the phenomenon clearly (but not 
extremely) 
 Maximum variation cases, which represent a wide range of variation along 
dimensions of interest, or capture a wide range of perspectives relating to the 
phenomenon under study (and which may also identify important common 
patterns across variations) 
 Homogeneous cases, which are selected for reduced variation and focus on 
common concerns 
 Typical or paradigmatic cases, which illustrate normal, average or exemplar 
situations 
 Stratified or purposeful cases, which allow focus on characteristics of particular 
subgroups of interest 
 Confirming or disconfirming cases, which allow for elaborating and deepening 
initial analysis, seeking exceptions, or testing variation 
 Critical cases, where a single case, or small number of cases, are decisive in 
investigating the phenomenon of interest 
 Criterion cases, where cases are picked on the basis on meeting a particular 
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criterion or set of criteria 
 Snowball or chain cases, where new cases in the sample are generated by 
determining new relevant cases from interviewees themselves 
 
For the purposes of this study, projects (and then interviewees) were selected to 
contribute projects that were information rich, paradigmatic, and of maximum 
variation—the latter to ensure project choices as a whole were representative of the 
diverse characteristics of the scenario project population as a whole. The basis of 
judgements made as to the purposively selected sample is laid out in Chapter 4B 
(Section 4.6). 
 
1.7.7.5 Number of Interviewees 
In determining the number of interviewees, a balance needed to be struck between 
number or interviewees and depth of interview. Janesick (2000) advises against 
deciding whom to interview based on a pre-determined number of interviews, and 
suggests the aims of the study itself should determine how many and who to 
interview. Alvesson (2003) notes that a high number of interview reports does not 
necessarily guarantee absence of bias: the interview sample, unless truly random, 
may merely capture many people who have undergone a similar training, or who 
are otherwise thinking about their field in the same way. The intention was to 
gather a spread of critical insight from the most illuminating valuable sources in the 
field, as espoused by anthropologist and close associate of the strategic foresight 
field, Mary Catherine Bateson (Bateson, 1989). It is claimed that the research 
represented here is a valid spread of different approaches and “communities of 
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interpretation” (Cunliffe, Luhman, & Boje, 2004), that is, has captured the spread of 
possible interpretation on this topic enough to reliably investigate the research 
question.  
Potential interviewees were contacted by phone and-or email, in which the 
researcher introduced himself (where he was not already known to the subject) and 
his research role as a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Cape Town Graduate 
School of Business, explained the tenor of the research and the reason he had short-
listed the recipient as a possible interview candidate, and requested their 
participation in the form of an interview at a convenient time. It was explained that 
the interview would be semi-structured in the sense of asking identical base 
questions of every interviewee, but also allowing the interview to pursue 
individually productive areas; and was to be recorded, both to facilitate accurate 
representation of the interviewee’s views and to allow the interviewer to think and 
respond unburdened by the need for copious note-taking, particularly in that the 
interviews were to be semi-structured, that is, demanding assiduous “real-time” 
listening and processing of responses and choice of further questions by the 
interviewer.  
 
1.7.7.6 Ethical Considerations 
Although there are no interpersonal ethical issues in this research area with regard 
to personal privacy or consent-to-study, there is in this topic area a need for 
consideration of (a) professional integrity and (b) company-private information and 
non-disclosure. To protect individuals or groups of people involved in the study, the 
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interview request sent to potential study participants therefore disclosed to each 
participant all relevant information as to the purpose of the study and the nature of 
their requested involvement, and notified them that the discussion (and recording 
of it) would be confidential, but that an academic publication in the form of this 
Ph.D. document and potential academically published papers would pertain. 
Interviewees were also told they had the right to be anonymous and have their 
names or statements remain confidential. It is noted that the information sought 
was not of a level of sensitivity such that it was expected that interviewees would 
choose anonymity for themselves or their organisations, as indeed none did. In the 
event of the interviews, inevitably some areas were approached that were “off the 
record”, and the write-up here has respected that wish. It can be stated here that 
nothing of consequence as regards making academic inferences with regards to the 
research question has been compromised in these occasional and very minor 
omissions of detail. 
 
1.7.7.7 Rigour in Evaluating Interviews 
Leedy & Ormrod (2009, 134) comment that subjects’ answers aligns as much “with 
what might or should have happened” as what did happen. For this and many 
reasons of subjectivity and bias, analysing the interview responses provided similar 
hermeneutic challenges to those recorded above in the discussion of project-
document text analysis, and the observations and caveats recorded above were 
again relevant here, particularly recognition of the interpretative role of the 
interviewer (as, of course, present in positivist survey studies too, but not always 
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recognised.) Silverman (1993) advises that there is a potential in qualitative 
research for the researcher to seek confirmation of concepts and theories under 
testing, rather than looking for contradictions and alternatives. Above all, what is 
required is conditions set to validate and maintaining the validity and reliability of 
process, leading to outcomes that recognise but overcome the potential bias or 
vested interest of a qualitative research process. In quantitative research, rigour is 
often created through the repeatability of an experimental process (by the same or 
other researchers.) This form of rigour was not available withi  this research 
project, as it is not available to any researchers within the qualitative research 
process. However, Marshall & Rossman (1995) argue there is no possibility and 
therefore no requirement for qualitative research to be replicable. The best (and 
sufficient) that can be done is render the processes adequately available for 
inspection. In this spirit, the research here—the process by which knowledge is 
arrived at—is made fully accessible to the reader, as reflected in interview 
transcriptions made by the research in Chapter 4B, based on interview audio that 
remains available and subject to inspection. Rigour in the qualitative assessment of 
the interview texts is also achievable through researcher attention to interpretive 
awareness and sensitivity, and in this spirit, recognition of interviewee subjectivity 
and personal or organisational orientation in interview responses is reflected in the 
interview transcriptions.  
 
1.7.7.8 Triangulation  
Another way of adding rigour to qualitative findings and interpretations is by 
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triangulation of findings from a variety of sources or through a variety of 
methodologies. The point of triangulation is to follow independent sources or 
methods that address themselves to the research problem at hand, to see if they all 
return similar results despite differences of process or origin. It is widely held by 
research theorists (Marshall and Rossman 1995; Janesick, 2000; Yin, 2009) that 
triangulation offers a means by which observations and interpretation can be 
validated by cross-checking results or interpretations using multiple methods. 
According to Golafshani, (2003), triangulation does not necessarily require using 
completely different research methods; it can be achieved by using different data 
collection or analysis processes. For instance, he suggests that validity and 
reliability is achieved if a case study observes, interviews, and records. The case 
studies in the following chapter were created similarly, via document-analysis, 
interviews, and careful recording of evidence. More generally, the triangulation 
approach was pertinent in this study: indeed the study was built from the ground up 
to create triangulation by finding and comparing multiple sources of information 
across sources that ranged from project-documents, to case studies, to interviews, 
across project types and respondent types; that is, specifically avoiding dependence 
on a single information collection method or type of source.  
Janesick (1998) lists five basic types of triangulation, four of which are attributed to 
Denzin (1989): 
 Data triangulation: the use of a variety of sources of data in a study  
 Investigator triangulation: several researchers or observers are used 
 Theory triangulation: various theoretical perspectives are used to interpret the 
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data  
 Methodological triangulation: the use of multiple strategies within a method or 
different methods to study a single problem  
 Interdisciplinary triangulation: use of different disciplines to broaden 
understanding of method and substance. 
 
In this research, investigator and theory triangulation were not applicable. There 
was only one investigator and therefore no possibility of triangulating findings in 
project-study or interviews. Similarly, while the researcher was specifically looking 
to avoid applying any theory or theoretical bias, such bias of theoretical perspective 
that may tacitly have existed could not be triangulated owing to the presence of just 
one researcher. On the other hand, data, method, and interdisciplinary triangulation 
were achieved by (a) choosing project-document from across the scenarios field, 
and similarly (b) interviewing subjects from different backgrounds and 
perspectives. 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Review 
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2.1 Overview 
This chapter reviews the pertinent literature and key debates in the academic 
literature pertaining to scenario planning, as applicable to the research terrain and 
purpose of study outlined in Chapter 1. The perceived benefits and limits, and best 
uses of scenario approach in general, with reference to shortcomings of existing 
forecasting and planning models and allied organisational failure are elaborated, 
and issues relating to the categorisation of alternative scenario methods are 
reflected upon and are related to the research question. Academic criticisms of 
various elements of scenario planning are reflected, along with an allied discussion 
of current typologies of scenario planning, which readies us for the case studies and 
interviews ahead—that investigate real-world scenario practice as a basis for 
advancing these debates via advancing understanding the framing conditions of 
alternative purpose platforms and constraint conditions in limiting the extent of 
scenario validity and therefore best use of scenario approaches. The following 
chapter (Chapter 3) takes a longitudinal view of the history and evolution of 
scenario planning, which is necessary to complete the academic context upon which 
to develop the findings and argument of the dissertation. 
 
In proceeding with this theory review, the researcher notes the proliferation of 
debates and taxonomies, and justifications thereof, in the scenario planning field, 
and how the literature reveals a large number of different and, at times, conﬂicting 
deﬁnitions, characteristics, principles and overlapping methodologies—as reflected 
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by Bradford et al (2005, 796), who describe the field is one of “methodological 
chaos”, and Dator (2009b) who notices considerable confusion within the futures 
field (generally) about the meaning of terms—and concurs with these authors and 
others who have remarked that there appears to be virtually no area in scenarios on 
which there is wide-spread consensus. Mason (1994) observes that the term 
“scenario” has become as ill-deﬁned as the term “strategy”. According to Khakee 
(1991), few techniques have given rise to so much confusion as scenarios. The 
situation is not helped in part due to the broad church of underlying foresight and 
decision-enhancement practices that claim a relationship with the scenario method, 
including planning, forecasting, organisational learning, scanning, and visioning, and 
further because the methodology is inserted into a broad set of work streams, 
including innovation, strategy, risk assessment, and crisis management. Desmerais 
(2000, 82) observes that in a single book Schwartz (1991) uses the following broad 
dispersion of overlapping and potentially contradictory definitions of scenarios:  
 “A tool for ordering one's perceptions about alternative future environments 
in which one's decisions might be played out,  
 A set of organized ways for us to dream effectively about our own future,  
 Stories built around carefully constructed plots that make the significant 
elements of the world stand out boldly, and  
 Vehicles for helping people learn.”  
 
and notes that this confluence of different definitions is a source of confusion for 
practicing managers. Burt (2010) observes it is possible to derive a range of views 
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of scenario planning, from scenarios-as-grounded-speculation to scenarios-as-
organisational learning, to scenarios-as-sense-making and becoming, and notes “the 
confusion in the literature between these views does not help managers.”(2010, 
491).  
Understanding the field as fairly young and emerging, with attendant theoretical 
“chaos” is the first step on the road to achieving the aims of this chapter, which is to 
encapsulate the key dimensions of the debates that exist in the academic literature, 
and relate this to the research question, in order to provide the academic context for 
presenting and analysing the research that follows. In the next section (2.2), the 
commonly held benefits of scenario planning are considered; Section 2.3 looks at 
problems perceived in the method, and Section 2.4 reflects discussion of scenario 
typologies and taxonomies. Section 2.5 relates these dimensions to the research 
question.  
 
2.2 Purposes and Benefits of Scenarios 
The purpose and benefits of scenarios are various and closely intertwined. In 
enumerating these benefits, as described in the practitioner and academic literature, 
two choices have been made. First, there is close focus on the original statement of a 
benefit, to avoid repetition where the original has been much-repeated over time; 
second the benefits and purposes are parsed into various separate sections, but the 
clear understanding is that these are tightly interrelated: for example, challenging 
mental models is a facet of organisational learning and it is intrinsic to achieving 
decision robustness—however these features are, for clarity, dealt with in separate 
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sections here. It is also necessary to say here, by way of introduction, that accuracy 
of scenarios with regard to the actual outcome of events (prediction correctness) is, 
following universal consensus in the literature for reasons explained below, not 
suggested as a benefit of the process. Accurate prediction is impossible in a system 
of any real complexity. Scenario work perceives predictive success, where it occurs, 
as lucky happenstance, and instead counts success rather in ability to correctly 
identify forces of change and conceptualise in advance the resultant spread of 
alternative future outcomes, none of which is predicted.  
 
2.2.1. Strategic Effectiveness and Decision Enhancement 
This section discusses the benefit that scenario planning offers in enhancing the 
perception of and responsiveness to emerging challenges, including improving 
decision processes, avoiding surprises and generating robust strategies. The benefit 
of innovation and ideation is discussed in Section 2.2.2 below. 
 
2.2.1.1 The Limits of Quantitative Forecasting 
In order to understand the strategic effectiveness of scenario planning it is 
necessary to address the limits of quantitative approaches thinking about the future. 
As described in the next chapter, scenario planning emerged as a revolutionary 
method of doing industry foresight because its raison d’etre ran counter to existing, 
traditional, quantitative planning approaches. The 1960s and 1970s were the 
heyday of classic “long-range planning”, where foresight was typically the province 
of a head-office strategic planning department whose culture of thinking ahead was 
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to research statistical trends in recorded data and make forecasts by extrapolating 
and modelling data. The founding premise of this approach was that planners could 
make accurate predictions of the future (at least better than those of their 
competitors) based on good data and good systems to forward-model it. This 
transitioned into planning by mathematically evaluating and ranking decision 
alternatives against decision objectives, the aim being to find a quantitatively 
verified “best option”, that provided the highest value future at the lowest risk.  
The method allows for some uncertainty, via the introduction of probability, and 
part of the role of the analysis is to verify having correctly determined the 
probability distribution of future events: the predicted future being, by definition, 
the most probable. It retains, however, the fundamental assumption that the future 
will resemble the present along important dimensions (typically slightly better or 
slightly worse), which is always implied when using past-data extrapolative 
modelling as future-predictive. On this issue, renowned strategy theorist Henry 
Mintzberg has said (1993) that predictive forecasting embraces “the fallacy of 
predetermination”. Conway (2005) suggests that in strategic planning the “authority 
of the past” is dominant. Insights about the future derived from data about the past 
and present do not take into account what might happen, only what has happened, 
and what is happening. Various commentators have observed that without 
explorations of the future to deal with possible (new) realities, strategic planning 
rests on an “official future” based on the present. This appears to be a satisfactory 
mode of planning—until unexpected events undermine the foresight completely. 
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Expanding on the implications of this, then Head of Group Planning at Royal Dutch 
Shell, Pierre Wack (1985a, 73) comments: 
“Forecasts are not always wrong; more often than not, they can be reasonably 
accurate. And that is what makes them so dangerous. They are usually 
constructed on the assumption that tomorrow's world will be much like 
today's. They often work because the world does not always change. But 
sooner or later forecasts will fail when they are needed most: in anticipating 
major shifts in the business environment that make whole strategies obsolete.” 
 
2.2.1.2 Determinism and Irreducible Complexity 
To fully understand the role of scenarios in compensating for the failures of 
predictive modes of foresight, it is necessary to consid r more fully what predictive 
planning models are actually up against—which causes them to fail in situations of 
medium or high uncertainty. This is the problem of irreducible system complexity 
and the inherent inability of deterministic prediction to adequately capture future 
elaborations of current complexity. The author of this thesis has written (Gordon, 
2010) that future-predictive systems fail because they endorse the fallacious 
assumption that human and social situations are deterministic, that is, situations 
where the same inputs under the same conditions will always lead to the same 
outcomes—that fixed relationships determine the relationship between present and 
future states, as occurs commonly in the pure sciences. In other words, in much of 
pure science and biology, given certain starting conditions and known forces, a 
future outcome event is determined: if we heat water to a hundred degrees Celsius, 
it will boil. In the 18th century, social theorists thought the laws of human behaviour 
were similarly deterministic—that a "science of society" was possible—and they set 
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about uncovering these laws. It has since become clear many times over that 
deterministic laws governing human society don’t exist. Drawing a line under this 
science-of-society debate, philosopher Karl Popper pronounced, in the preface to his 
The Poverty of Historicism (1957): “There can be no prediction of the course of 
human history by scientific or any other rational methods... We must reject the 
possibility of social science that would correspond to theoretical physics.” 
Attention to the problem of accounting for multifactorial situations and complex 
interactions between many often not fully known or understood variables, and how 
this renders extrapolative predictions impossible, is provided by Duncan (1992), 
where he categorises the intractable issues that must be solved to get to reliable 
modelling algorithms—and therein good predictions—into four categories: Shape, 
Thresholds, Interactions, and Lag. 
• Shape refers to the mathematical form of the relationship between input 
variables and outputs (the future predicted). In reality the shape may be 
anything on a continuum between a simple straight-line relationship to one 
that requires half a page of algebra to account for it. 
• Thresholds are discontinuities in relationships, the points where the effect of 
an input factor suddenly changes. All values below a threshold may be zero, 
but above the threshold the input factor influences outcomes suddently and-or 
greatly, and may cause a system to change entirely or collapse. Similar 
attention to the confounding roles of thresholds is offered by Batchelor (2009) 
in discussion of catastrophe-theory models, where a key variable falling below 
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a critical value leads the whole system to respond in a way not predicted by a 
linear model. 
• Interactions are present when the effect of a factor depends on the values of 
one or more of the other factors. This is the "everything affects everything" 
problem, where ability to forecast is commensurately reduced as the number 
of interconnections and interactions rises. 
• Lag takes place when output is affected not by the current value of a factor 
but by an earlier or later value, raising the problem of how far back to go in 
considering the future effect of input factors. (Lag itself may be subject to 
interactive or threshold effects.) 
 
Duncan reflects that, in any social system (non-deterministic system), each of these 
four categories of factors is unknowable in itself, let alone in combination with each 
other, making outcome possibilities effectively unlimited, and therefore prediction 
impossible for any complex system. Other ways of expressing irreducible 
complexity have also gained currency. In a famous early formulation, Rittel and 
Webber (1973) proposed the concept of intractable “wicked problems” in 
describing situations that have incomplete, ill-defined, or contradictory 
interdependent variables. (For a normal problem there are solutions—which may 
be difficult to find; for a wicked problem there are no solutions.) In the 1980s, 
chaos-theory analysts such as Gleick (1987) postulated immense sensitivity to 
changes in initial conditions, the so-called “butterfly effect” where events can lead to 
widely differing outcomes when fully played out. A chance word or stray bullet can 
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change history. As billions of small changes are happening around us all the time, it 
is therefore impossible to predict future outcomes to any reasonable standard of 
performance. In this, scenario planning is very much a kindred spirit of the Chaos 
and Complexity theories that gathered steam from the 1980s, sharing the 
perspective that, for all future analysis beyond the short term, the multiplicity of 
forces that shape the future and the complexity of their interactions make the 
relationship between cause and effect in complex systems effectively unfathomable, 
and therefore unpredictable. Ogilvy (1992, 41) tartly sums up what the foresight 
field has learnt in this regard: “ Forget about the laws-and-causes approach toward 
a predictive science.”  
The theoretical literature is therefore unambiguous and definitive in establishing 
the irreducible complexity of human and social situations, and therefore their 
irreducible unpredictability. This has enormous implications for organisational 
planning, for those who are willing to see them. Pre-eminent in this regard was 
Wack who argued (1985a) the way forward for managers is not to attempt to do 
better forecasting. No single "right" projection can be deduced from past behaviour. 
Too many forces work against the possibility of getting the right forecast. The 
challenge is to accept uncertainty, try to understand it, and make it part of 
management thinking. In other words, the planning process must be congruent with 
an unpredictable world: it must be a non-predictive investigation of important 
uncertainties facing the organisation, which embraces complex and multifaceted 
situations rather than wishing them away. Briggs et al (2007) comment that 
scenario analysis has emerged as a particularly useful tool for considering the 
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complex linked development trajectories of ecosystems, ecosystem management, 
and human well-being, also known as social-ecological systems, that is, systems at 
an extreme level of complexity. 
 
2.2.1.3. Overcoming Decision Failure 
The role scenario planning may play in promoting better management decisions has 
been prominent throughout the history of communicating scenario purposes and 
benefits. Kahn (1967, 6) defined scenarios as “hypothetical sequences of events 
constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision-
points”; Godet (1996, 164) citing the “futuribles” of Bertrand de Jouvenel, described 
the rationale of scenarios as “to illuminate the choices of the present in the light of 
'possible futures',” while Parson et al. (2007, 1) calls scenarios “a description of 
potential future conditions, developed to inform decision-making under 
uncertainty.” Moving the debate further, Van der Heijden et al. (2002) draw the link 
between planning failure and real-world organisation failure, citing the 
“Sharpbenders” research of Grinyer et al (1989). Commenting on this research, van 
der Heijden et al. determine that failure in businesses (or organisations of any type) 
occurs for one or both of two different fundamental reasons. The first is operations 
failure, that is, failure to successfully implement a good decision because of poor 
execution. This is sometimes known as “hygiene failure”. The other type of failure is 
failure of strategic direction and-or timing. Here an enterprise is operationally 
excellent but fails because it proceeds in the wrong strategic direction (or the right 
direction at the wrong time). Failures of direction and timing occur when senior 
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managers miss changes in their operating environment. What worked yesterday no 
longer works today, which in turn implies a lack of management acknowledgement 
or exploration of contextual changes, and-or poor understanding of how these 
impact the sector environment. A shift in the operating environment makes whole 
strategies obsolete no matter how well executed.8  
As described above, classic strategic planning strongly implies linearity and 
incremental change. It is therefore unsuitable in preparing managers for significant 
category- or step-change in the external (market, or technology, or legislative, or 
industry) environment. In practice, it is therefore unsurprising that predictive 
strategic planning, and point-forecasting, has been associated with failure to foresee 
contextual shifts—direction-and-timing failure—not only at Shell, as described in 
Chapter 3, but in many similar corporations. In a move that has become the iconic 
event in the history of strategic planning, Jack Welch, when he became CEO of 
General Electric in 1981, fired the strategic planning staff and scrapped the 
company’s strategic planning function altogether. Conway (2005), citing Sidorowicz 
(2000), comments that the apparent failure of corporate strategy even after 
extensive planning, and the inability of many organisations to read signals in the 
external environment, implies existing planning models fall short in concept as well 
as execution. Moreover, predictions of this sort have been shown not only to fail in 
complex environments, but to fail by many orders of magnitude, particularly when 
                                                 
8 One of many similar examples is the case of Fiat Auto, a successful car company in tariff-protected, 
Cold-War Europe, which found itself surprised and confounded by tariff protection changes in its 
operating environment after the end of the Cold War in1990. The nature of the operating 
engagement changed very significantly, Fiat was unprepared for this, the company all but collapsed 
and 15 years later has only finally recovered. “Fiat Auto: The Italian Giant in Trouble”, ICFAI Centre 
for Management Research. Business Case Study 303-085-1. 
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looking beyond the short term (Schnaars, 1989; Sherden 1997).9 All this suggests 
the foresight approach itself, rather than its execution, is wrong—and has directly 
informed the rise of “anti-predictive” foresight—of which scenario planning is the 
most evolved and well-known manifestation. It is therefore fair to say that scenario 
planning was born as a response to the failure of point forecasting, as a remediation 
of existing ways of planning. (Ogilvy, 2002; van der Heijden, 1996; van der Heijden 
et al., 2002).10  
 
2.2.1.4 Promoting Strategic Robustness 
Van der Heijden et al (2002) describe the benefits of the scenario method in terms 
of a “wind tunnel” (such as may be used in aerodynamic engineering). Each scenario 
is a wind tunnel for an organisation’s strategy and decision-making, meaning 
whatever decisions, intentions, or options are pending may be tested in each 
scenario “as if” enacting them in that future operating environment, to see if they 
would be good decisions or otherwise generally stand up to the demands of that 
future, were it to emerge. In this formulation of scenario benefit, scenarios are the 
articulation of different paths along which future may unfold, so that managers can 
explore implications and consequences, and so avoid surprises and create or exploit 
opportunities or design strategies that are robust against a range of potential 
outcomes (none of which are predicted). In fact, scenarios point up robust decisions: 
                                                 
9  For detailed studies of forecasting hubris, see Gordon, A., “Future Savvy”, Amacom, 2009; also 
Schnaars. S., “Megamistakes”, Free Press, 1989; and Sherden, W., “The Fortune Sellers”, Wiley, 1997. 
10
 Ratcliffe (2002) observes the increasing interest in the scenario methodology as part of a wider 
attention given to techniques and approaches that embrace complexity and eschew determinism, 
such as Delphi technique, cross-impact matrices, environmental scanning, systems thinking, network 
analysis and simulation modelling. 
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by definition those that would lead to successful outcomes in each of the full 
spectrum of envisaged different future scenarios are robust decisions. Robustness-
testing against alternative scenarios makes strategic decisions as "future-proof" as 
possible, including showing where necessary hedges and insurances need to be put 
in place. Robust strategies may be assessed either qualitatively (van der Heijden, 
1996; Mercer, 1997; Dewar, 2002), or quantitatively (e.g. Lempert et al., 2004, 
modelling environmental robustness to climate change scenarios).  
Cornelius et al, in “Three Decades of Scenario Planning in Shell” (2005, 99) give 
insight into how this wind-tunnelling process works in practice:  
“With the global scenarios setting the macro-economic framework, the 
strategic funnel is then narrowed further by analyzing demand trends in 
individual energy markets and the strategic behavior of Shell's competitors… 
At the project level, it must be demonstrated that a particular investment is 
sufﬁciently robust against both the global scenarios and the supporting 
focused scenario. For instance, could abrupt changes in the regulatory 
framework make a project obsolete? To what extent could changes in the 
geopolitical landscape affect production and transportation? To what extent 
could demand shifts affect the economics of a project?” 
 
2.2.2. Innovation: Stimulating New Ideas 
Robustness is the defensive aspect of preparing an organisation for step changes 
and surprise events. The flip side is taking advantage of such changes to create new 
initiatives. Wack (1985b, 146) refers to this use of scenarios as “entrepreneurial—
discovering strategic options of which one was previously unaware". According to 
van der Heijden et al. (2002, 22) overcoming thinking limitations through 
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developing multiple futures is a competitive advantage to the firm in that it enables 
“businesses to avoid conventional approaches that may be easily predicted and 
parried by a competitor, allowing new business ideas to be invented instead.” Burt & 
van der Heijden (2003) propose that the idea of multiple futures naturally stretches 
and widens managers’ viewpoints and opens up the possibility to explore 
imaginatively the possible impact of contextual driving forces in the markets, which 
is impossible to achieve if only one forecast is tabled. The enhanced perception of 
potential future operating environments stimulates management to determine best 
responses for each, some of which may inspire new offerings or new business 
models, or engender innovation along other dimensions. 
 
2.2.2.1 Reification 
The attribute of the scenario process that directly fosters innovative thinking is the 
“reality” of scenarios. In contrast to standard planning numbers and graphs, 
scenarios tell stories with characters, events and timelines. In this, the process 
provides a reification of elements that usually remain abstract in other forms of 
planning. It also draws many complex elements into one narrative, which perforce 
leaves out many items that would clutter delivery of the message. In this, scenarios 
achieve clarity of communication compared with the abstraction and at times 
paradoxical detail that hampers many conventional planning formats. In strategy 
there is always a balance to be struck between detail and perspective, and scenarios, 
which are vehicles of perspective, reify abstract planning situations to decision-
makers, making future possibilities seem more “real” than trend lines or numbers 
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on a page. These attributes of the scenario process often lead to an “aha” moment, 
where decision-makers suddenly arrive at a composite understanding of the 
elements and demands of a new (future) environment because they have effectively 
been inserted into it. This immersion stimulates opportunities assessment and 
creative-innovative responses thereto. Burt & van der Heijden (2003) relate this 
innovativeness to the greater conﬁdence in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity 
that scenarios provide: a confidence that derives from having “experienced” 
important dimensions of the future operating environment.  
 
2.2.2.2 Empowering Non-dominant Voices 
Many organisations struggle to fully harness their internal resources in the sense of 
unlocking what employees and stakeholders know, particularly where this 
knowledge threatens conventional wisdom or entrenched power blocs. Roxburgh 
(2009) remarks that in large corporations there is typically a very strong status-quo 
bias: large amounts of time and money, and many senior executives’ entire careers 
may have been invested in the core assumptions underpinning a current strategic 
path, which means that challenging it is unwelcome. Scenarios, however, allow 
companies to break out of this trap by providing a freedom (the freedom of a 
hypothetical future), to propose new operating environments in which current 
management assumptions are no longer valid. This allows an organisational “safe 
haven” for contrarian or creative thinking.   
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2.2.3. Challenging Mental Models 
Whether improving management decisions through promoting robustness to 
change and surprise, or through promoting identification of innovation 
opportunities, scenarios play a key role in challenging managers’ mental models. 
Managers operate from maps or models in their heads about how the world works 
(Wack 1985a). These maps are helpful when they are accurate representations of 
reality, but dangerous when they are incomplete or inaccurate. In Wack’s terms, 
scenarios drive managers towards a “reperceiving” of present conditions. He wrote 
(1985a, 84):  
“Scenarios deal with two worlds; the world of facts and the world of 
perceptions. They explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside the 
heads of decision-makers. Their purpose is to gather and transform 
information of strategic significance into fresh perceptions.” 
  
The inherent multiplicity of outcomes that are implied in alternative scenarios is in 
itself a challenge to any “groupthink” consensus about the future operating 
environment that may exist in the minds of managers. In other words, a manager’s 
“default scenario” is cast as just one outcome among many. The manager becomes 
aware of the key assumptions that underlie his or her expected future, exposing 
blind spots that might otherwise be overlooked. Following Weiner & Brown (1997) 
this researcher, (Gordon, 2011) has written that alternative scenarios help to 
overcome managers’ “educated incapacity”, that is, the paralysis of default-scenario 
perspectives and business-as-usual assumptions that assails industry insiders. They 
also specifically widen perceptions of factors relevant to an enterprise’s success to 
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include those that lie outside the day-to-day organisational and industry concerns, 
challenging the comfortable notion of profiling the future by varying one or two 
known key variables—that is merely effect a “sensitivity analysis”. Hamel and 
Prahalad (1994a) describe how most managers focus their time inwardly, and on 
day-to-day events. Burt and v.d.Heijden (2003) remark that this inward-looking and 
problem-solving mindset is exacerbated in a turbulent business environment, or 
crisis management situation, where management copes by ﬁltering out much of 
what is going on outside the organisation (where the largest threats and 
opportunities lie). Scenario planning addresses these problems by refocusing 
management attention onto exogenous factors, and therefore towards preparedness 
at this level.  
 
2.2.3.1. Memories of the Future 
Cognitive psychologist and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman (2011) summarises a 
long tradition in psychology that recognises that the human mind is far more likely 
to perceive phenomena it has been primed towards. Multiple studies have shown 
that, for example, a person has been shown an image of an ice-cream is more likely 
to remember the words “cold” and “ice” and “milk” and so on, in a random list, than 
a person shown a picture of a baseball cap. In the same way, scenario planners 
beginning with Wack, and through the Shell Group Planning tradition and beyond, 
have considered scenarios to be valuable primers—once managers have seen a 
potential future evolution, they will be more ready and able to see it early and 
clearly if and when it begins to evolve in reality. Mental rehearsals or “memories of 
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the future” function therefore as cognitive priming that helps managers pick up 
subtle cues from the environment where they may not have otherwise seem to have 
had relevance, and so enhance management’s early and correct cognition of changes 
in the operating environment. Wendell Bell’s latest book “Memories of the Future” 
(2012) makes the case for the role images of the future play in shaping the future 
that emerges.  
 
2.2.4. Strategic Conversation and Organisational Learning 
A commonly perceived benefit of scenario making is its virtue in surfacing 
important discussions among decision makers. In this regard, scenarios (both the 
construction and use of) are seen to provide a vehicle for structuring and facilitating 
participation in collective thinking, shared sense-making, building a shared 
understanding of key concerns including a deep understanding of business 
environment drivers, developing a common strategic language, and aligning and 
communicating strategic perspectives across the organisation and beyond (Biggs et 
al, 2007). Further, it is commonly held that through scenario thinking, managers 
may also better be able to locate the source of disagreements that often occur 
because they are envisaging and making decisions based on different scenarios of 
the future without realising it. In the terms of van der Heijden (2005), the increased 
knowledge sharing and communication among managers is referred to as an 
enhancement of “the strategic conversation”.  
This benefit is closely tied with the process of developing a “learning” organisation, 
in the sense encapsulated by Senge (1990). The alignment of scenario process and 
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organisational learning runs solidly though scenario theory, most clearly articulated 
by Shell executive Arie de Geus in his book “The Learning Organisation” (1988). 
Within the learning perspective, some analysts even see the actual product of a 
scenario planning exercise (the scenarios output itself) as less important than the 
discussions that must have happened in order for them to be created. The 
implication is even if the scenarios are of low value as forward-planning resources 
in themselves, this does not nullify the utility of the method because valuable 
conversations will nevertheless have been had, thus the quality of the strategic 
conversation will still have been improved. Desmerais (2000) citing (Fiol & Lyles, 
1985) sounds a cautionary note that despite general consensus about the idea of 
organisational learning and its critical role in developing a strategic fit between an 
organisation and its environment, organisational learning is its own considerable 
and complex field, and no model of organisational learning is widely accepted.  
 
 
2.2.5 Aspirational Benefits 
There is a significant body of work that sees the benefit of scenarios in facilitating 
the emergence of a vision of a better future for an organisation or its stakeholders, 
or society at large, and inspiring actions towards it on the part of the organisation or 
a collection of stakeholders.11 While still outlining a non-predicted spectrum of 
plausible situations that could emerge, i.e. not predicting the future, aspirational (or 
                                                 
11
 This body of work has most clearly been articulated in various essays since the 1980s by Jay Ogilvy, 
the most important of which are collected in “Facing the Fold”, Triarchy Press (Ogilvy, 2011). 
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“visionary” or “normative”)12 scenario planning particularly orients itself in 
describing how a desirable (or undesirable) future can emerge from the present. 
Ogilvy (2002) presents this purpose of scenario planning in the context of how the 
world is changing, and how interest groups of all kinds can and do shape the future, 
and therefore how it can be changed for the better (guided by a preferred future). In 
an earlier work he comments: “The point is not to predict and say, yes it will, or, no 
it won't. The point is to imagine what it might be like as a way of anticipating 
possible moves for the human spirit. 1992, 31). Bezold (2009a; 2009b) has coined 
the term “aspirational futures” to describe the use of foresight tools, including 
scenario methods, in articulating a group or institution’s preferred outcomes. 
Jerome Glenn  (2003, 4), Head of the United Nations Millennium Project summarises 
this approach to scenario-based foresight this way:  
“Although it is not possible to know the future, it is possible to influence 
elements of it. The forces of nature, social and political dynamics, scientific 
discovery, and technological innovation largely determine the future. However, 
human choice increasingly shapes the future.”  
 
Similarly, Ratcliff, (2003) sees scenarios as a tool for discussing and weighing 
preferred outcomes, which allows different stakeholders to further their agendas 
                                                 
12
 As has been noted in Chapter 1, scenario planning is a fairly young discipline. One of the 
implications is that the terms for different aspects of the discipline are unstandardised. “Normative 
scenarios” is a term developed by the French school, Berger, de Jouvenel, and Godet, as described in 
the next chapter, to refer to scenarios of the aspirational or visionary or advocacy type. Due to 
inherent definitional slippage and confusion over the term “normative” in English, this term has lost 
the currency it once had. As explained in Chapter 1, this dissertation has evolved the compound term 
visionary-advocacy to refer to aspirational scenario work, but in this literature review section 
(Section 2.2.5), the terms “visionary” and “aspirational” and “normative” are used, to remain close to 
the literature and to avoid possible error of assumption as to the academic intentions of other 
theorists.  
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and their respective hopes and fears in defining the preferred outcome for the 
organisation. In other words, this category of scenario benefit prioritises the 
question “what do we want?” rather than “what could happen?” and works towards 
clarity and consensus on actions which will bring the desired future closer. In this, 
scenarios are also seen to foster comprehension of and empathy towards other 
stakeholder groups’ visions for tomorrow, and part of the benefit of the method, as 
applied in a visionary or aspirational way is that the process demands and facilitates 
a conversation amongst possibly divergent stakeholders, and similarly demands and 
facilitates discussions about what the goal of the organisation (or wider group) 
should be going forward. To this end, scenario practice can be used to draw together 
groups who hold potentially divergent interests to collaborate towards narratives 
that inspire hope or represent consensus aspirations and consciously sets out to 
negotiate and articulate a collective, collaborative view of a preferred outcome, 
which finds resolution in forward momentum towards influencing the future in the 
direction toward this outcome. Markley (2007; 2012) has developed “guided 
cognitive imaging” techniques that allow individuals or groups to develop mental 
images of preferred outcomes. 
Among the practitioners most closely associated with developing scenarios to 
manifest this benefit is Adam Kahane, who was the facilitator of the “nation-
building” Mont Fleur scenarios in South Africa in 1992, among others. Kahane 
(2001, 1) states:  
“The purpose of a civic scenario project is to build the leadership to change 
the course of a country's history. A group of influential leaders—a microcosm 
of the society, representing all the principal stakeholders—works together to 
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uncover what has happened, is happening, might happen, and should happen 
in their country, and what they must do—what they cannot not do—to enact 
that vision. Through a structured process of action and reflection, with each 
other and with other societal leaders, they build the shared understanding 
and commitment necessary to bring forth a better future.”  
 
It is for this reason that one of the hallmarks of visionary scenarios is widespread 
publication and dissemination: to publicly disperse the shared preferred outcome as 
widely as possible, as discussed following the findings of the research presented in 
this dissertation, in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.2).  
Kahane (2001; 2010) has isolated a number of common core benefits associated 
with the larger visionary-aspirational benefit: 
 Broadened networks of relationships. Future influence and societal change 
cannot be effected by one person or institution alone. To gather the 
resources for this kind of change requires broad alliances, which in turn 
implies a shared perspective: a common mental model and common ground 
in aspirations. The scenario process helps build this shared understanding 
and common ground.  
 Building consensus and shared commitment to the future. Scenarios of 
this form give stakeholder representatives a role in planning. Because a 
number of possible futures are created and many perspectives can be 
included, the discussion can move beyond current fixed positions. The 
process forces decision-makers to merge their thinking about the future and 
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promotes dialogue in articulating and sharing outputs with others who have 
different perspectives. 
 Regenerated energy and commitment. Achieving collective forward 
movement requires energy, which in turn requires hope. Scenario benefit 
may therefore be understood as manifesting and-or aiming to rekindle 
aspirational hopes.  
 
2.2.5.1 Aspiration as Social Critique 
Visionary or aspirational scenario orientation and benefit, as reflected in the 
literature, is more than “just another” benefit category. In fact, it is often presented 
as counterpoint to other approaches in scenario work (or the foresight field more 
generally). Emblematic of this is Slaughter (2002, 28) who develops the notion of 
Critical Future Studies as a critique of the “American mainstream empirical 
tradition”, particularly: 
 “its superficiality and lack of depth; 
 its failure to recognise the roles of language, power and embedded social 
interests; 
 its lack of understanding of its own sources and grounding; 
 its routine appropriation (not only in the USA) by the powerful; 
 its over-confidence in easy prescriptions; and 
 its lack of openness to other traditions and other ‘ways of knowing’.” 
 
Slaughter argues that standard approaches to scenario building “tend to accept 
current social reality as unproblematic, as just ‘being there’. They lack any notion of, 
or means of, operationalising critique or critical awareness. This means that 
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scenarios are readily assimilated into existing power structures, with all their 
inequities and dysfunctions, without anyone being aware of the fact.” (2002, 28) 13. 
To escape this, scenarios need to evolve from “an attempt to explore diversity 
within the forward view” to “’Social Constructed Futures’ that consciously and 
deliberately lead toward more humanly viable futures than those currently in 
prospect.” (2002, 30). A manifestation of social rather than individual construction 
is a key part of the transition to values-based foresight: the preferred outcome is 
one arrived at by consensual rather than individual (including individual company 
or organisation) process, that is, requires progress along such a path from individual 
to social capacity (Slaughter, 1996b). Ogilvy (1992) develops a similar position in 
describing the power of normative scenarios in their ability to articulate the force of 
widely accepted values and so transcend the relativity of individual opinion.  
 
2.2.5.2 Aspirational Benefits in Context 
It will be seen, as emerges from the research conducted, as presented in the 
following chapters and consolidated in the argument (Chapter 6), that the 
aspirational benefit of scenario planning is more than merely an additional benefit 
in a spectrum, but forms an alternative broader category of benefit in the sense 
that pursuing it comes at partial “cost”, or at least reorientation from, other 
benefits. At this stage, within the literature review, it is pertinent to record that the 
differences between broader benefit categories is reasonably commonly 
understood and reflected in the literature. For example, Borjeson et al., (2006, 86), 
                                                 
13
 Slaughter (2002) includes Causal Layered Analysis (Inayatullah, 1998) as an allied method in the 
Critical Future Studies critique. 
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within a broader analysis of scenarios orientation into various multiple categories, 
names “External” and “Normative” as two of the categories, in an explanation as 
follows:  
“External scenarios focus only on factors beyond the control of the relevant 
actors. They are typically used to inform strategy development of a planning 
entity. Policies are not part of the scenarios but the scenarios provide a 
framework for the development and assessment of policies and strategies. 
The external scenarios can then help the user to develop robust strategies, 
i.e. strategies that will survive several kinds of external development. [...] 
How can a speciﬁc target be reached, is responded to by normative scenarios 
(where) the study has explicitly normative starting points, and the focus of 
interest is on certain future situations or objectives and how these could be 
realised.”14 
 
Coates (2000, 116) provides a similar analysis:  
 
“Scenarios as used in business, other organizations, and government 
planning fall into two broad categories. One is scenarios that tell about some 
future state or condition in which the institution is embedded. That scenario 
then is used to stimulate users to develop and clarify practical choices, 
policies, and alternative actions that may be taken to deal with the 
consequences of the scenario. The second form tells a different story. It 
assumes that policy has been established. Policy and its consequences are 
integrated into a story about some future state. This second type of scenario, 
rather than stimulating the discussion of policy choices, displays the 
consequences of a particular choice or set of choices.” 
                                                 
14
 The authors go on to add a pertinent distinction which is in line with the research results of this 
project: “Normative scenarios consist of two different types, distinguished by how the system 
structure is treated. Preserving scenarios respond to the question: How can the target be reached, by 
adjustments to current situation? Transforming scenarios respond to the question: How can the 
target be reached, when the prevailing structure blocks necessary changes?” (Borjesson et al., 2006, 
86).  
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2.3 Criticism and Limits of Scenarios 
The previous section enumerated the benefits of scenario planning, as articulated in 
the academic literature. This section elaborates the shortcomings of the scenario 
planning method, as articulated in the academic literature, including criticism that 
reflects both practitioner (scenario facilitator) and user (scenario client) points of 
view. These criticisms provide an array of explanations for failures of adoption or 
inadequate use of the scenario tool in practice, or lack of follow-through to strategic 
decision-making, and are therefore directly pertinent to the research question and 
contribution to knowledge proposed in this dissertation, which seeks to address and 
solve category misapprehensions that stand in the way of effective scenario use, 
therein adoption.  
The spectrum of academic and practitioner critique and self-critique over the 40 
years that scenario planning has been in use is a vast archive. What follows here is 
guided by perceptions of limitations and caveats regarding the benefits of the 
method (enumerated above), and relevance to the research question.  
 
2.3.1 Overview Assessments 
It is common cause in the field that there is little formal evaluation of scenario work 
or studies towards to evaluate critically the factors that allow scenarios to be used 
successfully, or the impacts scenario approaches can have on organisational 
performance (Harries, 2003; Chermack, 2005). It is generally held that the studies 
that evaluate the effectiveness of scenarios, although few in number, have found 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
78 
 
them to be useful (Glenn and Gordon, 2001) and little debate that the scenario 
workshop process improves decision-makers’ understanding of the challenges they 
face and options for response, and have positive outcomes in terms of individual 
learning (Chermack, 2006). However, such findings do not represent academic 
verification as to the benefits of the method. Desmerais (2000) comments that 
scenario planning has received only a limited amount of critical academic thought 
and research, and that the discursive approbation of the scenario method has been 
led by practitioners: a few 'classic' stories from the corporate world are often cited 
as proof of its benefits. This criticism is similarly made by Goodwin & Wright 
(2001); Chermack (2003); and Cairns, et al., (2004), where it is pointed out that 
most of the journal articles published in this area are written by practitioners 
describing their own case experiences (Schoemaker & van der Heijden, 1992; Godet 
& Roubelat, 1996; Moyer, 1996; Mason, 1994; Wack, 1985a & 1985b); or by 
consultants describing their approaches and methods (e.g. Mason, 1994; Millett, 
2003; Ringland et al, 1999). Because of the practitioner bias, it is perceived that 
descriptions of scenario planning benefits are often uncritical accounts where the 
authors and scenario practitioners are one and the same, with an obvious conflict of 
interest in evangelising the method, resulting in a promotional “look at what we are 
doing” evocation rather than critical analysis of the method. There is also the 
problem of author-practitioners blaming the client for project failure—typically the 
client problem being refusal to engage or buy into the process to the extent 
necessary to allow it to succeed (Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002).  
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One independent empirical study that set out to determine the effects of scenario 
use on organisational performance (Phelps et al., 2001) detected benefit in finding 
that in two British industries (water supply and IT consulting), scenario use 
correlated with increased profitability and returns on investment. Another 
evaluation study “Looking Back on Looking Forward: a Review of Evaluative 
Scenario Literature” (EEA, 2009) reviews 52 pieces of research on scenario 
planning, finding many positives in the method but a relative lack of adequate 
empirical study to support the claims made regarding the be efits of using 
scenarios, particularly in testing claims by comparing the performance of 
organisations that have used scenarios to those that have not. The study separates 
evaluative discourses within the scenario planning domain into five categories:  
 Scenario typologies 
 Assessments of what types of scenario work in different contexts 
 Assessments of methods and institutional arrangements which enable 
organisations to use scenarios more effectively  
 Reviews of impacts of long-term policy analysis on the decision-making 
process 
 Analyses that evaluate the robustness of strategies over multiple scenarios  
 
It finds that important work remains to be done in all five categories, but efforts in 
the second, third and fourth would address the most significant weaknesses of 
current understanding. The EEA study also observes that the literature assessing 
scenarios employs a variety of evaluative methods which are not necessarily 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
80 
 
congruent, some drawing on general psychological understanding of human 
decision processes and biases, some reporting specific laboratory tests of impact on 
decision-making (e.g. Schoemaker, 1993; Chermack et al., 2006), while some refer to 
observations of decision processes within organisations. It suggests that there is 
evidence that scenarios can improve the robustness of decision-making, 
organisational performance and learning, but that they lose impact when identifying 
threats of marginal consequence or issues for which there is no workable response. 
Further, the study points to the need to draw lines between the needs of public and 
private sector scenario purposes, particularly in that it finds (2009, 10) public 
sector applications require “a more systematic connection” between scenarios and 
recommended decisions than do private sector applications, and often aim to build 
consensus or to foster a shared understanding within diverse multi-stakeholder 
settings—a specific contextual need to be accommodated. The EEA study also 
perceives that scenario exercises “often fail to realise their potential benefits 
because there is a mismatch between aspiration and supporting capacities” (2009, 
11), that is, the aspirations contained in scenarios goes beyond the ability of the 
organisation to implement them. Issues related to implementation failure, and how 
these may be related to the matters addressed by the research question, are directly 
relevant to this dissertation, as tackled in question 6 of the interview set (see 
Chapter 4B, Section 4.8.1) and developed in the argument (Chapter 6, Section 6.6). 
In another iconic criticism of scenario planning, Graham Molitor, a lifetime 
theoretician and strategic foresight practitioner, questions (2009, 81) “whether 
scenario dynamics added anything of significant value to forecasting efforts and 
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whether the output was worth the effort expended”. This criticism, along with 
comments and rebuttals, became the topic of a symposium at Tamkang University, 
Taiwan, in 2008, the proceedings of which are published as a stand-alone edition of 
the Journal of Futures Studies (vol. 13.3., February 2009). Listing things that can go 
wrong when scenarios are implemented poorly, Molitor comments that outputs 
become excessively conjectural, hypothetical, tangential, non-germane and 
unrealistic; that overbearing superiors may stifle and stymie free association 
deliberations; and transition from the workshop phase to the write-up involves 
crudification and possibly bias. Molitor’s critique also rests on determining that the 
amalgamation of techniques that scenario planning uses—brainstorming, impact 
analysis, lateral thinking, group input, story telling, etc.—are not new or unique. 
“There is a tendency to ascribe a uniqueness and coin new terms that repackage and 
reintroduce timeless techniques. When all is said and done, what scenarios are all 
about— dates far back into ancient history” (2009, 83). This criticism is fair, but 
perhaps polishes rather than dents the prestige of scenario work in showing how it 
manifests the fundamental, archetypal human approaches to managing complexity 
and solving problems related to uncertainty, which are timeless. 
 
2.3.2. Client Adoption Issues 
Burt and van der Heijden (2003) identify three kinds of hurdles to corporate client 
adoption of the scenario method: (a) organisational culture, which they elaborate as 
the “dominant management” style, including (low) level of and commitment to 
strategic conversations (see Section 2.2.4 above); (b) client state of mind, 
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particularly intolerance of variety and divergence of thought, short-termism, and 
preference for incremental change; and (c) fear of engaging with the outside and of 
interacting with new possibilities. The study concludes that most of these hurdles 
originate in a lack of clarity of purpose, in other words, lack of a clear sense of 
specific outcomes sought by the company. (It should be pointed out that this 
determination runs more-or-less diametrically counter to the open-ended, 
exploratory benefits that scenario planning is valued for, as described above.) Burt 
and van der Heijden also isolate “fire fighting”—perceiving the need to manage the 
day-to-day running of the enterprise a more important priority—as a countering 
force in scenario adoption. Verity (2003, 186) offers the insight: “the very flexibility 
and applicability of scenario techniques appear to mitigate against their use”. By this 
she means there are many outcomes, and potential applications thereof, for 
managers to evaluate, so matching the methodology to the business issue or 
purpose underpinning the exercise is not straightforward. Curry (2009) holds that 
one of the problems with client adoption of the scenario method is, if it is well 
applied it produces far too much variety for managers to process effectively.  
 
2.3.2.1. Qualitative Methods as Barrier to Adoption 
Conway (2005) finds that the adoption of scenario planning is held back because it 
is strongly qualitative in nature, and relies on storytelling, so its acceptance as 
“valid” analytical thought in developing forward strategy is compromised. Partly 
this is due to unfamiliarity with rigorous qualitative thinking, and partly a 
preference for the (often illusory) security of the fixed answers provided by 
quantitative processes. Either way, the cultural preference in organisations for 
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“data-driven decision-making” creates a relatively hostile environment. Cairns et al. 
(2004, 223) comments similarly: “The central problem in scenario development, 
then, is the fact that aside from a limited set of tools, the task is essentially a creative 
one and the process is 'more art than science’.”15 On this topic, Desmerais considers 
the scenario process “highly intuitive” and comments  (2000, 85): “it is highly 
improbable that two competing businesses would develop similar scenarios about 
the future of the driving forces.” (He however recognises this is true of quantitative 
forecasting too.) Speaking to the same perceived problem, Miller and Waller (2003, 
94) suggest insertion of real options analysis into scenario work as way of adding 
quantitative rigour into the process. Goodwin and Wright (2001, 13) advocate 
multi-attribute value modelling as a way of meeting the perceived need for a formal 
evaluation process during scenario building—making the process benefits, or lack 
thereof, recordable and accountable.  
In a related matter, the careful avoidance of ascribing probability to scenarios—a 
fundamental principle of the method, necessary in avoiding a predictive mindset— 
is also seen as a brake on general management adoption.16 Millett (2003) argues 
that a stubborn avoidance of forecasting and prediction by “purist” scenario 
                                                 
15
 Cairns, et al. (2004, 231) negatively contrast “simple unstructured models based on intuition and 
reasoned judgment” with “highly sophisticated probabilistic algorithms and causal simulation 
models”. 
16
 Mainstream scenario theory holds that scenarios should be designed to be diverse plausible 
pictures of the future, each with equal probability, and that managers should be discouraged from 
planning around one “because it is most probable” because that scenario then effectively becomes a 
(spurious) forecast. Any forward strategy must rather satisfy the total spectrum of the scenarios, 
because the future will most probably contain elements from all the scenarios. The pioneer in 
eschewing any probability assessment among scenarios, Herman Kahn, wrote (1967): “No scenario is 
ever probable; the probability of any scenario ever being realised is minute. Accuracy is not the 
measure of a good scenario; rather it is plausibility (a rational route from here to there); internal 
consistency; description of causal processes; and usefulness in decision-making.”  
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practitioners in their prescribed methodologies is a reason why the technique lacks 
popularity. It is difficult for managers to accept (or to be seen to accept) that 
uncertainty and risk cannot be determined in terms of probabilities. McKinsey 
analyst Charles Roxburg (2009) offers a palatability workaround whereby scenarios 
proceed along a base-case + variation(s) model, with probability ascribed to the 
base case, but comments that this view would not be accepted by scenario purists.  
 
2.3.2.2. Cost-Benefit Problems 
There is the commonly held and not unfounded view that a scenario process is 
expensive, absorbing large amounts of both time and money resources, particularly 
in that is it widely agreed that both broad engagement across the organisation and 
the introduction of external thought-catalysers is beneficial, all of which drives up 
costs. Millett (2003) finds that that a scenario team might consist of 5–10 people 
who meet regularly, which, in addition to the call on other staff time, the cost of 
running workshops, and the price of external facilitators, suggests that costs could 
easily reach US$ 600,000 for a six- month exercise. Verity (2003) determines that 
“the cost argument” is rational and hard to overcome. Intrinsic to the cost-benefit 
perception is the problem that many scenario projects do not have an adequate 
process for engaging executive teams in the scenario thinking, and that the ties 
between scenario-building and follow-on strategy formation are unclear. Molitor 
(2009) articulates a common practitioner counter-argument to this, that direct “use” 
is not necessarily the point of such undertakings. Working through scenario 
processes makes participants more fully aware of the contextual changes around 
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them and prepares the management mind in general, rather than being a problem-
solving device. However, the unclear link between concrete benefit, particularly 
when linked to cost, remains a criticism of the scenario process and a reason for lack 
of adoption thereof.  
 
2.3.3. Inter-practitioner Debates 
There is, as one might expect, a spirited debate among scenario practitioners as to 
the benefits of the scenario method as a whole, and the relative benefits of different 
methods. The following section captures the key elements of this; further related 
analysis occurs in the typology section below.  
A core element of the raison d’etre of scenarios is rendering visible marginal or less 
well-considered outcomes, forcing managers to face them. While criticism exists 
that scenarios are fantastical and without basis in quantitative rigour, on the other 
hand there is a stream of thought among practitioners that scenarios underplay the 
full range of uncertain outcomes, that is, are too timid in avoiding the real breadth 
and depth of plausible uncertainty. There are broadly two causes of this: (1) 
unintentional narrowing, where scope is reined in due to scenario practitioners’ 
own lack of ability to approach truly unforeseen events. In this regard, Taleb (2007) 
comments that changes in human behaviour and values, the randomness of nature, 
technological surprises and so-called high impact, high uncertainty “black swan” 
events, are commonly outside the scope of the analysts’ perception. The other 
reason has to do with the adoption problem elaborated above, which leads 
facilitators to dampen their elaboration of “stretch” scenarios to suit the client’s 
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worldview. Glenn, (2009) sees a problem when scenarios are given to or adopted by 
participants who were not part of the formation phase, who may then see the 
scenarios as the "official set of possible futures" and hence, self-censor or limit their 
thinking to some degree. Postma & Liebl (2005, 167) hold that scenarios sometimes 
do not prevent management from being surprised: “It is striking how often 
situations occur that were simply not included or were excluded as ‘logically 
impossible’ or ‘inconsistent’ during the process of scenario building.” Such 
situations, where the future view does not lie within the corridor of the various 
“extreme but consistent” projections, but rather beyond them, often remain hidden 
despite the scenario process. There is also a body of work that suggests that 
scenarios, while articulating plausible model worlds, intrinsically makes the view of 
non-articulated outcomes harder to see. Treanor observes: “'futures scenarios are 
explicit rejections of other possible futures. […] a small number of alternative 
scenarios is presented: they indicate the range of futures considered acceptable. In 
other words, the range of acceptable future(s) … is made visible by the choice of 
scenarios.”17 He cites the Amsterdam Urban TVA project as an example, where the 
three scenarios all proceed from one (elite, urban) assumption base.  
Various commentators have pointed to the intrinsic weakness of scenario projects 
where a “best case”, “worst case” and “middle case” is presented, or when the 
process is based on too simplistic a variable, such as optimistic vs. pessimistic 
outcomes. The problem here is with the scenario formation—high, middle, and low 
                                                 
17
 http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/few.futures.html. Unpublished work. Viewed May 20, 2012 
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scenarios (or optimistic vs. pessimistic) typically manipulate one variable, 
effectively presenting merely a sensitivity analysis, which is a severe contraction of 
aspiration when compared to the richness of multiple-variable variation that 
scenario planning stands for. Further, a “middle” case draws the scenario user to 
prefer the middle case or emphasise it by default in forward planning. In this the 
credibility of alternative, unexpected scenarios is undermined.  
 
2.3.3.1 Limits of the “2x2” method 
Despite the ubiquity of the “2x2” method as a method of scenario construction, 
many practitioners consider that this construction format itself limits scenario 
richness and breadth of outcomes. In the 2x2 method, two “very” or “most” 
important uncertainties are isolated (typically via group process), and are then 
crossed on a 2x2 matrix (as inspired by the Boston Consulting Group’s four-box 
framework. For examples see projects analysed in Chapter 4.). This is the method 
associated with SRI International, and elaborated by both Shell and SRI alumni, for 
example Schwartz (1989), Schoemaker (1991); and van der Heijden (1996). Curry 
(2009, 120) observes the extent to which particular assumptions about early 
scenario building have become embedded: “Aspects of practice which developed 
initially because of contingent issues of practice in particular organisational or 
cultural environments have become inscribed as method.” Curry & Schultz (2009) 
observe that the “flatland” of many 2x2 matrix exercises in scenario building can be 
greatly enriched by using Causal Layered Analysis, or the Ethnographic Futures 
Framework, or Futures Wheels, to create more densely detailed story fabrics. 
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Further, Curry and Schultz (2009) demonstrate that the choice of method 
considerably influences what scenarios emerge, despite the same input conditions. 
The authors put a single set of project data put through four different scenario 
building approaches: the 2x2 approach; Causal Layered Analysis; Manoa method; 
and using Scenario Archetypes, to see if this produced significantly different 
perspectives on the future, which it did. By applying multiple methods to one 
dataset, Curry & Schultz go beyond comparison and classification represented in the 
typologies section (below) to show how choice of scenario-building process directly 
determines the orientation and richness of results obtained. 
 
2.4. Scenario Planning Typologies 
 
Since the rise of scenario planning as a mainstream planning tool, many academic 
authors have attempted to determine a classificatory system or “typology” of 
scenario work, to bring order to the methodological “chaos” of contested definitions 
and justifications perceived in the field (Bradfield et al., 2006). Borjeson et al 
comment that typologies are important for communicating, understanding, 
comparing and developing methods. “Without a common language among 
researchers, all those tasks become much harder.” (2006, 724).18 The following 
section reflects the key interventions in the scenario typology field, and relates them 
to the research question. The typology debates, as reflected below, show—above 
                                                 
18
 It is important to distinguish between scenario typology—the classification of scenarios method 
approaches, as discussed here—and scenario archetypes or “generic” scenarios (common, repeated 
human or social narratives) as expressed for example by Schwartz (1991, 1992) or Dator (1996b). 
(Dator refers to 4 generic futures: Continued Growth, Collapse, Disciplined Society, and 
Transformation.) 
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all—the lack of an accepted typology of method, and therein the emergent nature of 
the field. They demonstrate the on-going, significantly contested debate over what 
scenarios’ spectrum of purpose is, and contested criteria of quality in scenario 
building and outcomes. For this reason they round out the benefits and weaknesses 
discussion above, and provide the final preparation for the case studies, interviews, 
and analysis to follow.  
Most significant moves towards scenario typology have been made since the 1990s. 
However, Godet and Roubelat (1996) closely following a triptych codified much 
earlier, by Roy Amara (1981), as follows:  
 Possible scenarios—everything that can be imagined;  
 Realisable scenarios, —all that is possible, taking account of constraints;  
 Desirable scenarios—which fall into the possible category, but which are not 
all necessarily realisable. 
 
The distinction between “desirable” and all forms of other scenarios is a 
categorisation that closely approximates the visionary or aspirational view of 
scenarios, as discussed in Section 2.2.5 above. Godet (1996, 9) cross-cuts this with a 
probability determination to derive four categories—‘reference’, ‘trend-based’, 
‘contrasted’ or ‘normative’ scenarios, explained as follows:  
“A trend-based scenario, whether or not it is probable, corresponds to the 
extrapolation of trends at all points where choices are to be made. It is 
among the realizable scenarios which have a higher than zero probability 
that we find contrasted (unlikely) scenarios and the field of development 
where the most probable scenarios are found. As regards desirable scenarios, 
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these are found somewhere within the possible zone and are not all 
necessarily realizable.”  
 
Borjeson et al (2006) observe Amara’s foundational influence in scenario typology 
thinking and point out others that have followed in this vein, particularly Masini 
(1993) who identiﬁes three approaches: extrapolation, utopian and vision, and 
Dreborg (2004) who identiﬁes three modes of thinking: predictive, eventualities 
and visionary. Borjeson et al follow this same framework in presenting six types, 
built on permutations of the categories probable, possible and preferable, adjusting 
the typology to emphasise how scenarios are used. Therein they identify three main 
categories of scenarios based on the principal questions the user poses about the 
future. These are: (1) Predictive—“what will happen?”; (2) Explorative—“what can 
happen?”; and (3) Normative—“how can a speciﬁc target be reached?” In turn, each 
of these categories contains two responses to the category defining question. In (1) 
the predictive mode may be (a) forecasting—what will happen; or (b) what if—what 
will happen based on condition of a particular specified event or events. Explorative 
scenarios (2) may be either (a) external—what can happen in the development of 
external factors or (b) strategic—what can happen if we (the scenario users) act in a 
certain way, that is, an exploration of the spread of outcomes of strategic choices. 
Normative scenarios (3) are either (a) preservative—how can the target be reached 
by adjustments to the current situation; or (b) transformative—how can the target 
be reached assuming a transformed contextual environment.  
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Heugens and Van Oosterhout (2001) put forward a basis for distinctions between 
scenario types along two dimensions: epistemological orientation and normative 
involvement. The epistemological dimension is a continuum between “Cartesian 
cognitive” where scenarios are tools for improving decision-making, but maintain a 
strong split separating thought from organisational action; in non-Cartesian 
scenarios this chasm between thought and implementation is crossed. The 
normative involvement continuum spans “passivity” at one end, where 
organisations regard themselves as “spectators” using scenarios for broad 
reconnaissance purposes only, vs. “activity” where scenario studies stimulate and 
develop strategic responsiveness.  
 
A commonly referenced typology in the field is that of van Notten, Rotmans, van 
Asselt, and Rothman (2003) who propose a typology of scenarios based on three 
themes. The themes are (1) project goal: “the why”; (2) process design: “the how”; 
and (3) content: “the what”. Each of the themes is described as a spectrum. The goal 
theme spans a goal of “exploration and awareness” on one side of the spectrum to 
“decision support” on the other. Process design refers to a spectrum with “intuitive-
qualitative” processes on the one side and “analytical-quantitative” methods on the 
other. The content theme spans “complex, multifaceted” scenarios on the one side 
and “simple” stories on the other. Across these three themes the authors refer to 14 
characteristics, including items such as inclusion of norms (descriptive vs. 
preferred); vantage point (forecasting vs. backcasting); time scale (short term vs. 
long term); special scale (focused vs. global); nature of the data; method of data 
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collection, and so on. While this is an exhaustive analysis of the 17 cross-cutting 
ways that scenarios input or output can vary, the analysis remains very much at the 
level of description and categorisation of what exists, rather than connecting any of 
these spectra to purpose, and is laconic on accounting for the influence of the 
context of the scenario development process itself. Further, a feature-descriptive 
typology does not invite access to the deeper methodological influences, or their 
theoretical foundations, involved in various scenario approaches. Curry & Schultz 
(2009, 37) comment: “as a result, this absence leads to a difficulty for the typology 
to be used consistently as a framework for facilitating the judgement of the quality 
of scenario development processes and outcomes. Quality here includes conceptions 
of the scenario development processes’ contextual influences and the relevance of 
the approach and outcomes.”  
Wilkinson & Esther (2005) offer a typology that distinguishes three types of 
scenario building approach: “problem-focused”, “actor-focused”, and “reﬂexive 
interventionist or multi-agent based” (RIMA) scenarios. Problem-focused scenarios 
set out to create accurate maps of the future that will enable others to reach a 
destination as reliably and efficiently as possible. Actor-focused scenarios invite 
stakeholders to help draw a map of the route that they need to take. The third 
category, RIMA scenarios, are those specifically designed for dealing with complex 
situations, for example the urgency of global environmental concerns that requires 
interventions that mobilize and sustain collaboration across different jurisdictions 
and worldviews. According to the authors, the third approach is a combination and 
enrichment of the ﬁrst two approaches.  
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In a study closely allied to the scenario typology terrain, Bishop, Hines, and Collins 
(2007) note the typology work of van Notten (2003), and (Borjenson 2006) as well 
as the historical scenarios overview of Bradfield (2005) as pertinent in bringing 
clarity to the field. Bishop et al’s contribution takes a slightly different format: they 
inventory and classify eight categories of techniques (23 individual techniques in 
all) as the base of foresight approaches found in scenario planning. In this they offer 
rigour by way of understanding common patterns of technique use that underpin 
apparently extremely different types of scenario work without proposing a typology 
of their own.  
 
2.4.1 Role of Typology in the Research 
It is understood that the investigations into the role of purpose of scenario practice, 
both in itself and with reference to its congruence to organisation context, 
aspiration and constraint conditions, as articulated by the research question, 
implies a potential contribution to the typology debates above. In the event, the 
research presented in the dissertation (Chapter 4) establishes the case for an over-
arching “meta-category” of purpose applicable in scenario planning, as argued in 
Chapter 6. The articulation of the findings of this study with the past and present 
debates within the field of scenario typology theory is recorded as a topic for future 
research (Chapter 6. Section 6.8.2).  
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2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated key debates in scenario planning theory, following the 
broad classification of (a) purposes and benefits; (b) criticisms and limits; and (c) 
classification-typology, all of which directly prepares the ground for the research 
presented ahead, particularly in that the research question is set up to investigate 
the role of categorisation (mis-categorisation) of purpose in its relation to 
organisational purpose or external constraint conditions as a possible cause of 
problems in the scenario method, the resolution of which may provide a route to 
amelioration of these problems. However, one further preparatory step is required 
before turning to the research: this is an investigation of the history of the field and 
its emergence and use by key theorists and well-known companies, which has had a 
defining role in formulating understanding of scenario purpose, and therefore 
merits direct consideration before moving to presentation of the original research. 
This is done in the next chapter, Chapter 3: History and Evolution. 
 
*** 
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Chapter 3: History and Evolution of Scenario Planning 
 
 
3.1. Overview 
The previous section dealt with theoretical discussions in the literature pertinent to 
the research domain. In this section, the literature associated with the history and 
origins of scenarios is discussed, with particular reference to the early development 
and emergence of scenario planning as both a business and non-business 
(government; NGO) planning tool. This reveals founding contextual issues relating 
to the conceptualisation of the method, which strongly shape the field to this day, 
including framing current understanding of the purposes and limits of the scenario 
planning, which therefore has direct bearing on the research terrain. Consideration 
is given to origins both within the U.S. and Europe; early commercial adoption by 
Royal Dutch Shell; how Shell’s experience has been foundational in the field in 
defining the original purpose and rationale of the method; and how this purpose 
changed in the hands of those same Shell originators when they brought the method 
to South Africa in the 1980s. 
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3.2 U.S. Origins of Scenario Planning  
The concept of scenarios is ancient: since earliest recorded time people have used 
scenarios as a tool for exploring the future of society and its institutions. Bradfield et 
al, (2005) comment that, in this context, scenarios have taken the form of treatises 
on utopias and dystopias, for example in the writings of the early philosophers, such 
as Plato's description of his ideal Republic; or may be applied to social revisionists 
such as George Orwell; and have implied use in military planning for millennia. It is 
in fact from military use that modern scenario techniques emerged, particularly in 
military strategy studies around the US “Manhattan Project” (1942), where the 
limits of probability distributions in assessing outcomes of atom-bomb explosions 
led analysts to develop computer simulations of the distribution of possible events 
(Schwartz, 1991).  
 
3.2.1 Influence of Herman Kahn and the Rand Corporation 
After World War II, the concept of scenarios was further developed for the nuclear 
strike early warning system “Air Defence System Missile Command” by Herman 
Kahn at the RAND Corporation, a US military think tank. Kahn’s scenarios 
demonstrated numerous possible paths to, and outcomes from, nuclear war with 
Soviet Russia, and examined the possibilities of world order, potential power 
alignments and international challenges to American security, as documented in his 
book On Thermonuclear War (1960). Kahn’s scenarios were innovative in being 
“non-predictive” hypothetical chains of plausible of events, much like a play or 
movie script, from where the scenario term was borrowed. Thinking about the 
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future in this way shows the influence of Kahn’s location near the film lots in Los 
Angeles, and particularly his friendship with Stanley Kubrick.  
In 1961, Kahn left RAND to set up the Hudson Institute, a private research firms 
devoted to issues of U.S. public policy, international relations, and defence, and 
continued to explore uncertainties surrounding nuclear strikes and alternative 
pathways to nuclear escalation via his “escalation ladder”. Referring to Kahn’s book 
On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (1965), Joe Coates (2000, 115) writes: 
“Kahn's monumental contribution to military thinking was his escalation ladder. 
The world is not a world of nuclear war or no nuclear war. There are distinct 
variations or stages of what may occur between ‘war’ and ‘no war’ under different 
circumstances. His escalation ladder described a sample of those steps.” (Kahn’s 
scenarios-of-escalation work remains the spiritual antecedent of both professional-
military war games planning and amateur war “gaming” to this day.)  
Soon after Kahn founded the Hudson Institute, two other Rand “alumnae” Olaf 
Helmer and Theodore (Ted) Gordon founded the Institute For The Future which 
remains a pre-eminent think-tank in the foresight field to this day. At the time, 
Helmer, Gordon and Norman Dalkey developed their understanding of corporate 
scenarios in association with the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). Kahn’s following 
book, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years 
(Kahn & Wiener, 1967), developed scenarios in currently recognised terms (Millett, 
2008). One of the authors’ scenario “worlds” depicts an arms control agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union; another assumes the Soviet Union 
would lose control of the Communist movement; a third projected construction of 
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new alliances among countries. In demonstrating the use of scenarios as a 
methodological tool for policy planning and decision-making in complex-uncertain 
situations beyond the military, the book is a landmark event in the ﬁeld (Bradfield et 
al., 2005), and strongly inﬂuenced subsequent development and diffusion of 
scenario techniques, for example, the Club of Rome’s “The Limits to Growth” Study 
(Meadows, D.H. et al., 1972) and “Mankind at the Turning Point” (Mesarovic & 
Pestel, 1974).  
 
3.3 European Origins of Scenario Planning 
The scenario method had, simultaneously, independent European roots: in France, 
in the 1950s, French philosopher Gaston Berger created the Centre d'Etudes 
Prospectives, also formulating a scenario-based approach to planning which he 
called “la prospective”. Bradfield et al (2005, 802) reflect that Berger was concerned 
with the long-term political and social future of France, and the underlying 
philosophical premise of his work was that the future is not part of a 
“predetermined temporal continuity”, but something which is to be created and 
which can be “consciously modelled to be humanly beneficial”. Accordingly, the 
objective of the Centre Prospectives was to formulate a scenario-based methodology 
for developing positive images of the future, and to lead these images into the 
political arena where they could serve as a guiding vision to policy makers and the 
nation, providing a basis for action. This is the earliest clear antecedent of what is 
referred to in this dissertation as “visionary-advocacy” scenarios.  
Berger died in 1960, but the Centre Prospectives continued under economist Pierre 
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Masse who introduced the use of the prospective scenario approach in the 
development of the fourth French National Plan (1960–1965), and Bertrand de 
Jouvenel, who directly followed Berger, and coined the term “futuribles”, using 
scenarios to construct positive images of the future with the aim of finding ways to 
bring these into being. The Prospectives work has been continued and expanded by 
Michel Godet who was in charge of the Department of Futures Studies at the SEMA 
Metra Consulting Group, from 1974 to 1979. The method further evolved during 
1980s when Godet was at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, during 
which time he developed scenarios for French national electricity company EDF, the 
oil company Elf Aquitaine SA and the French Ministry of Defence. (Godet, 1996). 
Bishop et al (2007) remark that Godet took scenario work in the direction of 
computer programs to analyse structural conditions and stakeholder positions, and 
also created two tools that generate scenarios—MORPHOL and SMIC PROB-
EXPERT.  
 
3.4 Early Experience of Royal Dutch Shell  
As Kahn’s work at the Hudson Institute grew in renown, he was approached by 
corporate planners, including Ian Wilson of the General Electric Corporation, and 
Pierre Wack and Ted Newland of Royal Dutch Shell, France, looking to apply Kahn’s 
methodology to their corporate planning situations. Wilson’s team at GE generated 
four alternative futures for the U.S. domestic consumer market (1980) as shaped by 
global and US economic and socio-political conditions over the decade. (The Wilson 
scenario report was published internally at GE as “Environmental Task Force of the 
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Corporate Executive Staff: Four Alternative World/U.S. Scenarios 1971‐1980,” 
General Electric, January 1971.)  
It was Wack’s work at Shell, however, that was truly formative for the entire field of 
scenario planning going forward. In 1965 Shell introduced a new planning system 
called "Unified Planning Machinery" (UPM). UPM was a worldwide system that 
looked ahead six years: the first year in detail, the next five in broader lines. (Wack, 
1985a). UPM was characterised by statistical and financial modelling, and remained 
based on positivist assumptions (as defined in Chapter 1). However, planners found 
that, given the long lead times for new oil infrastructure investments, the six-year 
horizon was too constraining. Pierre Wack, a planner at Shell France, one of the 
participating companies in the corporate-level exercise, was familiar with the 
scenario approach developed by Kahn, and decided to experiment with the 
technique using France as the testing ground. In 1970 Wack led a 15-year (to 1985) 
look-forward exercise called ‘Horizon Year Planning’ for Shell Group Planning, 
which considered transformative change in the oil-producing regions—particularly 
change in the Arab world that would destroy the stability of the existing oil regime 
which Western oil companies had dominated and drawn a rich profit stream from 
for 25 years. Kleiner (2003) reflects that transforming organisational thinking to an 
approach that required study of a number of environments that were fundamentally 
different from the present, and different to each other, was a culture-shock for Shell 
planners. However, taking this “surprise scenario” seriously, Shell executives in 
1971 decided to further develop scenario analysis for the decade ahead (the 1970s), 
particularly considering outcomes in a then newly-politically charged Middle East 
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environment in contrast to the default future (continuation of the post-war 
historical trajectory of year-on-year industry expansion and oil price stability). 
During 1972 and early 1973, the Shell Group Planners' message percolated through 
the global Shell organization: the oil price could soar from its then-current $2 per 
barrel to an unimaginable price of $10, a rise of 500% (In reality, by 1975, it would 
hit $13.) Despite resistance from some Shell managers at the time, the organisation 
began to put in place hedges and options not considered valid strategy during the 
price-stable 1950s and 1960s (Wack, 1985a). This in turn put Shell in an enviable 
position when the 1973 oil crisis did occur, and an even more profitable position 
during the Iranian revolution of 1979, when the oil price soared to $37 per barrel. 
The initial scenarios developed in 1971 on an experimental basis and presented to 
senior management in 1972, had proved extraordinarily successful in that they non-
predictively fostered a view of the future of the industry by acknowledging 
important potential discontinuities. Shortly thereafter scenario planning was 
extended throughout the company (Kleiner, 2003). Millett (2008) comments that 
the work of Wilson and of Wack and Newland, changed the fundamental definition 
of a scenario from Kahn's “hypothetical sequence of events from the present to the 
future” to “alternative future states, regardless of the steps by which they were 
achieved.” 
Shell’s early successes in application of scenario planning to the energy industry 
encouraged scenario development through the energy crisis of the mid-1970s. Two 
well-known energy futures scenario projects were Project Independence (Federal 
Agency Administration, 1974); and the Ford Foundation's Energy Policy Project 
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(Freeman, 1974). These scenario sets helped stimulate public awareness of the 
seriousness of the energy problem and alternative resolutions thereof (Gordon, 
1974). Further to Shell’s iconic experience, after the high-oil-price 1970s the oil 
industry as a whole entered a bubble phase and through the early 1980s executives 
assumed the price would keep rising. Under Wack however, Shell continued 
exploring counterintuitive outcomes and particularly a scenario where the oil price 
bubble would burst: the forces holding OPEC together would fragment (cartel 
supply caps would fail), while at the same time energy demand would slow due to 
global recession. As observed by Kleiner (2003) Mia de Kuijper, a Shell Group 
Planning executive shocked senior executives in proposing that oil was about to 
become “a commodity product,” and Ted Newland dramatically recited to Shell 
managing directors in 1982 a nursery rhyme about the oil price: “Humpty Dumpty 
sat on a wall. Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.” The price did in fact fall heavily over 
the next three years, setting in motion an industry consolidation that eventually 
swallowed three of oil’s “Seven Sisters,” to Shell’s great advantage as described by 
Wack (1985b). Part of Shell’s success in the 1980s also came out of scenarios which 
ahead-of-time considered implications of a breakup of the Soviet Union, which was 
not only a political unstable entity at that time, but also a major supplier in the 
European gas market.  
 
3.4.1 Purpose Implications of the Shell Method 
It was of critical importance to the Shell method that managers were not invited to 
choose any of the scenarios presented to them as “most valid” (Segel, 2007). This 
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follows the directive established by Kahn in 1967, as explained and cited above. In 
the same vein, probabilities were not to be attached to the scenarios, and planners 
were required to remain prima-facie neutral as to the different possible outcomes. 
Kahn and Wack (and SRI, GBN, and others that followed) eschewed probabilities 
which “look like numbers” and therefore assume too much precision and “imply 
predictive accuracy.” (Millett, 2008). The purpose of Shell scenarios of the time (and 
to this day) was therefore not to predict if or when a chain of events would come 
about, or what outcomes would arise; their purpose was raise alertness and 
understanding with regard to chains or clusters of events that could lead to 
important outcomes, with implied opportunities and threats for the organisation, 
therefore raising the credibility of these events and the merit of spending 
management time investigating and considering how to adapt the company or its 
offerings in the light of them. In other words, the purpose was to stimulate 
managers to mentally rehearse their options in alternative external environment 
conditions, and where necessary be ready to recast their strategy. Kleiner (2003, 4) 
comments that Wack’s underlying motivation was that “managers’ mindsets had 
continually to be ‘refreshed’ to take account of perpetually changing circumstances.” 
Wack’s own term for this process was “reperceiving” (1985b), showing clear 
orientation to enhancing managers’ quality of perception, particularly through 
challenging their assumptions and questioning mental models that may cause a 
manager to discount or be entirely blind to unexpected important outcomes. (See 
Chapter 2. Section 2.2.3).  
At this early stage, Wack (1985a; 1985b) also sought to identify “predetermined 
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elements” in the future operating environment vs. “important uncertainties”, a move 
that remains foundational to scenario planning to this day, as the projects studied in 
the following chapters show. Predetermined elements are future certainties, which 
will arise in all plausible iterations of the future. Uncertainties on the other hand, 
which may resolve in two or more different ways (which way remains unknown and 
unknowable), form the basis of alternative plausible model worlds (scenarios), 
which become by virtue of their juxtaposition to the present, and to each other, a 
challenge to a manager’s assumptions and mental models. 
 
3.5 Global Adoption and Proliferation  
Since these foundations in the 1970s and 1980s, the scenario planning method has 
been very widely embraced across private, public, and military spheres, and has 
become part of the standard offering of management consulting firms such as KPMG, 
Bain, & Co., and Accenture. Ringland (1998) notes the proliferation of scenarios in 
the public sector, in such organisations as; the UK National Health Service (NHS), 
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), Consignia, Scottish Enterprise, US General Services 
Agency (GSA), World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD); and 
similar. The appeal of scenario planning increased further in the wake of the 
September 11th, 2001, strikes in the United States which heightened both popular 
and management acceptance of the notion of an unpredictable future. According to 
Bain & Company’s (Bain, 2007) annual survey of management tools, fewer than 40% 
of companies used scenario planning in 1999, but by 2006 its usage had risen to 
70%. This rapid dissemination dovetailed closely with perceptions of rising 
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uncertainty in the business macro-environment and the inability of statistical 
forecasting or classic strategic planning to manage it, as discussed in the previous 
chapter (Section 2.2.1.1). In the private sector, organisations such as Texaco, 
Caledonian Paper and IPC Magazines, IDON Ltd, GlaxoSmithKline, Allied Irish Banks 
and Kinder-Care, British Airways, Cable & Wireless, Digital Equipment Corporation, 
Electrolux, ICL, Krone (UK) Technique, Statoil, and United Distillers are examples of 
companies that have endorsed and used scenario planning (Ringland 2002; Fahey & 
Randall, 1998).19  
 
3.5.1 Enduring Influence of Royal Dutch Shell 
Postma & Liebl (2005) hold that the influence of Shell’s experience on the 
development of scenario planning “cannot be over-stated”. Bradfield et al (2005, 
800) state that Shell’s definition of scenarios and process methods “have become the 
de facto gold standard of corporate scenario generation”. Further, Shell has had a 
foundational role in the global adoption and proliferation of scenario planning to 
this day. Shell Group Planning continues making scenarios and publishing some but 
not all of them. (As proposed further in this dissertation, what works are published 
vs. which remain confidential is a marker of alternative scenario purpose platforms. 
See Chapter 5. Section 5.4.2). Shell has also had a role in published scenario methods 
guidelines, distilling best practices from its own internal processes, for example 
                                                 
19
 The adoption and proliferation of the method, while substantial, has not been seamless, as referred 
to in Chapter 1 when describing the purpose of the research project: toward unravelling a set of 
problems that have mitigated against scenario planning adoption. It is also recognised that part of 
the foresight field itself has been critical of scenario planning both in general, and in its endorsement 
of the “American mainstream empirical tradition”. These criticisms are reflected in Chapter 2 
(Sections 2.3 and 2.2.5). 
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“Scenarios: An Explorer’s Guide” (Shell International, 2003), and other booklets as 
detailed in the bibliography, which has furthered the influence of the Shell approach 
as regards both the purpose and method of scenario planning.  
Shell’s influence has spread in other ways: it had a close relationship with the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI International) in the 1970s, formed in part around 
developing the SRI’s scenarios method into a business tool. Various analysts who 
had pioneered the scenario method at SRI International or at Shell Group Planning 
in London in the early 1980s, subsequently formed the pre-eminent scenario-based 
consulting firm, Global Business Network (GBN) in San Francisco in 1988. Among 
the principles of this firm were Shell and SRI “alumni” Peter Schwartz and Napier 
Collyns. Schwartz’s book “The Art of the Long View” (1991) was the first popular 
book-length treatment of scenario purpose and methods. Other former senior 
executives in Shell's Group Planning department, such as Arie de Geus, Joseph 
Jaworksi, Charles Hampden-Turner, and Kees van der Heijden, all became corporate 
consultants and evangelists of the scenario method. Further, as described below, 
key Shell executives including Pierre Wack himself had foundational roles in the 
evolution of scenario planning in South Africa. 
 
3.6 Scenario Planning in South Africa 
On retirement from Shell, Pierre Wack and Ted Newland became consultants to 
Anglo American’s London office, Charter Consolidated, which then invited Wack and 
Ted Newland to present their scenario work in Johannesburg in 1982 to Anglo 
American’s executive committee (Segel, 2007). Anglo American then pursued an 
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internal scenarios exercise involving Wack and Newland, plus individuals from the 
research and economics unit from Charter Consolidated and the corporate head 
office team in Johannesburg. The South African team at the time was headed by 
Clem Sunter, a figure who would subsequently become synonymous with scenario 
planning in South Africa over the next 25 years. The bulk of Anglo’s Wack-and-
Newland-led study focused on the formulation of global business-environment 
scenarios, but at the same time South African scenarios were developed which 
focused on an apparent choice facing the country at the time: whether it took the 
“High Road” of consultation and negotiation towards a non-racial democracy and 
rising prosperity, or the “Low Road” of continued repression, confrontation, global 
ostracisation and economic decline. Sunter presented these South African scenarios 
inside Anglo and its associated companies in 1986. After one of these sessions, the 
chief executive of Togaat Hulett, a sugar company, suggested Sunter make the 
presentation to the Natal-Kwazulu Indaba, which was at that time debating forming 
a joint legislature. Anglo’s chairman Gavin Relly was initially reluctant because it 
had never been the intention to take the project into the public domain, but gave the 
go-ahead (Segel, 2007). Immediately after that presentation, five of the 29 delegates 
present asked that the talk be given to their constituencies. The company agreed, 
and further also decided he should make the presentation available to any group 
who requested it. In less than a year Sunter presented the “High Road vs. Low Road” 
scenarios 230 times across the country, to audiences from the National Party 
Cabinet to minor clubs and associations. (Jim Buys and Michael Spicer were added 
as separate presenters to enable Anglo to respond to the demand). Sunter published 
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the “High-Road vs. Low Road” scenarios under the title “The World and South Africa 
in the 1990s” (1987). 
Since the High Road vs. Low Road scenarios, South Africa has used scenarios in 
national planning, in various projects some of which will be referred to later in this 
document, including: South Africa: Prospects for a Successful Transition (Nedcor/ 
Old Mutual, 1992); The Mont Fleur Scenarios (1993); SA 2020 (African Leadership 
Institute, University of the Western Cape); SA 2020 (Dinokeng) and South Africa 
2025. Scenario-based planning has also been used variously in the parastatal and 
corporate sectors in South Africa, most notably by Sasol, Eskom, and MTN. 
 
3.7 Implications for the Research Project  
The rationale of widespread scenario dissemination of the type practiced by Anglo 
American is discussed further in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.2). What is important to note 
here, at this stage preparatory to the research presentation in Chapter 4, is that in a 
very short space of time, scenarios in the hands of the same exponents (Pierre Wack 
and his immediate associates) are apparently used for distinctly different purposes. 
At Shell in the 1970s and early 1980s, and for Anglo American global operations in 
the 1980s, the method is used to assess and describe future outcomes to enable 
company executives to respond to changes in geo-political context surrounding the 
oil industry which they have little or no control over, but which could drastically 
change their operating environment and therefore the company’s returns. It is this 
purpose that is disseminated via the Shell communications, including Wack’s 
seminal Harvard Business Review pieces, company scenario practice reports and 
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method handbooks, as described above.  
However, in South Africa in the mid-1980s, the High-Road vs. Low-Road scenarios, 
despite being created in association with Wack, appear to have been created and 
were certainly used for another kind of purpose: to illuminate and alert the white 
South African public and senior decision-makers to the choices they had (in areas 
they did collectively control), to persuade them to make one set of choices rather 
than another. It is apparent therein that a different purpose and view of constraint 
conditions underlies each. In the Shell scenarios of the 1970s, the purpose was to 
ready Shell to respond optimally to adapt to pending and-or unexpected changes in 
its external environment; in the Anglo American High Road vs. Low Road scenarios 
of the 1980s the purpose was to help push against and overcome constraints (in this 
case, white community intransigence) towards a better outcome for all; to influence 
the future towards away from one road and towards another. 
The next chapter, Chapter 4A, presents and investigates the primary case studies 
towards investigating purpose-platform distinction in scenario planning. This is 
followed by Chapter 4B which presents the subsidiary cases (by semi-structured 
interview) that further investigate the existence and parameters of purpose-
platform distinctions. This is followed by Chapter 5, which consolidates and 
analyses the findings of the research investigation, and Chapter 6 which presents 
the argument of the dissertation and proposed contribution to knowledge, in terms 
of the research question.  
*** 
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Chapter 4 
Section A: Case Studies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presents the research conducted for this dissertation. For clarity, this is 
divided in two parts, this section, Section A (Chapter 4A) which presents two in-
depth case studies, and Section B (Chapter 4B) which presents 13 supplementary 
mini-cases, studied by project-based structured interview.  
Chapter 1 delineated why research by case study would be appropriate and 
effective, in serving to investigate the research question in general, and with 
reference to scenario-method subject matter in particular. To this end, in-depth 
descriptive interviews with representative practitioners directly involved and 
responsible for each of the case studies have been done, and various pertinent 
graphic elements have been selected from the scenario preparation or write-up 
documents, in pursuit of a full and reliable case study, and are presented below. (It 
should be noted that, for the purposes of separation and independent 
triangulation of findings, the in-depth case studies investigated were not also 
subject to semi-structured qualitative case-study interviews as pertained to the 
method of investigation of the 13 supplementary cases, as presented in the next 
section, Chapter 4B.) The cases are presented here with allied clarification and 
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enrichment, but with minimal interpretation. The analysis of the work presented 
below and in Chapter 4B is collated and presented in Chapter 5.  
 
4.2 Choosing the Case Studies 
With the benefits of case study research and its applicability to the current 
research needs established, as described in Chapter 1, the research direction of 
this project proceeded to find and choose case studies that would provide 
academic insight most beneficial and relevant to investigating the research 
question. To this effect, for obvious reasons, the case studies needed to be scenario 
projects. Further they needed to be scenario projects where enough was known, 
or could be reasonably researched, about the methods of construction of the 
scenarios, in order to be able to make the key judgements sought by the research 
in terms of purpose platforms and constraint conditions underpinning scenario 
work.  
 
4.2.1 Success Orientation 
The point was made in Chapter 1 that while many scenario projects are highly 
successful, many others fail or return low utility, and that this is among the 
primary motivations of this Ph.D. project: to add to the theory on why this may be 
so; to investigate whether, and if so to what extent, project failure is caused by a 
maladaptation between scenario purpose mode and underlying project or 
organisational purpose, and-or maladaptation of purpose-based method to 
external constraint conditions. Choosing primary case studies therefore produced 
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the problem: would it be better to investigate case studies of projects that are 
considered a failure or case studies considered a success? Although it was 
anticipated that either route would bear fruit towards investigating the research 
question, it was decided to use case studies of success. This is was because success 
inherently implies that the underlying choices made in case project construction 
were successful, and therefore any steps and methods extracted can be reliably 
associated with the success. On the other hand, when a project fails, the cause of 
failure is often not clear, and one or a number of factors, or even their associative 
interplay, may be at fault. Alternatively, the method may be not at fault, but its 
particular execution by an organisation or facilitator may have been poor. In sum, 
a reliable connection between a causal factor and failure would be academically 
less certain. Therefore successful projects were chosen. A mix of successful and 
unsuccessful projects was chosen for the 13 supplementary cases presented in 
Chapter 4B.  
 
4.2.2 Location 
Despite the researcher’s academic and professional familiarity with scenario 
projects completed in the 1980-2010 time period the world over, a specific decision 
was made to find and investigate African case studies, which reflects primary 
location of the research at an African research institution, as well as the significant 
experience of the researcher in this location. Further, as discussed in the previous 
chapter (Chapter 3, Section 3.6) the African region, and particularly South Africa, 
has participated extensively to the evolution of the global scenario project base 
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which in itself suggests this region is a fertile terrain of study; in addition, as will 
become apparent below, and as further discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.7.2), 
African situations are more than averagely academically productive for 
investigating the research questions in that they provide clear constraint conditions, 
and therefore are instructive in revealing the implications of alternative scenario 
purposes in relation to constraint conditions. Therefore African studies were 
specifically chosen as the basis of primary case study analysis here. 
 
4.2.3 Number of Studies 
The researcher needed to make a decision as to how many cases to investigate. The 
obvious trade-off was between depth and breadth: more studies could be 
investigated at lesser depth. In the context of interviews to come (Chapter 4B), it 
was decided that the single greatest benefit of case studies to the research project 
would be the depth of analysis they offered, and so the number should be kept small. 
Given this, in many projects it would make sense to take one case only. However, in 
this project, which rests fundamentally on comparing and contrasting two methods 
of approach, it made more sense from an academic research point of view to 
investigate two cases that were apparently contrasting in method and purpose. This 
is therefore what was done.  
 
4.2.4 Limitations of the Case Method 
As outlined in Chapter 1, a case study implies a close study of a situation, event or 
process. It involves gathering detailed information to obtain in-depth knowledge of 
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target subjects in context. As this depth of description and analysis was required for 
describing scenario process, and therein drawing theoretical inferences with 
regards to the research question, the research situation clearly called for the case 
study method as applied above. However, as Easton (1992) and Hussey & Hussey 
(1997) describe, the case study is a detailed examination of a single instance of a 
phenomenon of interest: cases studies are an example of phenomenological 
methodology, which is characterised by illuminating the specific and the particular. 
They are deep in focus but narrow in scope. Basing an analysis on isolation of two 
scenario projects out of the hundreds known to have been completed in the last 30 
years where scenarios have been in common practice would of course represent 
research that is too narrow in scope. It therefore remained to augment the cases 
above with qualitative interviews. The primary case studies investigate the research 
question in detailed, concrete terms: the semi-structured interviews that follow test 
its validity over a wide spectrum of projects.  
 
4.3 Scenario Case Study 1:  
 
Eco-Resorts of the Future (Scenarios for 2028), Arup Foresight & Innovation, 
Ngurdoto Mountain Lodge, Tanzania, 2008. 
 
4.3.1 Case Sources 
This case study was investigated via the documents of the project, kindly made 
available to the researcher by Arup Foresight, as detailed in the bibliography. Chief 
among these are the Scenario Report and the Delegate Pack. The textual records 
and materials were augmented with (a) the researcher’s own notes of a 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
115 
 
presentation of this scenario work at London Foresight Symposium, attended by 
the researcher in November 2008; and (b) by in-depth interviews conducted with 
the scenario project leader, Francesca Birks, of Arup Foresight, in April 2010 and 
over the following months.  
 
4.3.2 Case Overview 
In mid-2008, the consulting firm Arup Foresight (UK) hosted and conducted a 
scenario-building workshop for a client that operates in the international eco-
tourist industry. Aside from pre- and post-production, the scenarios centred on a 
two-day workshop at the Ngurdoto Mountain Lodge, in Tanzania, in 2008. 
Subsidiary contributing organisations were Arup Botswana, Arup NYC, Arup South 
Africa, BT, Central St. Martin, Dissing & Weitling, Eikosphere, Governess Films, Hines, 
Make, The Mountain Institute, Nature & Kind, NYU Film School, P2P Safaris, 
Planning Kenya, and Sleeper. (Arup Foresight 2008a, 39). 
 
4.3.2.1 Situational Context 
Tourism plays a vital role in the Tanzanian economy. As in many places in Africa, it 
is a crucial foreign exchange earner, but beyond this, it has a key role in 
developing grassroots communities economically and socially. Tanzania has 
significant potential for the development of eco-tourism projects that can help to 
conserve vast lands belonging to rural municipalities. Investors can only acquire 
these lands through the Village Land Act, a progressive law that respects 
traditional rights of land tenure. 
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4.3.2.2 The Client 
The scenarios were commissioned and paid for by the firm Habitaem, under the 
directorship of social entrepreneur Jose Ojeda, and its partner ISTCD (In Service 
Training on Cultural Diversity). Habitaem has eco-businesses in Tanzania and 
Nepal. On its web site, Habitaem defines itself as: “a socially committed business 
initiative. It is formed from an international group of professionals including 
architecture, medicine, and hospitality…. Our main aim is to generate eco-resorts 
which can contribute to conservation and sustainable development.”20 Arup 
defines the client as a social and sustainable entrepreneur, interested in 
sustainable development, with the view that eco-tourism is a viable way to achieve 
social-sustainable goals, including social development and protecting habitat and 
wildlife.21  
 
4.3.3. Defined Purpose of the Scenario Project 
Habitaem had raised funds to develop a model of for-profit eco-resorts that were 
efficient tools for both conservation and rural development. It had chosen 
Tanzania and Nepal for the development of pilot projects, to test models that 
would bring about a symbiosis between eco-tourism, conservation and rural 
development, and to anticipate formats for partnerships between local 
communities and outside investors in developing sustainable African resorts. 
                                                 
20
 http://www.habitaem.com. Viewed April 17, 2012 
21
 Arup’s point of view in this case study has been determined via documents as listed in the bibliography 
as well as interviews with Francesca Birks, Arup’s facilitator and manager of the project; and via emails 
and document exchange with Birks and with Arup Director of Foresight, Dr. Chris Leubkeman. 
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“Within this context, the goal of the scenarios was to explore how sustainable 
resorts (eco-resorts) could emerge into the Tanzanian tourist industry, what these 
might look like, what types would be successful, and why, and to build towards 
new and improved concepts of sustainable resorts.”22 
 
4.3.4 Pre-Work and Event Setup 
Arup invited participants from its various global offices, and also looked at its 
network from previous events, seeking to invite participants based on interest in 
sustainable business in general, or eco-tourism in particular, or those who could 
make other specific contributions on themes relating to business in Africa, 
technology, development, tourism, and allied interest.23 Arup assigned one piece 
of preparation “homework” before the event, asking people for their associations, 
particularly: “What have you loved or hated about an eco-resort?” (Arup Foresight 
2008a, 6) 
 
4.3.4.1 Local Experience: Learning Journeys 
The facilitator also provided an “experience day” on June 9, 2008, the day before 
the plenary workshop. In what was described as a “learning journey” Arup sent 
four groups to experience the range of service and client issues at various different 
resorts (the Dik Dik, Arusha Coffee Lodge; Mount Meru Game Lodge; Mountain 
Village) near the city of Arusha, Tanzania. The specific questions the delegates 
were tasked with answering were as follows: 
                                                 
22
 Birks Interview, April 2010. See Appendix 1. 
23
 The full delegate list of 32 is recorded in the delegate pack: (Arup Foresight, 2008b, 5) 
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FOOD: 
VIIhere does the 'ood saved at the resort come from? Please describe inf <XlS~e tcxx:I productlCfl 0: 
pt.fd>asing practices ie. OOj.ing crly gccds that aelccal, o:garic, fa:r-trOOe a'ldIo: gx;d practJc.e? 
Does the food SEn>ed at the resort repe5ellt IccaI aJ!inary aJtttxe? I¥e optKnS d.f!red to accoomodate 
preferen:::es st.eh as vegetaiar1, ha:aal , k:>sher, etc.? 
SOCIAl: 
HaN does the local conYTlJrlty t:>e-rnlt 'rem the existence and activity of the resort? Exampies ire an 
iraeased 1lLm00r of jobs, skils traa-lng in the bcaI corrrrurl;ty 0: re&I~S of projects su::h as resort iJded 
constructlCfl of a needed schco!room. lrases a.Jtural awa'ff18SS, occourages part:cipatlCfl in COTIllmcty 
actMtes, facilitates local spalsasll~ programmes, etc. 
Please list ~ past, preseru 0: p:arTied CorTYrUl;ty projects and the, ~t on the 0C0l!TllJrity. 
Please state any staff, guest 0: comrrurlty eco-tranng 0: edtx;at'0Il programmes, materia's and resot.fces . 
INTERPRETATION QUESnONS: 
Is irlfoonation regcnJng the opernti<XlS and pra::;tices of the resort easily accessible? Rease describe 
.....nether staff members are I<TcwleO;Jeab'e and oottusiastic about ecological <Jld cuttural issues. 
Please desabe....rut aspects make)'OJ war.! to stay at this accommodatoo, and....rut dlarges 1'.O.)k:J 
make)'OJ want to stay here more. 
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Figure 4.1. Source: Arup Foresight. From supplementary documents provided to the 
researcher by Arup Foresight. 
 
The spirit of localisation that the learning journey embodies ties in with the client 
Habitaem’s general contention that visiting participants needed a close 
understanding of not just the industry but also African situational conditions and 
constraints, in order to more accurately think about future scenarios and 
solutions.  
 
4.3.5 The Scenario Building Workshop 
The plenary workshop session was held over 2 days, on June 10-11, 2008. As 
reflected in the main report (Arup Foresight, 2008a) and confirmed by Birks, 
participants went through trend identification exercises common as a first phase 
of scenario building. These took the form of STEEP scanning, particularly looking 
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at drivers and constraints, and a “global force” session. In Arup’s terms this is a 
group stimulation of “where we are today vs. where the group thinks we are 
heading”, to challenge current perceptions of reality and get participants thinking 
long-term: the time-horizon of the project was 2028. Among the pertinent results 
were (Arup Foresight 2008a, 10): 
 
Figure 4.2 
 
4.3.5.1. Scenario Matrix 
The scenario report reflects the following 2x2 scenario matrix (Arup Foresight 
2008a, 23): 
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Figure 4.3 
 
The vertical axis of uncertainty plots resort developers’ attitudes towards 
projects: whether they would take a long-term or short-term approach; the 
horizontal axis plots consumer (resort guest) attitudes to their African lodge 
experience: whether people would mostly indulge in a more superficial 
“hedonistic” and ecologically superficial experience, or whether they would be 
more environmentally and socially conscientious in their choices, and have a 
deeper relationship with the locality and local inhabitants. The polarities of the 
axes are described as follows: 
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“Long term: Developers invest in a long-term business strategy that nurtures and 
supports the local community and natural environment, vs. 
Short term: Developers apply quick and inexpensive green solutions with a view 
to seeing immediate results. 
 
Hedonistic: Visitors travel for a comfortable, relaxing vacation experience that is 
indulgent and that revives, vs. 
Conscientious: Visitors are open and interested to learn about the local culture 
and environment through an interactive and responsible experience.” (Arup 
Foresight 2008a, 23) 
 
In this project, as sometimes happens in scenario facilitation where time is 
precious, the facilitators had in fact derived the idea for scenarios based on these 
uncertainties and therefore this particular matrix structure before the workshop; 
they were thus able to use workshop time to develop stories and implications 
around it. According to the Arup style of facilitation, as reported by Birks, the 
facilitators had determined these were the key drivers of uncertainty that would 
shape the future sector operating environment, and which therefore would 
provoke the most fertile workshop discussions and scenarios outcomes.  
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4.3.6. The Scenarios 
 For each of these alternative worlds a specific eco-resort solution was envisaged, 
as follows (Arup Foresight 2008a, 28): 
 
 
Figure 4.4 
 
4.3.6.1 Salama Village (conscientious visitors and long-term investors)  
Key terms: niche market, cultural exchange, eco-village community 
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Visitor Experience: The 5,000 hectare resort has been transformed into an eco-
village of bungalows. On average the length of stay is anywhere between 1 week to 
6 months. The resort will be developed and designed to cater to tourists' needs 
and will be flexible enough to meet the desires of the market sector. 
Economics: The project will involve the community as an integral part of the 
financial model for the resort. Dynamic pricing will be set to discourage short and 
passive stays and to encourage repeat business. Guests, as primary shareholders, 
can put their property back into the rental pool when not in use. CSR operating 
partnerships have also been identified. 
Eco-Concept: The resort will incorporate the natural landscape into its design. 
There will be the use of natural resources for passive ventilation and the use of 
local geothermal ground conditions for producing electricity and hot water for the 
resort. The resort will be entirely self-sustaining in terms of food, energy and 
water. Animal conservation will also be an element. 
Prototype client: Pratima. (Each of the four groups was assigned a character. 
The characters were carefully developed taking into account global demographic 
and lifestyle trends in the next twenty years such as the growth of the Chinese and 
Indian middle class, ageing populations, and the increased buying power of female 
professionals.) 
Pratima is beginning the fourth chapter of her life. Indian, recently widowed and 
an “empty-nester”, she is looking for a new place to call home. Community and the 
ability to be part of one are extremely important to her. Her immediate 
surroundings are also critical to her spiritual world. 
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4.3.6.2. Nemba, a private island (hedonistic visitors and long-term investors)  
Key terms: high-end, luxurious, exclusive, branded philanthropy, customised 
Visitor Experience: The property offers a maximum of six units. All units are 
100% private and provide shared central services to the occupants. The central 
core has private spa and service facilities. A personalized host serves each guest 
and is able to provide the guest with the kind of service they are accustomed to 
receiving in their primary home.  
Economics: There is a total of six investors on the property, which include Taylor 
and five other suitable occupants. The members pay an annual fee for exclusive 
and unrestricted use of the facilities.  
Eco-Concept: The immediate community benefits from jobs and dividend flows. 
The property maps the fishing populations to assist the fishing community, which 
is dependent on this trade for their subsistence. The theme for the buildings is low 
rise and low impact. 
Prototype client: Taylor. Taylor is a successful partner at a New York law firm, 
Taylor is extremely ambitious and used to getting what she wants. She is selective 
about her brands and is equally discerning about her leisure time. She is willing to 
pay a premium for quality. 
 
4.3.6.3. Pangani: (conscientious visitors and short-term investors)  
Key terms: mobile eco-resort, layers of private space, local community interaction 
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Visitor Experience: The self-contained mobile pods can be assembled and 
disassembled to move to new locations and to incorporate other social pods. The 
design of each pod balances the guest's need to be connected with a desire for 
privacy. The pods can travel on land and water so that guests can follow migratory 
patterns in Africa. 
Economics: A large part of the economics of this project are that a percentage of 
the revenue will be re-invested into the local communities via partnership 
agreements and shareholding in order to invest and develop human capital. 
Eco-Concept: The pods aspire towards carbon neutrality. They are built from 
renewable materials and are sustainable in their operations. A roof clad of PV 
panels, internal composting toilets and grey water treatment are part of the 
design. Guests also contribute to the local education system by fostering a child 
from the community. 
Prototype client: Lars & Stephan. Lars and Stefan are a young gay couple still 
excited to discover new places and experiences. However, they are also quite 
conscious of their impact on the natural world. They are open to new ideas, but 
any holiday they take will need to be low-impact. 
 
4.3.6.4. Chen-grila: (hedonistic visitors and short-term investors)  
Key terms: big brand get away for families, Chinese-centric, feng shui design, 
invisible green eco-resort 
Visitor Experience: The minimum stay at the hotel is seven nights. The resort has 
been carefully designed to take into account feng shui principles. The Chen-grila 
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offers adventures within guidelines to cater to its Chinese clientele. The resort is 
safe, offers child care, and holds no surprises for the visitor.  
Economics: The anticipated cost of construction for the resort is high, requiring 
considerable investment in hidden or invisible green technology. The economics of 
this concept highlights the extreme hidden efficiency of the operational side. 
Eco-Concept: The resort will operate as a closed self-sustaining loop and respect 
cradle-to-cradle principles (i.e. grey water from showers will be used for laundry; 
photo-voltaic power generation from the man-made volcano lake). A close 
connection to the community will be developed with an understanding that many 
of the resort employees will be locally employed. 
Prototype client: The Chens. The Chens are part of the recently emerged Chinese 
middle class. They are hard workers and operate their own franchise. They value 
their traditions and the time they spend with their immediate and extended family 
network. Ideally they look for holidays where they can reconnect and play with 
family. 
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4.4. Scenario Case Study 2: Live the Future (Scenarios for 2025), Metropolitan 
Life Foundation, Cape Town, 2005.  
 
4.4.1 Case Sources 
This case was investigated via the extensive documents of the project, kindly made 
available to the researcher by the Metropolitan Life Foundation, many of which 
are also available at the website http://www.livethefuture.co.za. The documents 
are detailed in the bibliography. The textual materials were augmented with 
phone calls with various Metropolitan Life employees, and an in-depth interviews 
with Desiree Daniels, past-Metropolitan Life employee and Chief Co-ordinator of 
the scenario project, and with Dr Barbara Heinzen, Lead Facilitator of the project.  
 
4.4.2 Case Overview: Situational Context 
In 2004-2005 Metropolitan Life and the Metropolitan Life Foundation created a 
set of scenarios for HIV-AIDS in South Africa to 2025. At the time HIV-AIDS was 
very much top of the national agenda, particularly in terms of governmental non-
acknowledgment of the problem and lack of apparent policy responses; worries 
surrounding health care provision and cost; lack of clarity on roles and obligations 
of pharmaceutical companies; and individual and group fears. As the data in the 
charts below shows, South Africa was facing a very severe medical catastrophe, 
the outcomes of which certainly could not be predicted. However, it is apparent 
that the scenario creators did perceive that HIV-AIDS outcomes for 2025 could be 
influenced and beneficially shaped by the various agents involved during the 20 
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year time period (2005-2025), and created scenarios based on that assumptions, 
as described in the next section.  
 
4.4.3 Defined Purpose of Scenario Project 
In the Forward to the Project Overview (Metropolitan Life Foundation 2009a, 3) 
Program Director Nathea Nicolay addresses the purpose of the scenarios as 
follows: “The Live the Future scenario model is a powerful tool to inspire all South 
Africans to take action against HIV and AIDS.” The goals of the Live the Future 
scenario project are further defined on the livethefuture.co.za web site as follows:  
“The Live the Future project aims to mobilise leadership from all sectors, 
and anyone else who can make a difference, with a view to drawing 
together and intensifying efforts to mitig te the effects of HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa. Our donor, Metropolitan Group, has for a long time played an 
active role in the HIV and AIDS arena, having developed the Doyle 
model—the first actuarial tool to project the demographic effect of HIV 
and AIDS in southern Africa. We view the Live the Future scenarios as an 
equally pivotal tool to: 
 Create a shared understanding of the key factors driving the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic so as to minimise the spread and the effect of the epidemic; 
 Create a vision of a successful future that will inspire people from different 
sectors to commit to specific actions at an individual, organisational, 
community as well as at a national level; 
 Identify key actions required to align, intensify and broaden efforts 
countrywide so as to maximise synergies and more effectively use limited 
resources; 
 Influence policies and agendas at different levels.” 
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Purpose is further elaborated as follows:  
“The key question we asked when developing the scenarios was: 'How will 
HIV and AIDS and our responses (new italics) shape the future of South 
Africa by 2025?'… The Live the Future scenarios suggest that unless we aim 
to prevent new infections, collaborate and adopt a holistic and integrated 
approach, we will make little progress in stemming the tide… Join us in 
'living this dream' by taking the necessary steps to shape South Africa's 
future in areas where you have influence, i.e. in your personal life, in your 
community and in your work or professional capacity. Together we can 
create a South Africa beyond expectation.”24  
 
4.4.5. Pre-work and Event Setup 
Peter Doyle, CEO of Metropolitan Life at the time, had done actuarial HIV-Aids 
“projection scenarios” 20 years before (in the mid-1980s), the more gloomy of 
which had in fact turned out to be accurate. Twenty years later, his idea was to 
redo scenarios, but less to do with projections and more to do with the idea of 
“collaborating, getting stakeholders on the same page, sharing a vision, so they 
could collaborate. There was a lot happening around HIV; responses were not 
necessarily attuned, we felt if we could create a shared understanding of where 
things are at, and if we could created a shared vision, we could work towards that 
and make a difference to HIV-AIDS in South Africa.”25 Desiree Daniels was heading 
an HIV-Aids Unit at Metropolitan Life (a business advisory-advocacy unit) and 
became de-facto internal head of the project. Pieter Fourie was a close advisor, 
                                                 
24
 www.livethefuture.co.za, viewed April 2012. 
25
 Daniels Interview, March 2011. See Appendix 1. 
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and then-UK-based American facilitator Barbara Heinzen was appointed chief 
consultant and facilitator of the project. Storyteller Philipa Kabali-Kagwa and 
health economists Veni Naidoo and Marisa Casale were added, to form the core 
project team. Among the well-known advisors to the project were Pieter Le Roux 
and Adam Kahane, who were both instrumental in the Mont Fleur Scenario Project 
(Kahane, 1997) and whose contributions to scenario planning theory, particularly 
interpretation of its purpose and benefits, is recorded in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.5).  
 
4.4.5.1 Meeting 1: Pre-session 
In this first meeting, known within the project as the “Pre-session”, the core team 
investigated various existing studies of the future and scenario sets that were 
primarily either (1) African in subject matter, or (2) HIV-AIDS scenario studies 
(global). They invited the authors of these projects to a workshop in Cape Town to 
share the highlights and discuss learnings and implications. According to Barbara 
Heinzen, the key questions asked at this stage were “who has the power, and what 
are their values and goals?”26 Then the group asked themselves: “Are these the key 
things? And took the results forward to verify them in the open sessions” (that is 
at the stakeholder meeting, below).27 At this early stage the following fork-in-the-
road visualisation of alternative future paths was drawn (Metropolitan Life 
Foundation 2009a, 5): 
 
                                                 
26
 Heinzen Interview, April 2012. See Appendix 1. 
27
 Daniels Interview, March 2011. See Appendix 1. 
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Figure 4.5 
 
4.4.5.2. Meeting 2: Stakeholder Meeting 
At the next open meeting, known to the core team as the “Stakeholder Meeting”, 
the core team invited a spectrum of business, government and community 
representatives to comment on their work thus far, to confirm or critique, or to 
further develop the themes that came out of the Pre-session. This was the meeting 
where much of the content was developed and the scenarios (presented below) 
were first fleshed out. It should be noted that, similarly to the Eco-Resorts of the 
Future study above, the core facilitation team developed the fundamental 
elements of the Live the Future scenario matrix prior to open plenary facilitated 
workshops. 
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4.4.5.3. Meeting 3: General Meeting 
This was a plenary meeting of about 120 people from across South Africa, 
representing a wide spectrum of organisations and viewpoints: labour unions, 
community representatives, the business sector, central government and 
government departments such as Health and Education, specialist doctors, and 
professional directly involved in the HIV-AIDS care. They were invited “because 
they were stakeholders, not experts. They had an interest in the outcome of the 
issue. At this meeting the pre-scenarios were shared with the broad spectrum of 
stakeholders: the idea was to check and develop our thinking, and ask ‘are we on 
the right track?’ and get buy-in and so take the scenarios forward.”28 
 
4.4.6. Scenario Matrix 
The scenarios in final form were built around the uncertainties: “Economic 
Growth” (High vs. Low) and Social Collaboration (High vs. Low), as follows 
(Metropolitan Life Foundation 2009a, 6): 
                                                 
28
 Daniels Interview, March 2011. See Appendix 1. 
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Figure 4.6 
 
From this point in the proceedings facilitator Barbara Heinzen was no longer 
directly involved, and writing of the scenarios was handed over to a 
communications team at the Metropolitan Life Foundation. Desiree Daniels 
remained in oversight at the team came up with final names for the scenarios, 
created scenario write-ups, and made a video. The scenario summaries are as 
follows (Metropolitan Life Foundation 2009a, 8ff.):  
 
4.4.7.1 Scenario 1: Autumn of Limited Opportunity (high economic growth 
and low social collaboration) 
Key characteristics: • Leadership driven by growth • Exclusive partnerships • 
Significant income differentials • Treatment and care is available, prevention is 
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lacking • Little behaviour change • Gender inequality and sexual violence • AIDS 
response intellectualised • Limited acceptance of HIV positive people 
The focus: In the Autumn of Limited Opportunity the focus is on treatment and 
support to those who can afford it. The response to HIV is very much intellectualised 
and little benefit trickles down to those in need. Leadership is often self-serving and 
corrupt with the wealth and resultant power concentrated in a relatively small 
pocket of society. Exclusive partnerships are formed with strong individual agendas 
to address HIV and AIDS. Society is profit-driven with little focus on the spread of 
wealth. Business response to the epidemic is mostly profit-driven due to the 
reduction in HIV-related costs that come with an HIV workplace programme. 
Initiatives in the community are limited to urban areas and corporate social 
investment funding cycles are short. Civil society response under this Autumn 
scenario where there is high GDP growth and low social collaboration is limited. 
Donor programmes are short-sighted and work in isolation. 
Individual behaviour: Awareness of HIV is quite high in the relatively wealthy first 
economy leading to a third of South Africans knowing their HIV status. Sexual 
violence is prevalent, and gender inequalities remain. There is limited acceptance of 
people with HIV and AIDS. Around 40% of adults use condoms consistently. Those 
not in a long-term relationship change partners very frequently and risky sexual 
behaviour still remains a huge obstacle in the response to the epidemic. 
The new society: This is a society with high economic growth that is very unevenly 
spread leading to a high increase in income inequality. Some provinces show a high 
GDP per capita and others remain at very low levels. The Human Development 
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Index (HDI) differs widely between the first and the second economy. The HDI 
remains high in the first economy with good quality education and high life 
expectancy for those who can afford a good standard of living. Rural households and 
households in the second economy are severely affected by HIV and AIDS. Income 
reduction, increased borrowing, the sale of productive assets, illiteracy and 
malnutrition result in low GDP per capita, poor education and low life expectancy. 
The average person in the Autumn scenario is expected to live to age 55 by 2025. 
Business concentrates on capital-intensive industries and contract work becomes 
popular. The skills shortage worsens with the strong economic growth and skills are 
imported due to the lack of adequate skills development by the local education 
system. There is a booming market in the first economy with insurance remaining 
expensive but innovative. 
What does the HIV epidemic look like by 2025? The total number of people 
infected with HIV in 2025 will have reduced to 4.2 million from the current 
estimates of 5 million. The estimated HIV prevalence rate for those between 20 and 
64 will reduce to 13% from the current estimated 1%. A total of 530 000 South 
Africans will be in the final stages of the disease and in need of antiretroviral 
treatment. AIDS deaths per annum would have reduced to around 303,000. 
 
4.4.6.2 Scenario 2: Winter of Discontent (low economic growth and low social 
collaboration) 
Key characteristics • Weak self-serving leadership • Few partnerships • Focus on 
blame, stigma and conspiracy • No behaviour change: drugs, sexual violence, gender 
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inequality • Contradictory beliefs about HIV and AIDS • High crime • AIDS response: 
fake cures, corrupt systems.  
The focus: Under a Winter of Discontent South Africans are focusing on 
apportioning blame for the unabated effects of the HIV and AIDS epidemic on South 
Africa. Stigma, denialism and conspiracy theories are the order of the day in the 
absence of a strong integrated response to HIV and AIDS. The response to AIDS has 
become desperate under a weak and self-serving leadership. Few partnerships are 
formed and the National AIDS Plan becomes ineffective. Business response is limited 
under this low growth scenario and labour is regarded as dispensable. There is a 
weak civil society, which is disappointed by the State Welfare system, and criminal 
and violent behaviour fuel the epidemic. Donor programmes are implemented on 
hidden agendas and with a short-term focus. Donor funding is significantly reduced 
over time. 
Individual behaviour: Awareness of HIV is low with only one in five of South 
Africans knowing their HIV status by 2010. A high level of gender inequality and 
sexual violence still exist and criminal activity exploits these weaknesses in society. 
Condoms are only used consistently by about 40% of youths and 24% of adults. 
Those not in a long-term relationship change partners more frequently and South 
Africans are not taking individual responsibility for their health.  
The new society: The Winter scenario society experiences negative economic 
growth and low social collaboration. There is an increase in income inequality and 
unemployment, which exacerbates criminal and corrupt behaviour. This results in 
the flight of the wealthy and the exploitation of the poor. The Human Development 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
138 
 
Index (HDI) continues to drop after 2005 and AIDS reverses years of developmental 
gains made by some communities. Life expectancy drops to 50 years by 2025. 
Households are severely affected by AIDS with income reduction, increased 
borrowing, the sale of productive assets, and illiteracy and malnutrition being the 
order of the day. The State welfare system is strained and unable to cope. The large 
proportion of unskilled labour increases unemployment and skilled labour remains 
in short supply. Reduced foreign investment coupled with continuous deaths in the 
workplace leads to some companies closing down. The market shrinks with most 
expenditure focused on basic goods and security. Insurance remains expensive and 
unavailable to most HIV-positive individuals, as are most financial services.  
What does the HIV epidemic look like by 2025? The total number of people 
infected with HIV in 2025 will have increased to 5.4 million from current estimates 
of 5 million. The estimated HIV prevalence rate amongst the ages 20 to 64 will 
remain high at 18%. A total of 786 000 South Africans will be in the final stages of 
the disease and in need of antiretroviral treatment. AIDS deaths per annum will be a 
high 445,000. 
 
4.4.6.3. Scenario 3. Spring of Hope (low economic growth and high social 
collaboration) 
Key Characteristics • Idealistic broad-based but uncoordinated leadership led by 
communities • Small duplicating partnerships • Powerful pockets in civil society 
responding well • Focus on acceptance and care • Moderate behaviour change • 
Better gender equality • AIDS response: chronic, manageable disease.  
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The focus: The Spring of Hope focuses on acceptance, care and cooperation. AIDS is 
seen as a chronic disease and society learns to live with the epidemic despite its 
devastating effect. Leadership is idealistic in certain pockets of communities, but 
efforts are uncoordinated and not powerful on a national level. Civil society 
becomes very strong in its response to AIDS and occasional partnerships are formed 
with the public and private sector as well as international donors to address the 
effect of HIV and AIDS. Churches play a key role around care. These efforts largely 
remain fragmented and uncoordinated leading to duplication and resulting in the 
unsustainable use of time and resources. Business response to the epidemic is 
strong in the workplace and community, however, due to a low GDP-growth 
environment, business input is mostly limited to those few who are employed.  
Individual behaviour: Within this self-reliant society, certain pockets of the 
community become quite powerful and encourage people to get tested. Just more 
than one third of South Africans know their HIV status by 2010. More than 70% of 
the youth and around 40% of adults use condoms consistently. Those not in a long-
term relationship change partners less frequently, due to pressure from society. 
Many communities empathise and care for AIDS affected households, and encourage 
higher gender equality and less sexual violence.  
The new society: Low economic growth and an inadequate response to the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic result in a South Africa with low GDP per capita. Education remains 
poor, but life expectancy increases slightly to 56 years by 2025. Not much 
improvement has been made in the Human Development Index (HDI) since 2005. 
Skilled resources emigrate due to lack of employment opportunities and poor 
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service delivery. Most households are affected by AIDS but communities form 
cooperatives and assist with healthcare provision. The State welfare system 
becomes overburdened and government resources are limited. Shortage of skilled 
labour worsens with emigration and poor education, leading to the struggle of 
business to remain competitive globally. Foreign direct investment reduces in this 
low growth environment. Funeral insurance remains highly popular and the market 
for basic goods and services is strong.  
What does the HIV epidemic look like by 2025? The total number of people 
infected with HIV in 2025 will have reduced to 3.4 million from the current 
estimates of 5 million. The estimated HIV prevalence rate amongst the ages 20 to 64 
will have reduced to 11% from the current estimated 19%. A total of half a million 
South Africans will be in the final stages of the disease and in need of antiretroviral 
treatment. AIDS deaths per annum will be reduced to around 292,000. 
 
4.4.6.4 Scenario 4: Summe  for All People (high economic growth and high 
social collaboration)  
Key characteristics • Strong collaborative leadership committed to a develop-
mental society and led by government • Effective large-scale public-private partner-
ships • Focus on prevention, also provision of treatment and care • Personal 
responsibility for health • Wide-spread behaviour change • Strong social net • 
Integrated AIDS response 
The focus: The Summer for All People focuses on prevention in order to reduce new 
HIV infections in an already advanced mature HIV epidemic. Care and treatment are 
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also important but the AIDS response is integrated to ensure that every level of 
society focuses on prevention, care and treatment. In order to achieve this, a strong 
collaborative leadership has emerged by 2010 with effective public-private 
partnerships to support the National AIDS Plan resulting in successful 
implementation. In the Summer scenario business becomes sustainable as a result of 
the new environment that has led to a smaller HIV epidemic but also as a result of 
its own initiatives around socially responsible investment and HIV and AIDS 
workplace and community initiatives. A strong civil society is consulted and 
integrated in the National AIDS response. Donor programmes become sustainable 
and are well coordinated. 
Individual behaviour: The above positive environment results in widespread 
behaviour change. Around 40% of all South Africans are aware of their HIV status. 
Most South Africans test themselves regularly for HIV infection. Individuals take 
personal responsibility for their sexual health and behaviour. More than 90% of the 
youth and around 60% of adults use condoms consistently. Those not in a long-term 
relationship change partners less often. A strong social net breaks the downward 
spiral of poverty and the increased risk of HIV infection. Effective law enforcement 
has a dramatic effect on averting sexual violence and drug abuse. 
The new society: South Africa emerges as a society where people are living longer 
and becoming more educated and skilled. The Human Development Index (HDI) 
increases slowly after 2005 as a result of higher life expectancy (59 years instead of 
51 years), education and GDP per capita. Few households are affected by AIDS and 
those that are affected receive support via state and private sector initiatives. 
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Private and public healthcare initiatives reach most people. The stronger, more 
skilled labour force drives South Africa into a new era of economic growth. Business 
is utilising labour effectively and the cost of labour is competitive. More people 
enter the first economy, thereby spreading wealth. Skills are developed and 
retained. Foreign direct investment improves and South Africa becomes more 
competitive globally. 
What does the HIV epidemic look like by 2025? The total number of people 
infected with HIV in 2025 will have reduced to 2.4 million from the current 
estimates of 5 million. The estimated HIV prevalence rate amongst the ages 20 to 64 
will reduce to 7% from the current estimated 19%. A total of 340,000 South Africans 
will be in the final stages of the disease and in need of antiretroviral treatment. AIDS 
deaths per annum will be reduced by 50% to about 200,000. 
 
4.4.7. Scenario-Based Data Projections 
The scenarios were further elaborated in the form of actuarial research, calculation 
and extrapolation. The following charts summarise the actuarial projections for 
each of the scenarios, for the key variables:  
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Figure 4.7 29 
 
 
 Figure 4.8 
 
                                                 
29
 Source: www.livethefuture.co.za, viewed April 2012. (Legend note text in original.) 
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Figure 4.9. 
4.4.8 Project Publicity and Launch 
Metropolitan Life partnered with Business Unity SA to launch the scenarios in 
early 2006, two and a half years after the project was first started. At first, the 
scenarios were launched primarily towards the business community, asking: 
“What role could businesses play in terms of these scenarios, and if they don’t play 
it where will we be in terms of the scenarios? And if they do play a role, can we 
achieve Summer?”30 A year later, when the South African government’s National 
Strategic AIDS plan (NSAP) came out, the Metropolitan Life Foundation worked 
closely with it: it partnered with NSAP to do a national road show, taking the 
scenarios to business and policy leaders in the different provinces, and feeding 
content into the South African government’s own 2014 scenarios (See Chapter 4B, 
Section 4.9.9). 
                                                 
30
 Daniels Interview, March 2011. See Appendix 1. 
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4.4.8.1. Community Action  
After this launch phase there was a lull during 2007-2008, following which the 
Metropolitan Life Foundation reprinted materials, renewed its Web site, and 
focused on turning the scenarios towards community education, specifically to 
stimulate and guide actions. This on-going work has been managed by Nathea 
Nicolay at the Metropolitan Life Foundation and Desiree Daniels who has been a 
consultant to the project. The idea was to: “develop a strategy for rolling it out into 
communities, to use as a community conversation tool. We compiled a whole book 
about responses: what should people be doing before or in each scenario; we 
looked at identifying people’s roles as individuals or members of families, 
communities, organisations or the macro environment—where on the HIV-AIDS 
spectrum could they get involved? Many were already involved in management of 
death or orphans. But we wanted to get them involved earlier. We had to address 
the ‘so what can we do?’ question.”31 To this end, Daniels and Nicolay trained 20 
facilitators in Western Cape to use the scenarios material as a catalyst for 
community-wide discussion. Part of the facilitators’ task in this regard has been to 
find appropriate partners to work with in communities. One example of this action 
has been the Sir Lowry’s Pass community, which was: “doing some things, for 
example a soup kitchen, but nothing at a deeper or more serious level. We 
partnered with different role-players there; had an organisation workshop with 
them, to which they invited different sections of their community. We looked at 
                                                 
31
 Daniels Interview, March 2011. See Appendix 1. 
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where they are, what are things they must stop or start or continue doing. 
Everyone ideally wants to be in Summer of course; our role was to turn that into 
actions: how to build that for the community.”32  
 
4.4.8.2 Live-the-Future Workshops 
Since 2009, the centrepiece of the Metropolitan Life Foundation scenario project 
implementation has been its scenario-based Live the Future community 
workshops. These seek “to create awareness, transfer knowledge, empower and 
inspire personal and group action. ” The existence and purpose of workshops are 
explained as follows:  
• “Who can apply for a Live the Future workshop? Any organisation that would 
like to address the health and related challenges around HIV, AIDS and TB in its 
community.  
• What is the cost involved? The Metropolitan Foundation sponsors the fees of 
the Live the Future facilitators, the workshop material and, pending approval, the 
venue and equipment hire as well as catering and transport costs.  
• Who can benefit from a Live the Future workshop? Everybody, including: 
corporates that would like to establish the driving forces behind the HIV epidemic 
in their own communities; small businesses that cannot afford expensive training 
and motivational workshops; NPOs that would like to collaborate with other NPOs, 
businesses and government departments; organisations faced with HIV-related 
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 Daniels Interview, March 2011. See Appendix 1. 
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challenges on a regular basis; community leaders and development workers; 
teachers and youth workers; and social workers.  
• How do I apply for a free Live the Future workshop? Send an e-mail to 
[organiser email and phone number provided]. You will be sent a Workshop 
Request Form and, pending approval, an accredited Live the Future facilitator will 
be assigned to your group.”33 
 
4.4.8.3 “Respond to the Challenge” Document 
As part of the community engagement phase, Daniels and Nicolay developed a 
further document “Live the Future: Respond to the Challenge” (Metropolitan Life 
Foundation, 2009b) which provides a framework for community action towards the 
Summer for All People scenario. This document outlines a six-step programme of 
action under the title “Planning to Realise Your Vision” and “Taking Up the 
Challenge” (Metropolitan Life Foundation, 2009b, 8; 2009b, 15). The key steps are: 
“Respond to the Challenge: For us to achieve a Summer for All People in South 
Africa, we need ‘Leadership by All, at All levels’. Everyone can play an important 
part to make the Summer for All People a reality. To make a real difference, we need 
concerted, integrated and coordinated efforts by individuals and groups across the 
country. We believe that you can play a role in areas where you have influence, i.e. in 
your personal life, in your community and in your work or professional capacity.”  
The Respond to the Challenge Document further renders and recommends specific 
actions towards change under the title: “How do you move from the current 
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 www.livethefuture.co.za, viewed April 2011 
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scenario to your preferred scenario?” (Diagram: Metropolitan Life Foundation 
2009b, 9): 
 
Figure 4.10 
 
The community advisory is: 
”An individual level: For example, you could go for voluntary HIV counselling and 
testing so that you know your HIV status. 
“A family level: For example, provide a sibling who is living with HIV with love and 
care or speak to a family member about situations that may put them at risk of 
becoming HIV-positive. 
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“A community level: For example, participate in a community group that is 
providing HIV and AIDS prevention information to youth in schools. 
“An organisational/institutional level: For example, you may volunteer your time 
to assist in the development of a workplace policy and programme. 
“A macro-level: For example, you may work collaboratively with other institutions 
to implement strategies that are well coordinated and organise resources so that 
they assist those working at the other levels.”34  
 
4.5 Preliminary Analysis 
The full analysis of these case studies, in terms of each other, in terms of the 
further scenario work it is contrasted to (via structured interviews), and in terms 
of the research question, is presented in Chapter 5. What appears here are 
preliminary observations to consolidate the presentation of the case studies 
before proceeding to presenting the interview results in Chapter 4B. 
The projects are similar in that they are both situated in Africa, consider 
effectively the same 20-year future, and have a clear social and developmental 
agenda in addition to whatever other purposes they may have. Both stress 
uncertainty about the direction and nature of future developments; both examine 
change drivers and resulting trends, provide integrated stories of future outcomes, 
and consider the implications. Further, methodologically they follow a very similar 
scenario preparation (identifying drivers of change, predetermined elements, etc., 
in workshop forums) and then using fundamental axes of uncertainty (in a 2x2 
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form) to provide the basis for four alternative pictures of the future, which they 
then elaborate in story form. It would be tempting to conclude merely that they 
both “use the scenario method,” but this would appear to miss fundamental 
differences in purpose of approach and attitude to constraint conditions that 
underlies each project.  
In Eco-Resorts of the Future, while definite ideals and outcome-preferences are 
held by the client and by the facilitating organisation (Arup Foresight), 
particularly to do with eco-sustainability and African rural social and economic 
development, scenarios are not built around the elaboration of these ideals 
coming to pass vs. not. The aspirations of the scenario developers are not intrinsic 
to the construction of the scenarios. Rather, there is an attempt to perceive the 
variety of outcomes and advance organisational goals in each scenario; that is, to 
consider how the principles and aspirations of the scenario makers or the scenario 
client may be achieved in any of various alternative plausible model future 
worlds—with none of the worlds being strongly strived for prima facie, nor 
expectation that such striving would bear fruit. The Live the Future scenarios are 
also created with a strongly held goal: to change (improve) future outcomes 
concerning the AIDS epidemic in South Africa. But in this case the scenarios are 
built directly around the elaboration of the preferred outcome emerging vs. not, 
that is, the aspirations of the scenario developers is intrinsic to the construction of 
the scenarios. There is no suggestion that stakeholders should be ready to adapt as 
best as possible to each of the scenarios, nor are mechanisms offered for best 
managing in each. Rather the scenario develops preferred vs. dispreferred 
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outcomes, which are used to guide an agenda for stimulating people, communities, 
and policymakers to make choices to bring the preferred outcome into being. 
Implied in these two approaches are different perceptions about the extent to 
which external forces (constraint conditions on a desired outcome) may be 
shaped: Eco-resorts of the Future perceives little power to influence external 
macro-variables that will shape the Tanzanian tourist sector; Live the Future 
perceives significant power of the scenario organisation (including its wider 
contacts and influences) to influence the future course of HIV-AIDS i  South Africa. 
It seeks to push back against and overcome what appear to be “given” constraint 
conditions, and influence the future towards the Summer For All People outcome 
through consciousness-raising and collaborative action, and changing behaviour 
(at the individual, family, group, organisation, or macro level). As will be theorised 
in Chapter 6, the coherence of the scenario set and possibility of effective follow-
on implementation depends on whether the assumption of influence (or non-
influence) over constraint conditions is a valid assumption.  
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Chapter 4B 
Research: Project-Based Structured Interviews 
 
 
4.6 Overview 
Chapter 4A presented the research into two case studies chosen to investigate the 
research question. However, as described in the research methodology section in 
Chapter 1, further case investigations were necessary to broaden the reference base 
of scenario projects under analysis, to verify to what extent, if any, the findings of 
the two primary case studies were academically generalisable. This chapter 
therefore continues to present the research content began in Chapter 4A by 
presenting the content of the project-based structured interviews with scenario 
practitioners, or project sponsors, as conducted by the researcher. Each interview 
considers a specific real-world scenario project, as referenced. These interviews, 
when considered alongside and in addition to the case studies, form the original 
research material basis for the argument of the dissertation. Therefore it is 
necessary to reproduce this material at some length, to allow independent 
consideration and verification of conclusions drawn by the researcher in the 
chapters that follow.  
The interviews were conducted between February and June, 2012. Situational 
information referring to name of scenario project, source document, date and place 
of project, interviewee, and date of interview is provided. The interview 
transcription format follows the six-question framework followed in each case, and 
reflects the interviewee list, as outlined in Appendix 1. Interviewee responses have 
been edited for reasons of length and clarity—including omitting repeats, fixing 
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verbal grammar where necessary for written communication, and joining up text 
where interviewees returned to answer a question more fully later in the process—
but otherwise faithfully and accurately record the answers of the interviewees. All 
of the interviews were audio-recorded, and these records are readily available from 
the researcher. Analysis of interview findings, and discussion of insights as to the 
research question are presented in Chapter 5, as a basis for the final argument of the 
dissertation, which is presented in Chapter 6.    
 
4.7 Selection of Projects and Respondents 
In conducting field interviews of this type, various considerations arise in choosing 
scenario projects to investigate and, once chosen, assessing the best respondent to 
speak for that project. Beyond what has already been specified in Chapter 1 (Section 
1.7.7.4), issues of project selection were considered and resolved as follows:  
 
4.7.1 Selection of Projects 
Subjects were recruited through purposeful sampling, in which the aim was to 
interview representatives of a sample of (a) typical projects—where the project is 
judged to be a well-representative sample of the population, and (b) diverse 
projects—where diversity reflects the spread of the population of projects. 
Achieving this spread in the sample mitigates bias in the study that would be 
introduced through too narrow a base, either geographic or conceptual. In the event, 
this spread was achieved through wide diversity in project type, sector and location.  
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4.7.1.1. Document Study 
In this search-and-selection phase of determining which projects to investigate and 
to find interview respondents for, the researcher investigated his own resource base 
of over 100 scenario projects, as well as gathering and assessing many dozens of 
other project reports, principally from the resource base of 550 scenario project 
reports provided in the public domain by the Millennium Project.35 These projects 
were analysed with a view to criteria (a) and (b) above, to create a long-list of 
representative work for further investigation, which was then winnowed down to a 
short-list for interview contact based on criteria of diversity as follows: 
 Location. The projects under study cover a broad spectrum of North 
American, European, Asian, and Australian work in the field. Special 
consideration of South African and African projects is considered below. 
 Industry or sector area of the project. The projects under study reflect a wide 
spread of industries and sectors, including food, tourism, biotechnology, 
logistics, information technology, libraries, and finance, among others. 
 Client type. The projects chosen for study represent a spread of for-profit, 
non-profit and government work. 
 
4.7.1.2 Age Restriction of Projects Under Study 
It was appropriate to restrict projects under study to those done in the last 10 years. 
This was (a) to ensure greater currency of topics, perspectives, and use of methods 
among the sample, and (b) in recognition that the answers to the questions posed 
                                                 
35
 The bibliography is at http://www.acunu.org/millennium/sof/app-f.html. Viewed November 2011 
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relied in part on the memory of the respondents. It was felt that 10 years was a 
realistic limit on accurate recollection of past project work processes.   
 
4.7.1.3. African Orientation  
While conforming to the demands of the previous selection criteria, there was also 
(as mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.7.2.1) a specific aim to include African 
scenario work, in recognition of the research location of the dissertation, the 
nationality and relative specialisation of the researcher, and the particularly rich 
contribution South African scenario work has made to international theory and 
practice in the field. In the event, two South African scenario projects, and one from 
in Zimbabwe and one from Uganda, were used. (This is in addition to both primary 
case studies being of African orientation, as presented in Chapter 4A.) 
 
4.7.2 Scenario Method  
The projects under study were purposefully restricted to the “2x2” scenario 
construction method.36 While the researcher very well recognises the criticisms of 
this method (as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.3.1), the 2x2 approach remains 
far and away the most commonly practiced scenario construction method in the 
field. Given this, it was perceived that there was little compromise in limiting 
projects sampled to those that followed this method, while there was great research 
                                                 
36
 The “2x2” axis scenario building approach is associated with Shell Oil and the Global Business 
Network, base on early methodology work by Herman Kahn and RAND. According to the approach, a 
set of key driving forces is identified; these are sorted into predetermined elements vs. critical 
uncertainties; and two of the critical uncertainties regarded to be highly important in terms of their 
future development and effect on the organisation are chosen to form the axes of a matrix. This 
matrix determines the primary logic of the scenario storylines. 
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benefit in being able to compare projects effectively:  holding method as a constant, 
attribution of effects of the project that may follow from method could be factored 
out and it became possible to compare project purposes, constraint conditions, and 
outcomes to each other directly, without accounting for method effects. It is noted 
that the case studies in Chapter 4A were also projects that used the same 2x2 
methodological base. Similarly, this allows the findings of the interviews and the 
case studies to become directly comparable. The applicability of the research 
findings to projects that use other scenario construction methods is discussed in 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.8.3) as an item for further study. 
 
4.7.3 Selecting the Interviewees 
Once the scenario project was identified, there remained the question of who to ask 
to represent the project for interview purposes. Given the close connection between 
the questions asked and the particular project as it was developed and used, there 
were effectively only two type of credible respondent: (a) the project facilitator, who 
ran the project; or (b) a senior representative of the commissioning organisation 
who was closely involved in the process. Interviewees were contacted by email or 
phone, often both, to explain in general terms the goals of the research project, and 
to request and set up a suitable appointment time.  
 
4.8 Form of the Interview 
The interviews were conducted either in-person, or via phone (or Skype) link. 
Generally they took between 30-60 minutes. Respondents were asked for 
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permission to record the interview for note-taking purposes, and academic 
verification if necessary. They were asked for permission to use the information 
from the interview for academic research purposes, and all agreed. A table of 
interviews including respondent, organisation, and date of interview is listed in 
Appendix 1. The recordings of the interviews are available from the researcher.  
  
4.8.1 Interview Questions 
The interview began with establishing the permissions noted above, and explaining 
the general purpose (Ph.D. research and publication) of the study. Specific 
elaboration as to the particular purpose of the questions, or detailed elucidation on 
nature of the study, or elaboration of preliminary findings and perceptions—where 
sought by the interviewee—were held back until the end of the interview in order 
not to prejudice answers given or otherwise compromise the rigour of the process. 
Factual information, including the exact name and date of the project under study, 
as well as the name and title of the interviewee was gathered at the beginning or 
end of the interview, or from project documents. Following a short introduction, 
which centred on the permissions as discussed above, the questions posed to the 
interviewee were as follows: 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation (or sponsor) of the project, and what is 
that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in either (a) 
the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
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4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a matrix 
structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are [named by the 
interviewer, as per specific case under study]. To what extent were the real-world 
outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to be under the control or influence of 
the participants, or the commissioning organisation (either in themselves or via 
broader networks of influence and persuasion)? 
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one [alternatively, two; alternatively, 
none] of the scenarios [named by the interviewer] describes a distinctly better 
outcome for the organisation, or for the sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this 
the aim? (b) If so, what did this imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of the 
scenarios, as perceived at the time? 
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did the 
project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or not)?  
 
 
4.8.2 Rationale of the Questions 
The questions were specifically targeted to the investigating the research question, 
as defined in Chapter 1 (Section 1.5). Question 1 probed the pre-existing and 
continuing purpose of the commissioning organisation, allowing reflections on the 
congruence between this and the purpose sought or achieved in the scenario 
project. Question 2 sought elaboration of the answer to Question 1 to further 
investigate why, according to the interviewee, a scenario approach had been chosen 
and what purpose it was expected or hoped it would fulfil. Question 3 determined 
who (other than facilitators) participated directly in the project, which prepared 
consideration of Question 4, which assessed how much influence over the external 
environment the working group or organisation representatives perceived 
themselves to have (either in themselves or via wider vectors of influence they 
could muster) by asking to what extent the outcomes of the uncertainty axes were 
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perceived to be under the control or influence of the participants: (did they expect 
to be able to influence outcomes as represented by the axes, or did they think the 
primary drivers of uncertainty in their future were beyond their influence). 
Question 5 focused on the uncertainty matrix, which is the foundational process 
step in 2x2 matrix scenario building, and reflected to the interviewee the 
researcher’s perception of the presence or absence of “good vs. bad” scenario 
outcomes for verification; and continued to ask how this, in the view of the 
interviewee, integrated with the overall purpose and use of the sce arios. Question 
6 determined how the scenario project had been put to use in practice, or to what 
extent this had been lacking, with a view to eliciting the interviewee’s explanation 
for implementation-phase success, or lack thereof.  
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4.9 Interviews 
  
Interview 1. Columbia Basin Trust: Shaping Our Future Together 
 
Source Document: Columbia Basin Trust. (2010) Shaping Our Future Together: 
2010 Columbia Basin Symposium, Scenario Planning Summary Report.37  
 
Date and Place of Project: October 2010; Revelstoke, British Columbia, Canada  
 
Interviewee: Juliet Fox, Future IQ Partners & Innovative Leadership (Menomonie, 
Wisconsin, USA): Lead Facilitator of the project 
 
Date of Primary Interview: March 12, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The Columbia Basin Trust is a wealthy foundation in the British Columbia region 
along the US-Canada border. (The USA dammed up the Columbia Basin River and 
backed up all the water to Canada—and therefore had to pay out a large sum over a 
long period of time to the Trust. The Trust runs the dam’s hydro-electric plant as 
well.) The Trust is responsible for c mmunity and environment planning and 
development of the region, and exists to feed resources into the British Columbia 
region. According to the scenario report document (CBT 2010): “Columbia Basin 
Trust supports efforts by the people of the Basin to create a legacy of social, 
economic and environmental well-being and to achieve greater self-sufficiency for 
present and future generations.”38 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
                                                 
37 The report is available at http://www.cbt.org/uploads/pdf/SymposiumReport_web_FINAL.pdf. 
Viewed March 29, 2012. 
38 The Columbia Basin Trust web site (www.cbt.org; viewed 29 March, 2012) adds the following:  
“Created by the residents of the Columbia Basin, Columbia Basin Trust (CBT) serves the people who 
live in the Basin and assists communities in addressing their needs by: providing resources and 
funding; focusing on local priorities and issues; bringing people together around key issues; 
providing useful, credible, accessible information and expertise; encouraging collaboration and 
partnerships; seeking ongoing input from Basin residents; and investing prudently in Basin power 
projects, businesses and real estate.” 
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Being well funded, there are a lot of arguments within the organisation and among 
stakeholders about how resources are spent. The Columbia Basin trustees were 
finding that people were mistrusting the way funds were being spent. Their priority 
was therefore to have a process “that was obviously not coming from them, that was 
obviously not top-down.” They wanted to raise the issues facing the region in the 
future, get stakeholders to be pulled out from own local agenda, into a wider 
perspective, and allow people to see the consequences of action vs. inaction and 
choose their preferred outcome. But above all, they were very keen on having an 
authentic transparent process: to have a grass-roots point-of-view, to build future 
thinking with the clear input of citizens—bringing a lot of people together to decide 
how resources are to be used and for them to see they were part of the future-
thinking process. This is why scenarios were important for them, and why they 
picked us (the consulting firm Innovative Leadership) who specialise in this. The 
scenarios were built by over 300 participants with different backgrounds and 
stakeholder interests, from all over the region—it all fed input into the project 
rationale. The scenarios were about the difference between where the Trust is and 
where the participants want them to be. The scenarios were like a “listening tool” to 
listen, and to influence programming on the basis of this. 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
As answered above, there were 300 stakeholders, organisations, groups, businesses, 
and associations, all with a common interest in the future of the region. 
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are “Ability 
to Create Sustainable Regional Systems” (increase vs. decrease) and 
“Response to Changing Economic Conditions” (increase vs. decrease). To what 
extent were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to be 
under the control or influence of the participants, or the commissioning 
organisation (either in themselves or via broader networks of influence and 
persuasion)? 
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Figure 4.1 Source: Columbia Basin Trust. (2010) Shaping Our Future Together: 2010 Columbia Basin 
Symposium, Scenario Planning Summary Report, p.10. 
 
The project exposed the axes of uncertainty according to the group, to the group, to 
create discussion about consequences and to do something about it because the 
Trust is a funding agency for the region. Through the scenarios the Trust and its 
stakeholders were saying: “This is where we want to be (in response to the axes of 
uncertainty) and this is where are we now towards getting there. What decisions 
are we making currently and where are they taking us? What should we be doing?” 
It was all towards creating action and influencing outcomes. It was about getting 
stakeholders into the dialog and decision-making; helping them see how they are 
creating the pathway forward and therefore to think about what they want the 
future to be, and thinking about the consequences of their actions—therefore what 
actions to take today. So the assumption of ability to influence outcomes was there.  
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one of the scenarios, “Blooming 
BEST Basin”, describes a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for 
the sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did 
this imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as 
perceived at the time? 
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Our intent was not to define an ideal or to get one scenario to occur; it was rather to 
find a way forward that represented a commonly held view or belief of the 
participants. Having said that, the “Increase x Increase — Blooming Best Basin 
scenario was clearly preferred. But I should add that the one below it (100 Mile 
Happiness) had a lot of characteristics the participants were interested in having—
anti-industry, pro-environment; pro-crafts; anti-big timber. I would say that two of 
the scenarios (the top two) were better outcomes than the other two. There were 
definitely better ones and worse ones.  
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
The Columbia Basin Trust has “analysis paralysis”. I believe they have a person to 
use the scenarios in community conversations. I’m not sure where they are at with 
that. If we had continued with the implementation process it would have been along 
the lines of our “long-term engagement” phase. In doing this we engage 5-10% of 
the population in face-to-face or electronic contact. We train facilitators; create 
facilitated conversations across the community, sectors, age, etc., and get broad 
community input on the preferred outcomes presented (and perceptions on what 
capacities need to be built to achieve it). We do a capacity assessment and look for 
lowest-hanging-fruit actions, but it is n t so much about pursuing an ideal future; 
this phase is to get them (community participants) wrapped around the scenarios. It 
is about having a (wider) contextual conversation that is illuminated by what the 
(scenario-building) community perceived as more ideal. It is also about creating 
systems for on-going stakeholder conversations about the future; building a culture 
of dialogue about the future, a conversation about where we want to go. In this the 
scenarios are a “living document” for developing further engaged input and action. It 
is getting the broader participants thinking about what they want the future to be, 
and whether the consequences of their actions are in line with that. The scenarios 
foster context; a power of understanding that comes from seeing the integration 
between their local agenda and the wider long-term consequences.  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
164 
 
Interview 2. Trade Knowledge Network: Agriculture in Southern Africa 
 
Source Document: Draper, P., Kiratu, S., & Hichert, T. (2009) How Might Agriculture 
Develop in Southern Africa? Making Sense of Complexity. Winnipeg: International 
Institute for Sustainable Development.39  
 
Date and Place of Project: 2008, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
Interviewee: Tanja Hichert, Institute for Futures Research, Cape Town. Co-lead 
Facilitator of the project. 
 
Date of Primary Interview: March 16, 2012. 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The project was commissioned by the Trade Knowledge Network (TKN), funded by 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Canada. The TKN’s 
purpose is to build capacity and increase knowledge in Africa about trade and trade 
agreements, and how to navigate the world of international trade. The IISD has 
funded TKN on various projects and in this case TKN had the freedom to use the 
money as it best saw fit.40 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
The aim was to make sense of complexity in this area: to have more clarity about a 
very complex, interconnected set of topics and how they could play out in future. 
Bear in mind that agriculture, agricultural development, trade in agricultural goods, 
and investment in agriculture is all comparatively a big unknown in Africa. People 
outside Africa have much better access to knowledge than Africans do. Peter Draper 
of the South African Institute of International Affairs, and head of TKN, had some 
                                                 
39 The report is available at http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1135. Viewed June 6, 
2012. 
40 The role of TKN and IISD is further provided by the report (Draper, P., Kiratu, S., & Hichert, T. 2009, 
p.ii): “Coordinated by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, the TKN links network 
members, strengthens capacity and generates new research to assess and address the impact of 
trade and investment policies on sustainable development. The overarching aim of the TKN is to help 
ensure that trade and investment contribute to sustainable development, with social development 
and the environment equitably addressed in trade and investment policies.” 
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experience of using scenarios in a previous WTO project, and thought it would apply 
to agriculture specifically. It was a learning exercise, for the sake of learning more 
about unknowns. There were no imminent investment decisions or anything like 
that. The aim was to have African people more knowledgeable about trade issues in 
agriculture—what is the case now, and what might be the future. 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
Peter Draper, wearing his “TKN hat”, had commissioned four country briefing 
papers and background papers to do with food security and trade, from 
Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa—setting out the broad contours 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) dynamics concerning agriculture under the 
Doha Development Agenda. We all gathered in Harare, papers presented as 
precursor to scenarios. The delegates were mainly agriculture and trade people 
from the region, both governmental and non-government. We had Zanu PF people in 
the room. 
  
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are 
“Investment Environment (megabucks vs. money drought) and “Domestic 
Policy” (Excellent vs. Hopeless). To what extent were the real-world outcomes 
of these uncertainties perceived to be under the control or influence of the 
participants, or the commissioning organisation (either in themselves or via 
broader networks of influence and persuasion)? 
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Figure 4.2 Source: Draper, P., Kiratu, S., & Hichert, T. (2009) How Might Agriculture Develop in 
Southern Africa? Making Sense of Complexity. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, p.16. 
 
 
The “Megabucks” vs. “Money Drought” axis of uncertainty had to do with the 
external level of investment in agriculture, and there was no sense of control over 
this. But there were people who had say about food security and trade-policy issues 
in the room. There were no direct agricultural policymakers from Namibia or 
Zambia, but there were from Mozambique and from Zimbabwe, and it would be 
reasonable to say they had influence.  
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one of the scenario outcomes, 
“I believe I can fly”, describes a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, 
or for the sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what 
did this imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as 
perceived at the time? 
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An ideal scenario was not the aim: the intention was not to have fantastic-ideal vs. 
horrible. The intention was to work with the most uncertain high-impact drivers 
and see what they gave us in terms of plausible futures. However I Believe I Can Fly 
is certainly a better scenario for the region when compared with This is the End. But 
many people thought Chabuda Hapana (nothing comes out) would better—we don’t 
have money flowing in, as in I Believe I Can Fly, so we have to muddle our way 
through and get better at policy, and then money will flow in in the right way. In this 
sense the both “excellent policy” scenarios were equally good. So on the policy axis 
there was a clear value dimension, a clear good vs. bad. On the money axis the value 
dimension is unclear—more money can be both good and bad. There is an 
assumption that money input, whether from private sector or donor organisations, 
that money is good or always has the best interests of African agriculture at heart, 
but they don’t. The money they might put in can help create any of the four futures 
we laid out, not necessarily the best ones! Foreign institutions are serving their own 
purpose as much as anything else. What will create better future is work on the 
policy side plus fixing land tenure issues: “fix thyself” was the big learning! 
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
They were published and disseminated, put to use in the TKN as a learning exercise. 
It was ultimately never more than a learning exercise; a process of illumination. It is 
certainly not apparent that the scenarios were used to improve domestic 
agricultural or trade or food security policy. But the scenarios did meet the purpose 
of making sense of complexity. The single big realisation was that a huge flow of 
money into African agriculture would not necessarily be a good thing.  
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Interview 3. Public Library Network, New South Wales: The Bookends 
Scenarios 
 
Source Document: Neville Freeman Agency. (2009) The Bookends Scenarios: 
Alternative Futures for the Public Library Network in NSW in 2030.41  
 
Date and Place of Project: 2009, Sydney, Australia, 
 
Interviewee: Oliver Freeman, Director, Neville Freeman Agency, Australia. Lead 
Facilitator of the project. 
 
Date of Interview: March 23, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The project was commissioned by the State Library of New South Wales (SLNSW), 
on behalf of what they defined at the time as “The New South Wales Public Library 
Network”. That latter entity does not exist, but the SLNSW didn’t see the project as 
being related just to the state library itself, although the State libraries in Australia 
are very big research and copyright libraries in themselves. SLNSW is a big research, 
copyright, and public library.  
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen?  
 
Participants from SLNSW were interested in informing themselves as to the impact 
of the future on their State library and their vision of their role going forward. The 
main concern was to bring professional librarians in NSW together to look at 
impacts of the future on role of public libraries. They were seeing the role of 
libraries as becoming “contestable”: all sorts of things are going on in terms of 
funding, technology, demographics—and they wanted to get a sense of what these 
alternative futures hold and the impact they might have on the public library 
network. They were interested in provision of pubic library services and how this 
might change in different futures. As to “why scenarios?” The specification for 
project did call for scenarios specifically: they were sensitive to the fact that 
scenarios might help them get somewhere new in their thinking. There had been 
                                                 
41 The report is available in the New South Wales Public Library: 
http://library.sl.nsw.gov.au/search/X?scenarios; Viewed April 9, 2012 
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some work had been done in New Zealand using scenarios to think about strategic 
implications for libraries, so that was a model for them to build on. 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
Aside from the Neville Freeman Agency (the facilitating company) the core scenario-
building team was made up of representatives of the major libraries in New South 
Wales. We were backed up by the NSW Public Libraries Research Committee. The 
interviewees for the project were all library representatives, and we had some 
outside foresight people and library futures experts from the USA. Essentially it was 
library-insiders who made the project.  
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are “Impact 
of ICT” (chaotic vs. ordered) and “Nature of Libraries” (physical vs. virtual). To 
what extent were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to 
be under the control or influence of the participants, or the commissioning 
organisation (either in themselves or via broader networks of influence and 
persuasion)? 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Source: Neville Freeman Agency. (2009), The Bookends Scenarios: Alternative Futures for 
the Public Library Network in NSW in 2030, p.21. 
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All inputs, including these, came from the group. We got to a larger list uncertainty 
vectors, and then did a group “merge and purge.” There is a certain amount of 
“facipulation” (sic) that we do on top of this. We know it is important that we get to 
the ‘aha’ set of scenarios. Our role is to help them get to a rich outcome. Could the 
participants or the broader SLNSW influence the world to the extent of changing 
axes? No. The uncertainties were absolutely beyond their control. We see it as 
critical that scenarios are scenarios relating to the external environment of the 
system of interest. We can do lots of work that is internal to the system. But this 
kind of work is about the interface between the system and its external 
environment.  
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that none of the scenarios describes 
a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for the sector, or for the 
world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did this imply for the 
purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as perceived at the time? 
 
We at Freeman Associates have a specific method that I should explain. We start 
with a “preferred future” (vision) that the organisation would like to see (also 
revealing a mission statement). This tells us what are the events that need to 
happen for that future to come about. We map that. But then we recognise that some 
events are contestable! They don’t need to happen, and they won’t just happen 
because the organisation wants them to happen. The questions is “How do you use 
scenarios so you avoid the scenarios being just carriers of your vision?” These 
contestable items become the first uncertainties; we add others and we then use all 
this to frame up scenarios. The result may fall out to utopia/dystopia worlds, but 
this is not the aim of the exercise. We have done our preferred future before we get 
to scenarios. We start with the vision, but understand that many elements of it are 
contestable. In this particular case, however, there was not enough funding to do the 
vision part. We just did phase two. But the point of phase two, the point of the of 
scenarios as a whole, was telling us what are the things we need to do to intervene 
in the external environment to get us somewhere we prefer. 
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
I’m sorry to say that nothing has happened after the session! The 150 people who 
were involved in the project came away having had a good time, and got a lot out of 
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it. In this case, the problem is the system of interest behind the project was the 
public library network – which doesn’t exist! So there is no direct organisational 
system to take it forward—that is looking to adapt itself or generate new policies in 
order to help be more resistant to a turbulent future, although the SLNSW could 
have picked it up itself (but didn’t). 
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Interview 4. Arctic Council: The Future of Arctic Marine Navigation 
 
Source Document: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment of the Arctic Council’s 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group. (2008) The Future of 
Arctic Marine Navigation in Mid-Century: Scenario Narratives Report.42 
 
Date and Place of Project: Q1, 2007 to Q2, 2008; San Francisco, USA, and Helsinki, 
Finland 
 
Interviewee: Dr. Eric Smith, Senior Practioner, Global Business Network, a Member 
of the Monitor Group. Lead facilitator of the project. 
 
Date of Interview: March 13, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The sponsoring organisation was the “Arctic Council” that represents the seven 
Arctic states— Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden, and the USA, plus indigenous representatives. The US Arctic Research 
Commission had a working group: the “Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment” (PAME), chaired by Dr Lawson Brigham. The aim of the organization 
is to promote co-operation and sustainable growth in the region. The Arctic Council 
represents and facilitates a political dialogue among stakeholders in The Arctic. “It is 
the UN of the Arctic.”43  The kinds of questions they were wresting with were 
environmental protection; seagoing safety; land rights; what kinds of regulations, 
agreements, treaties should be put in place now in order to preserve the 
environment in the Arctic, plus ensure marine safety systems, plus protect the rights 
and representation of governments and indigenous people of the Arctic. 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
                                                 
42
 The document is available at: 
http://www.gbn.com/articles/pdfs/GBN_Future%20of%20Arctic%20Navigation%20Mid-
century.pdf. Viewed March 30, 2012. 
43 According to the Arctic Council web site “The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental 
forum to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States.” 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about. Viewed March 30, 2012. 
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The goal of using the scenarios was to think through what kind of policy 
recommendations the Arctic Council should be creating and making now to achieve 
common goals in the future, particularly in the face of rapidly changing ice structure. 
The aim was to facilitate a dialogue process to get to creation of the right policy-
regulation recommendations. In this particular situation, Brigham found the “multi-
stakeholderness” in the region was quite extreme. He was frustrated at lack of 
movement on key issues. Representatives of the Arctic states had multiple 
competing interests and no clearly agreed to treaties or framework for governance. 
At the same time, conditions were changing – particularly ice receding and the real 
possibility of an ice-free summer for many parts of the region, which opens up lots 
of possibilities for freight traffic; mineral extraction, oil drilling, fishing—which has 
implications for the environment, for marine safety, and so on. “It was a situation 
where different stakeholders with different competing interests were having a very 
hard time getting to have a structured conversation about how to think about the 
future together.” This is one of the times when scenarios are very helpful—because 
scenarios are hypothetical and about situations that are relatively far off—for 
groups who have disagreements in the present, talking through hypothetical 
situations rather than actual disagreements allows the conversation to move a lot 
further a lot faster  
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the c nstruction phase?  
 
In total there were three workshops; the first in April 2007 at the GBN Offices in San 
Francisco; than a regional implications workshop in Helsinki in July 2007; and an 
environmental implications workshop in San Francisco in early 2008. The 
workshops each had around 30 people, made up of various experts or stakeholders 
in the field: climate change experts, Arctic Council representatives, and shipping and 
mineral-mining stakeholders.  
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are: 
Resources and Trade (more demand vs. less demand) and Nature of Regional 
Governance (stable and rule-based vs. unstable and ad hoc). To what extent 
were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to be under 
the control or influence of the participants, or the commissioning organisation 
(either in themselves or via broader networks of influence and persuasion)? 
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Figure 4.4 Source: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment of the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment Working Group. (2008) The Future of Arctic Marine Navigation in Mid-Century: 
Scenario Narratives Report. p.5 
 
After much group process we ended up with a short list of top 10 uncertainties. Each 
of four groups tried out different 2x2 combinations; then we debated (the efficacy 
of) them. Various had prioritized climate change, for example. “In the end what we 
got to was a nice blend between uncertainties they have control over vs. those they 
don’t have control over. So it’s a bit different than, say, what a corporation might 
want, where it really only wants to look at things beyond its control.” It felt like it 
was a good blend between forces within the Arctic and forces outside the Arctic: 
governance is within the control of the stakeholders in the room; resources and 
trade is partly within the Arctic control, but allowed us to bring in uncontrollable 
forces and factors from the outside world.  
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one of the scenarios “Arctic 
Saga” describes a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for the 
sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did this 
imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as perceived 
at the time? 
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Looking across the four, one can see that Saga is the happier scenario; future that is 
better for more stakeholders in the region. Polar Lows is more challenging for more 
of the stakeholders. The other two are a mix; they are good or bad depending on 
who you are.  
Polar Preserve is better for environment activists and indigenous populations; 
‘Arctic Race’ is better for energy companies and mineral-mining and shipping and a 
bit of a mix for indigenous.  This was scenario-making as inspired by Jay Ogilvy (a 
GBN founder): about creating better futures. These are “normative scenarios,” using 
scenarios for alignment and collective visioning rather that objective strategic 
choice (for example, as per corporate use.) When the decision-making group is 
multi-stakeholder, the role of the scenarios is to create one vision of how good the 
future could be if they all were to work together.  
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
The scenarios became a chapter of the 1,000-page AMSA (Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment, as originally intended. Brigham had said “there is this massive 
assessment; we need scenario planning to help a multi-stakeholder group to think 
about the future and to test dialogue around recommendations. The work was 
therefore used in discussion and decision sessions that set the stage for 
recommendations that the Arctic Councils made to the relevant governments 
concerning environmental policy and shipping safety in the region going forward. 
Part of it was about trying to steer to the “vision” scenario. But we also wanted to 
make sure that policy recommendations took into account the dynamics of the other 
three scenarios—that we set in place a discussion about the merits and demerits of 
the other three. The outcome: as Arctic Council members and stakeholders thought 
about their policy recommendations, they thought about which scenario their 
recommendations would accelerate or decelerate! 
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Interview 5. Cofisa: Biotechnology Scenarios for the Eastern Cape (South 
Africa). 
 
Source Document (report): Non-Zero-Sum Development. (2009). Three 
Biotechnology-Related Scenarios for the Eastern Cape.44 
 
Date and Place of Project: October 2008 to February 2009; East London/ 
Mdantsane 
 
Interviewee: Dr. Bob Day. Founder and Co-Director, Non-Zero-Sum Development, 
Pretoria. Lead Facilitator of the project. 
 
Date of Interview: March 28, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The project was part of various provincial studies sponsored by Cofisa 
(Collaboration between Finland and South Africa). So it was a joint venture between 
the SA Government (Dept. Science & Technology) and the Finnish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The collaboration is about “amplification of innovation, geared both 
at economic growth and poverty reduction.” The Finns are very systemically 
oriented and the idea was to see how much more can be done in South Africa by 
stimulating systems of innovation. Also they specifically did not want to look at the 
national level; they wanted to act at the regional or even local (non-urban) level, in 
stimulating innovation. 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen?  
 
To understand this, one must understand both levels of the project. The first part 
considered what impact innovation could have on the Eastern Cape 25-30 years 
ahead. That was the first stage, the “Innovation level” which took about three 
months in late 2008, early 2009. Then there was a second round that focused on 
biotechnology. We used the scenarios from round one, but focused them on 
biotechnology in round two. The aim was to take the high-level scenarios and see 
how they could be used to see a range of futures on a specific issue. Scenarios came 
                                                 
44 The report is available at http://www.innovationeasterncape.co.za/library/reports.php; Viewed April 10, 
2012 
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about because we were working with Turku University that has a large foresight 
department, and they were using Jerry Glenn’s Futures Wheel in simple form. The 
various outputs from the futures wheel led to scenarios in capturing the full 
complement of outcomes. In general I see scenarios as very useful where there are 
entrenched ways of thinking, which was very much part of the problem here. Where 
we have traditional or dogmatic thinking, scenarios help groups look for new 
pathways. It also has a direct impact on individuals whose perspective may be 
completely changed (widened) by the process. So this is why the scenario approach 
was chosen. 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
We used small groups workshops. In total there were 30-40 people and these were 
from the private sector, public sector, donor community, farming and agriculture, 
academics, and representatives of SMEs. We created groups of six or seven that 
made sure these various communities were split up. Each phase of the project had 
two workshops of two days each, with electronic communications among 
participants in-between. 
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are 
“Knowledge Economy (Glocal-interdependence) vs. Neo-industrialisation 
(Global–Dependence)” x “Urban Focus vs. Rural focus”. To what extent were 
the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to be under the 
control or influence of the participants, or the commissioning organisation 
(either in themselves or via broader networks of influence and persuasion)? 
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Figure 4.5 Source: Non-Zero-Sum Development. (2009) Three Biotechnology-Related Scenarios for 
the Eastern Cape. p.1 
 
 
The axes emerged from the results of their futures wheel exercise as reflected back 
to them in the workshop. Everyone was enthusiastic about these axes. There were a 
few strong “influencers” in the room: people in economic development, government 
policy; CEO’s of SMEs. In general they would have hoped to have at least some 
influence as to outcomes along these vectors of uncertainties, although how much is 
hard to say exactly. 
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one of the scenarios  (“Rurbal 
Balance”) describes a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for the 
sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did this 
imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as perceived 
at the time? 
 
The bottom left-hand corner, for which we didn’t write full scenarios is the 
“business as usual” quadrant, which most people would agree is bad—we can’t 
carry on the way we are. But you will see bits of this in the other scenarios. The one 
that is least like this is top-right (Rurbal Balance). Most people would say top-right 
is where we want to be! But what the scenarios were used for was to say, “Do you 
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believe in this future?’ For all 3 (new) scenarios: “Can you see these problems, can 
you see these opportunities?... Now what does that open the door for, for you (or 
whatever consortium you can pull together) to do over the next 20 years to create 
something in the biotech sphere in the Eastern Cape that at the moment isn’t 
happening?” The aim was this would lead to more specific targets.  
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)? 
 
We produced the scenarios (both at the innovation level and biotechnology level) in 
final version as an end in themselves. Anyone can take them up. The higher-level 
innovation scenarios were definitely hoping to influence provincial and local 
government, and their development strategy. We know there have been inputs into 
many departmental planning processes, for example to produce a self-contained 
rural community (a consortium of Nelson Mandela University, Rhodes, 5 SMMEs, 
and East London municipal authorities. This is on-going. As used so far, the 
biotechnology scenarios have been a stepping-stone to producing technology 
roadmaps to be used by the Department of Science and Technology.  
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Interview 6. United Parcel Service: Migration to Open Source Systems  
 
Source Document: Company confidential. Selections made available to the 
researcher.45 
 
Date and Place of Project: 2004; UPS IT Center, New Jersey, USA 
 
Interviewee: Edward M. Rogers, Global Strategy Manager, UPS Corporate Strategy 
Group, UPS, Atlanta, GA, USA (Client liaison for the project.) 
 
Date of Interview: April 30, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation (or sponsor) of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
It was an in-company project done by UPS, a global logistics and package delivery 
company, headquartered in Georgia, USA. In this case, the part of the company 
responsible for this work, were head office in Sandy Springs, Georgia, in 
combination with the UPS Advance Technology Group, in Information Technology 
Systems (ITS) at UPS, based in New Jersey. ITS manages information technology and 
all information systems for UPS globally. 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
We use scenarios selectively in planning, turning to it when there is a lot of 
uncertainty and not much data to go on. In this case the issue, in 2004, was the 
impact of Linux or similar open-source operating systems on UPS. We were not 
using open operating systems very much, and neither were out customers. But we 
got signals that customers may go in this direction—toward Linux architecture—
particularly because of lower cost. There was a growing awareness of Linux 
operating systems being adopted by customers, along with a suspicion that Linux 
was less expensive than proprietary systems. So we turned to scenarios to think 
through: if our customers are suddenly asking us to interface, connect to open 
systems, how will this affect how we move and protect data, and would we be able 
to move as quick as our customers would want us to? This was a subject area with a 
                                                 
45 Due to UPS company confidentiality requirements, only select briefing slides—including the 2x2 matrix on the 
following page—were provided by the interviewee to the researcher, in advance of the interview on April 30, 
2012 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
181 
 
great degree of uncertainty. We needed a cross-functional team to evaluate 
implications and options, rather than a pure technology assessment.  
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
There were two workshops. First, a 2-day workshop in at the IT offices in New 
Jersey. This was followed by a second a 2-day workshop by videoconference. There 
were 22 people in the exercise, all UPS insiders. This included strategy people based 
in Atlanta, an Advanced Technology Group team in NJ, and representatives from 
Louisville (where the UPS airline is based).  
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are “Total 
Cost of Ownership” (high vs. low) and “External Push / Acceptance” (high vs. 
low). To what extent were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties 
perceived to be under the control or influence of the participants, or the 
commissioning organisation (either in themselves or via broader networks of 
influence and persuasion)? 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Source: Item provided to the researcher by Edward M. Rogers, Global Strategy Manager, 
UPS Corporate Strategy Group, UPS 
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We followed standard scenario development routines to identify a full list of 
important factors and environmental forces, which we eventually reduced to 12 
critical uncertainties, and ultimately to these two. The Cost of Ownership refers to 
the cost of running Linux, that is installing and converting to Linux. Would that be 
high or low? The External Push / Acceptance refers to customer demand. Would 
most of them be requiring us to move to this new standard vs. very few, and most 
don’t really care? In terms of our influence—this is why we were doing the scenario 
exercise—because we felt like we were more a victim of this rather than a 
perpetrator! I wouldn’t say we thought we could push things very much towards 
one quadrant or another.  On the other hand we can’t say we would have no effect 
because of our (UPS) size and magnitude. Just by virtue of us being so large – we can 
negotiate price breaks when we are buying equipment or professional services. But 
our perception was we were at the mercy of these global forces. 
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that none of the scenarios describes 
a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for the sector, or for the 
world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did this imply for the 
purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as perceived at the time? 
 
Just because you don’t like a scenario doesn’t mean it won’t occur! There was 
definitely one that would have caused us the most problems: Penguins for Profit 
(high customer demand and expensive to convert). So we spent a lot of time 
thinking through the implications of that world. Where demand would be low, even 
if high-cost, there were various unique solutions. Our main issue is that our vast 
legacy systems and legacy investment of billions of dollars would have to continue 
to operate in the midst of the conversion. With reference to legacy systems, markets, 
and investments, the purpose was to look at potentially troublesome outcomes and 
figure out what we could in advance of that.  
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
A set of options for each scenario was developed. Some became action items for the 
Advance Technology Group to pursue. (This answer was circumscribed by UPS 
company confidentiality requirements). 
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Interview 7. Conservation International: Sustainable Futures for Milne Bay. 
 
Source Documents:  
1. Bohensky, E., Butler, J., & Mitchell, D. (2011) Scenarios for Knowledge Integration: 
Exploring Ecotourism: Futures in Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea. Journal of Marine 
Biology, Volume 2011, 1-11. Article ID 504651,. doi:10.1155/2011/504651  
 
2. Butler, J., Bohensky, E., Skewes, T., & Mitchell, D. (2008) Sustainable Futures for 
Milne Bay Workshop Report. CSIRO, Australia 
 
Date and Place of Project: 2008; Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea 
 
Interviewee: Dr. Erin Bohensky, research scientist, Ecosystem Sciences Social & 
Economic Science Programme, CSIRO, Australia. Co-chief Facilitator of the project. 
 
Date of Interview: March 21, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
It was a jointly-funded project between Conservation International (CI) and the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), the public 
research institution of the Australian government. Conservation International is a 
large international US not-for-profit organisation, with many global offices around 
the world, including in Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea. CI focuses on conservation 
and biodiversity issues and the connection between human well-being and natural 
ecosystems: the connection between livelihood issues and ecologically sustainable 
development. The project was initiated by CI Australia, but we worked with the CI 
office in Milne Bay.  
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
CI and CSIRO were looking at different tools for exploring approaches for integrated 
conservation and sustainable development options for Milne Bay. There had already 
been workshops looking at ecotourism options for the region. Ecotourism had been 
identified as a possible development industry opportunity in the region partly 
because Milne Bay is one region that has not been completely transformed to other 
land uses (e.g. palm oil). So the original aim was to think about ecotourism there—
how well it was doing, what can be done better, how to avoid traps seen in other 
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regions, how it could foster biological and cultural diversity and also promote 
sustainable local livelihood. Scenarios were brought into the project because the 
sponsors were interested in looking at alternative future options—and scenarios 
were perceived as a systematic way of exploring those.   
  
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
The participants were regional stakeholders in Milne Bay, local representatives of 
Conservation International (CI); the Milne Bay Tourism Board, small environmental 
and conservations NGOs; and local hospitality and tourism operators.  
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are Climate 
change (gradual vs. crisis) and Technology (available vs. unavailable). To what 
extent were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to be 
under the control or influence of the participants, or the commissioning 
organisation (either in themselves or via broader networks of influence and 
persuasion)? 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Source: Bohensky, E., Butler, J., & Mitchell, D. (2011). Scenarios for Knowledge 
Integration: Exploring Ecotourism: Futures in Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea. Journal of Marine 
Biology, Volume 2011, 1-11. doi:10.1155/2011/504651. p.7. 
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The climate change axis: I think everyone agreed change is happening. When and 
where it happens is unknown, and particularly will it be a crisis event or a gradual 
process. That is the nature of the axis and it was seen as beyond the control of the 
participants. Technology was essentially about low-cost technology, particularly 
telecommunications, and the question there was essentially, would there be high-
speed Internet and related technologies that could support infrastructure 
development, or not (the status quo). If this technology were to be widely available, 
the various stakeholders in Milne Bay would be able to respond to change in new 
ways. As to control of this variable, for the participants in Milne Bay technology is a 
“national” issue—essentially beyond their control, apart from a bit of lobbying of 
local policymakers. 
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one of the scenarios, “Kula 
Connections”, describes a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for 
the sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did 
this imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as 
perceived at the time? 
 
There was a preferred outcome. This was Kula Connections where there is no 
climate crisis and technology availability would allow locals to proactively develop 
the ecotourism industry (where they could do the most things). But this was not the 
point of the scenarios. Rather, we want people to think “what if each scenario 
happens”? They were generally positive to all, and look at opportunities (responses) 
to all. In the world that appeared “bad” Escape to East Cape they looked at 
opportunities for a revival of traditional practices, which could be a marketing/ 
selling point for tourism. As a whole, if this project is anything to go on, Papua New 
Guineans are ready to acknowledge the possibility of various changes, and have an 
“adaptive” attitude to life. 
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
In the workshop, and in a follow-up session the next day with core participants, the 
delegates identified things they could do next—action items to go forward with. 
This was a mixed bag of follow-up tasks from the workshop, but also taking things 
up to the authorities, who would have power over technology distribution. Some of 
the action items had to do with what was discussed pre-scenarios, for example how 
to (eco) regulate the dive industry. Also conducting a visitor survey to get better 
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understanding of tourism needs and demands. Scenarios then fed into this, 
highlighting for the participants the importance of doing this. The scenarios were 
there for individual use and also articulated a collective go-forward and need to 
work together. Participants came to recognise the need for partnerships among the 
different operators in the region; and different organisations operating at different 
scales: regional, national, and international (including CSIRO and CI), but it is not 
clear that anything is directly happening since the project ended.  
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Interview 8. Nautilus Institute: Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis. 
 
Source Document: Nautilus Institute. (2003). A Korean Krakatoa? Scenarios for the 
Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis.46 
 
Date and Place of Project: 2003, San Francisco, USA. 
 
Interviewee: Doug Randall, Managing Partner, Monitor 360, San Francisco, USA. 
Lead Facilitator of the project. 
 
Date of Interview: March 26, 2012. 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The project was done by for and on behalf of the Nautilus Institute. The Nautilus 
Institute for Security and Sustainability is a public policy think-tank that conducts 
research to address macro-problems, particularly military and environmental 
security, in the Asia Pacific region. It is a think tank. In this case they were interested 
in getting a group of people together to discuss and understand what the range of 
futures and options were around North Korea.  
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
We were using scenarios as a way to get a dialogue going. It was very much about 
getting multiple stakeholders from various organisations together to talk about this 
issues, and scenarios were seen as a way to do this effectively. 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
The group included thought leaders, researchers, and academics. There was a total 
of 16. It was not directly a group of government policy makers or nuclear scientist. It 
was mostly US-based think-tank people. Although the reference was to Korea, the 
                                                 
46 The report is available at: 
http://oldsite.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/scenarios/DPRKscenarios2003.pdf.  Viewed June, 
2012. 
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project was done in the United States, which influenced who was there, that is, 
American and allied policy people.47  
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are: form of 
conflict (contained vs. escalating) and nuclear weapons in North Korea (yes vs. 
no). To what extent were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties 
perceived to be under the control or influence of the participants, or the 
commissioning organisation (either in themselves or via broader networks of 
influence and persuasion)? 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8  Source: Nautilus Institute. (2003) A Korean Krakatoa? Scenarios for the Peaceful 
Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. p.4. 
 
 
The people who made the scenarios were not in control of the outcomes along these 
axes: they were completely exogenous factors. It’s hard to imagine them influencing 
the axes in any way. 
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one scenario (Contained 
Conflict and No Nuclear Weapons) describes a distinctly better outcome for 
                                                 
47
 The project document (Nautilus Institute 2003, 3) shows participants came from organisations 
such as: Korea Institute for National Unification; Preventive Defense Project Stanford University; The 
Korea Society; The Heritage Foundation; The Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Business 
Hub; and the UC Institute for East Asian Studies.  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
189 
 
the organisation, or for the sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this the 
aim? (b) If so, what did this imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of 
the scenarios, as perceived at the time? 
 
All would agree that this outcome was better than the others. The aim was to 
understand the options more clearly, to have all perspectives, but also to make sure 
there was an option that was positive—to see whether you could motivate people to 
focus on that. The context is important: the whole “intel” (military-political 
intelligence) community, at lease here in the US, is centred on what they perceive as 
“objective analysis”. This study, revealing that this scenario set had a positive 
outcome (which may have been a forced outcome) would typically be used in 
situations where you’re trying to rally people towards some alternative future. 
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
It was used for a set of dialogues with a set of stakeholders—carried on serving to 
promote dialogue among stakeholders in the region. But it is true to say that there 
was not as much as the commissioning organisations would have wanted them to.  A 
good-use outcome would have been further clarity and understanding of the 
situation; people understanding how their actions could have an impact on things; 
on  the relationship with North Korea. But this was not really followed up.   
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Interview 9. Office of the Presidency: South Africa Scenarios 2014 
 
Source Document: Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, Office of the 
Presidency, South Africa. (2003). Memories of the Future: South Africa Scenarios 
2014.48 
 
Date and Place of Project: 2002-2003, South Africa  
 
Interviewee: Dr. Harry Dugmore, Co-ordinator and Lead Facilitator of the project 
 
Date of Primary Interview: March 19, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The scenarios were commissioned and co-ordinated by the South African 
Government at the time—the Office of the President at the time  (Thabo Mbeki). 
Specifically the project was managed by the Policy Co-ordination and Advisory 
Service (PCAS), the President’s in-house high-level concept councillors under the 
then Director-General of PCAS, Joel Netshitenzhe,49 who interfaced between the 
Cabinet and the project working group.50 The project was funded in part by the 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) which also provided 
project support through the Economic and Development Policy Advisory 
Programme (EDAP). These were essentially scenarios done in-government, for 
government. They were done in 2001-2003, to be ready for 2004 (the 10 year 
anniversary of democracy in South Africa) and looked 10 years ahead. 
 
                                                 
48 The report was available at: 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/pcsa/general/scenarios/memories.pdf. Viewed July 1, 2012. 
(However this electronic copy has latterly proved to be corrupt. The full report is available from Dr. 
Harry Dugmore: h.dugmore@ru.ac.za or from the researcher.) 
49 The core mandate of PCAS is defined as “to facilitate integrated strategic policy formulation and 
implementation across government”. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=183. 
Viewed July 11, 2012 
50 Further, from the report (Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, Office of the Presidency, 
South Africa, 2003, 33): “The project was overseen by a steering group of Ministers, including the 
Ministers of Social Development, Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Health, Justice, Provincial and 
Local Government, Public Enterprises, Public Service and Administration, Trade and Industry and the 
Minister in the Presidency. The project worked with a core team of Directors General and outside 
experts from the private sector, labour and community groups. It also benefited from interviews with 
a wide range of leaders from Government, the private sector, civil society and research institutions 
from Universities of Bochum, Bonn, Duisberg, London and Sussex.” 
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2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
The aim initially was to figure out the big things coming over the horizon—what 
was coming at us globally and on the continent. We spoke a lot about “horizon 
scanning”. The fundamental aim was to allow government to make better policy and 
better law, and do the things that government is supposed to do, including in this a 
cognisance of major international and local trends in a whole variety of areas. But all 
this morphed very quickly into an internal visioning exercise, along the lines of 
“what kind of society do we want to be?” The unstated aim of the project was, since 
1994 there had not been a process in government of common vision making. The 
project was directly commissioned in line with 10 years of ANC rule, and became the 
ANC leadership’s introspection at the 10-year anniversary point. So 2014 became a 
vision-making exercise—“where are we heading to? Where do we want to go to?” 
Shosholoza is a scenario where the State contracts and frees up the private sector to 
effect a six percent year-on-year economic growth. This was definitely a preferred 
future within the Mbeki administration. Behind this, there were fierce debates about 
the role of government, what it can and can’t do; what it should do; how big the 
State should be. And the scenarios to some extent end up reflecting these debates. 
But the fact that this scenario process became a national visioning exercise was 
more by accident (and government need) than by scenario design. 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
We started with pre-interviews, reaching about 65 very senior people in 
government and the pri ate sector, and in education and sport personalities, asking 
them to list the biggest challenges for SA in next 10 years, and what should we do 
about them? Their responses found their way into expression of key driving forces 
for consideration by the scenario team. This team, the working group, consisted of 
about a dozen outsiders and eight from the Office of the Presidency team. Without 
exception they were all they were very senior people: various Director-Generals e.g. 
from Science & Technology, and from Treasury, as well as ex-Ambassadors and 
very-well known people like Jill Marcus and Sheryl Carolus. The process consisted of 
three 2-day workshops where these 20 gathered over an 18-month period. Joel 
Netshitenzhe would take the work-in-progress into Cabinet at their lekgotla, about 
every six months and we would get detailed comments from Ministers.  
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
192 
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are “Global 
Economic Conditions” (Positive vs. Negative), and “Social Cohesion and Equity 
in South Africa” (Low vs. High). To what extent were the real-world outcomes 
of these uncertainties perceived to be under the control or influence of the 
participants, or the commissioning organisation (either in themselves or via 
broader networks of influence and persuasion)? 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9  Source: Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, Office of the Presidency, South 
Africa. (2003). Memories of the Future: South Africa Scenarios 2014. Presentation Slides p.13.51 
 
This issue was divisive in the process. We had two types of participant in the room, 
which perhaps represents two types of people in government: one group that thinks 
that the government can do a great deal and which therefore has a strong sense of 
State capacity. The other group say we don’t have such a high capacity civil service 
or influence. These issues are highly political, having to do with an ideological 
difference over whether big government or small government is preferable. In our 
discussions we were trying to cluster and focus on: “what is government good at? 
                                                 
51
 Although this matrix was not provided in the report, it is described in the report, with matrix 
implications determined by the researcher in agreement with the interviewee. 
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Where can we get most bang-for-our-buck? This was a recognition that government 
was not all-powerful, but could have a great influence in certain areas. For example, 
the participants did identify infrastructure, ports and railways, etc., as an avenue of 
influence. In general, while we were considering all the macro-drivers, it was clear 
that some of them were shapers of our future that we didn’t control, and others 
were shapers that we also had a lot of handle over. One of these was quality of 
governance: “how good was government going to be; how non-corrupt, open, 
transparent, effective, and impactful?” It turned out to be a big variable—
unsurprisingly—in the scenarios government was doing for itself, and this variable 
was clearly to some extent endogenous.  
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one of the 
scenarios, ”Shosholoza”, describes a distinctly better outcome for the 
organisation, or for the sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this the aim? 
(b) If so, what did this imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of the 
scenarios, as perceived at the time? 
 
As mentioned above, the preferred vision was something of an accident. There was 
in fact concern to move away from “good vs. bad” scenarios, not least because this 
form was associated with Clem Sunter’s (Anglo American’s) “High Road—Low 
Road” scenarios of the 1980s. But if you ask anyone who remembers the 2014 work, 
they remember the Shoshaloza vision, particularly the 6 percent growth rate. We 
saw in the workshops the lights go on: “We could really get rid of some of these 
structural constraints!” They really saw a vision of how we could grow the economy 
at six percent. This meme swept through government. “We can grow like other fast-
growing economies—more is possible than we thought. Get the shackles off!” And 
far rather this than Skedonk, a bleak Zimbawe-like future where the wheels fall off. 
After the other three scenarios, Shosholoza was a relief: optimistic, motivational, 
aspirational, plausible. At some of the presentations it became like a rally. People got 
really enthusiastic about the vision. “High-growth path, yea we can do it!”  
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
Between Netshitenzhe and myself we made about 20 major presentations of the 
work in central government, for example to the Ministry of Health, or provincial and 
municipal government, for example to the Johannesburg City Council. To add 
dispersion we created a PowerPoint “movie” that worked without need for a 
presenter and this was presented at least another 20 times and maybe more. There 
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were also 5,000 booklets printed and distributed. This was the extent of the direct 
follow-up, but the process was also foundational for the 2025 Office of the 
Presidency Scenario set (done in 2006-2007) where in fact the first thing we did 
was talk through the mistakes of the 2014 set, and our biggest critique was the 
limitations of distribution and implementation, which to some extent we rectified in 
the subsequent project. Overall the answer is I don’t think scenarios were well used 
at all. The 2014 set did give people a common language, for example “constraints to 
growth” and “Skedonk” and terms like that that you still hear. Overall the process 
was incredibly useful to think-outside–the box, but whether it made any difference 
on the ground… I haven’t ever heard even an anecdotal piece of evidence: they were 
going to do this, then they considered the scenarios and decided to do that. 
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Interview 10. Bord Bia: The Future of the Irish Food and Drink Market 
 
Source Document: Henley Centre Headlight Vision. (2007). Anticipating Tomorrow: 
Shaping the Future of the Irish Food and Drink Market Towards 2020.52  
 
Date and Place of Project: 2007, Dublin, Republic of Ireland 
 
Interviewee: Rachel Lloyd, (then) Associate Director, Henley Centre Headlight 
Vision. Lead Facilitator of the Project. 
 
Date of Interview: April 27, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The report was commission by Bord Bia, the Irish Food Board. The role of Bord Bia 
is to promote Irish food and drink, in Ireland, the UK, Europe and worldwide.53 Bord 
Bia has dues-paying subscriber members, which include both large and small food 
and agriculture companies across Ireland. In commissioning this project Bord Bia 
wanted to show to their member-stakeholders that they are at the forefront of 
understanding the future, and thinking about what it holds for Irish food companies, 
and what the opportunities might be g ing forward. It was a way of giving dues-
paying members the kind of perspective that many couldn’t afford on their own. 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
The Henley Centre (now Futures Company) was already doing consumer trends 
work for Bord Bia, which had gone down very well with member companies. 
Scenarios development was the next step. Bord Bia’s motivation also had to do with 
their perception that the food industry is a changing industry, but one that thinks 
very short-term. It felt there was therefore a role for scenarios to 2020, and the 
Bord could step in and do the long-term thinking small companies couldn’t do. The 
felt the process itself, including the multi-party meetings would be valuable (in 
addition to) the scenarios output itself.   
                                                 
52 The report is available at http://www.bordbia.ie/aboutus/publications/Pages/ 
AnticipatingTomorrow.aspx . Viewed June 4, 2012 
53 On its Web site Bord Bia defines its mission thus: “To drive the success of a world-class Irish food, 
drink and horticulture industry by providing strategic market development, promotion and infor-
mation services." http://www.bordbia.ie/aboutus/pages/servicecharter.aspx . Viewed June 4, 2012. 
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3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
We made sure everyone understood it was a co-creation project. All the member-
participants would provide input. All the workshops were in Dublin. There were five 
in all: a drivers workshop; a scenarios development; two strategy workshops; and 
an implications session. There were 12-20 participants each time, and these were 
representatives of the Bord Bia member companies. Where it was a small company 
we usually had the founder or MD; if it was a larger company we would have a 
representative from strategy or marketing. In addition there were various externals: 
academics, health professionals, a nutritionist, a journalist, etc. Among other things 
(providing an fresh perspective from the periphery or external to the industry), 
their presence diluted the competitiveness between the companies. 
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are 
“Attitudes towards Consumption” (Our Planet vs. My Life) and “Motivation for 
Eating” (Food as Ritual vs. Food as Performance). To what extent were the 
real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to be under the control 
or influence of the participants, or the commissioning organisation (either in 
themselves or via broader networks of influence and persuasion)? 
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Figure 4.10  Source: Henley Centre Headlight Vision. (2007). Anticipating Tomorrow: Shaping the 
Future of the Irish Food and Drink Market Towards 2020. p.22. 
 
This was a little different between the smaller companies—which felt completely at 
the mercy of market forces, the recession, etc., and larger companies or 
organisations, for example Tesco Ireland or Bord Bia itself, which felt it could have 
quite an impact. But it depended on the issue: none felt they could stop a recession. 
Some of the participants liked to be presented with: “here’s a world” how might we 
react and respond? Others, equally validly in our opinion, were asking: “how might 
we stop that world coming about; what would we do in that world to change it?” On 
this there was a fair amount of discussion around how they could move from one 
world to another, in other words a discussion of constraints. But on reacting to what 
is given: by the 4th or 5th workshop we had pulled out common issues across all 
four quadrants, including red flags / challenges that were true across all four 
scenarios.  
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that none of the scenarios describes 
a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for the sector, or for the 
world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did this imply for the 
purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as perceived at the time? 
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We very deliberately designed the scenarios so there were pros and cons in each 
world, and therefore opportunities in each. There is specifically no “better” or 
“worse” scenario. We were very conscious not to make “Great World vs. 
Armageddon” and some in-between outcomes. This related to the intent of Bord Bia 
in that they were specifically and consciously setting out to create “thought 
leadership” for the industry. This was something Bord Bia wanted the scenarios to 
show. So this meant getting stakeholders to come together as an industry and 
understand the opportunities and long-term strategic challenges they face in 
various outcomes (rather than articulate better or worse environments). This is 
what we (The Henley Centre) said scenarios would offer Bord Bia, and this is what 
they wanted from the process. 
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
There was a “glossy launch” of the scenarios at the Bord Bia Annual Food & Drink 
Awards, which introduced the scenarios to wider membership, even those who had 
not taken an active part in the process. There was also direct Bord Bia funding for 
follow-up, particularly for small member companies, to think about the medium-
term or long-term strategic implications of the scenarios for their own company. 
With financial backing from Bord Bia the Henley Centre took the scenarios to 
member companies — for example a small porridge manufacturer and said: “what 
happens to you as a company in this world?” or “What are the strategic 
opportunities for you in this world?” 
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Interview 11. Association of Research Libraries (USA): A User’s Guide for 
Research Libraries 
 
Source Document: Association of Research Libraries. (2010). The ARL 2030 
Scenarios: A User’s Guide for Research Libraries. Washington, D.C.54 
 
Date and Place of Project: January-October 2010; Washington, D.C., USA  
 
Interviewee: Karla Streib, (then) Assistant Director for Transforming Research 
Libraries, ARL. Client Representative for the project. 
 
Date of Interview: March 15, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation (or sponsor) of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The Association of Research Libraries (ARL) is a not-for-profit 501c3; membership 
organisation whose members are research libraries (not individual professional 
librarians). It has 126 members in the US and Canada, ranging from large 
government libraries, to major research university libraries, and includes other 
research libraries, for example the NY public library and the Smithsonian. The 
organisation focuses in three strategic areas: (1) federal policy as affects libraries, 
for example copyright issues; (2) scholarly communication; and (3) helping member 
libraries make the transitions necessary to becoming 21st century research venues, 
given the significant changes going on in research, teaching, learning in the digital 
age 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
The ARL is a strategic planning type of organisation and part of its mandate is 
helping member its organisations think better about the future and to prepare for it. 
My job was to think about how do we go about that? I looked at how other 
organisations had done this. Our members are familiar with Strategic Planning, so 
we needed to go beyond that. We had previously done a “horizon scan” and found 
there was a real hunger for tools like this among members, to be used for their local 
planning. Scenarios were the next step, both to convey a shared recognition of the 
                                                 
54 The report is available at www.arl.org/bm~doc/arl-2030-scenarios-users-guide.pdf . Viewed 
March 30, 2012 
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scale of change we need to undertake, and helping us push ourselves to think about 
change at a different scale. Scenarios are well tuned to that scale and larger timeline; 
pushing people to think about a set of alternative futures rather than a preferred 
future or incremental timeline going forward. 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
The development process was implemented by ARL staff working with (facilitator) 
Susan Stickley of Stratus, Incorporated. There was fairly wide public input: provided 
through focus groups (conducted in-person and online) as well as a public online 
survey, and one-on-one interviews. The strategic focus and critical uncertainties 
highlighted in the scenarios were identified through a consultative process with the 
ARL membership during the spring of 2010, followed by a 2-day invitation 
workshop (augmented by four “project provocateurs” from outside the library 
community tasked with stretching the group's thinking) where about 50 
representative leaders from ARL member institutions got to the bones of the four 
scenarios. They also developed strategic implications and related strategic 
questions for research libraries’ consideration while the scenarios were being 
written up at ARL; the group therefore played a role in helping tune the scenario 
work resource to serve the follow-on needs of research libraries. 
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are: “Nature 
of the Research Enterprise” (aggregated vs. diffused) and “Conditions 
Surrounding Individual Researchers” (constrained vs. unconstrained). To 
what extent were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to 
be under the control or influence of the participants, or the commissioning 
organisation (either in themselves or via broader networks of influence and 
persuasion)? 
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Figure 4.11 Source: Association of Research Libraries. (2010). The ARL 2030 Scenarios: A User’s 
Guide for Research Libraries. p.13. 
 
First, we spent a lot of time on deciding how do we articulate what this vector is? 
We didn’t want it to be just a distribution of resources (up/down). Then the group 
looked at three or four possibilities for the matrix. Our goal was to get four scenarios 
that were different to each other, but focused and relevant to our community, so we 
could think about different ways things could turn out. “We were not looking for, in 
the end, for the group to pick one of the futures. We were trying to do everything we 
could to keep that from happening at any point in the use of the scenarios!” 
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that none of the scenarios describes 
a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for the sector, or for the 
world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did this imply for the 
purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as perceived at the time? 
 
It was definitely not an effort all towards the ARL creating a vision of the future to 
impose it on the community. We definitely didn’t want an “official future”: “Here’s a 
scenario, let’s all do that!” This would immediately have created opposition. The aim 
was to provide a neutral framework for the conversation (about the future) among 
the research libraries. Neutrality, this “flexibility” in the scenarios, was appreciated 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
202 
 
by the members: each member organisation was able to use the outcomes in its own 
way; draw their own conclusions. We wanted scenarios that challenged our 
informal, unquestioned assumptions.  we wanted to  get beyond our official future – 
libraries  have been embracing of change since the 1990s and they are familiar with 
a lot of the issues. So our question was, can we change the nature of the 
conversation; move beyond what we know – what are the new things we should be 
thinking about? But we had no one vision of the future we wanted to put forward. 
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)? 
 
The main goal was to create a stimulus tool for members to use in own organisation 
planning at the local level. This is different to the “normal” situation where 
organisations usually develop scenarios for their own use. We did have a meeting in 
the September (2010) pre-release: to get member organisations to talk to us about 
how they could use the work. This helped us develop our user guide, which was 
released along with the scenario report. The obvious intended use was for member 
libraries developing a new strategic plan, say 3-5 years out. But it was also intended 
to be a tool for libraries to work together on joint projects—allowing them to jointly 
ask: “what futures are we preparing; what are the opportunities to prepare for?” 
Also it was apparent that some libraries would find use in sharing the scenarios 
with external and/or campus leadership and planning.   
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Interview 12. United Nations (FAO): Agricultural Produce in the Nile Basin 
 
Source Documents:  
(1) Hilhorst, B., & Schütte, P. (2010) Food for Thought: Discovering Common Ground  
Reflections (Society for Organizational Learning) Journal on Knowledge, Learning, 
and Change, 10(2) 1-12. 
 
(2) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2009). Demand 
Scenarios for Agricultural Produce in the Nile Basin for 2030.55 
 
Date and Place of Project: 2006-2008, Entebbe, Uganda . 
 
Interviewee: Dr Peter Schütte, Schütte & Company, Holland (Lead Facilitator of the 
project.) 
 
Date of Interview: April 30, 2012 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation or sponsor of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The organising and commissioning institution was United Nation Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO). In this case the commission came from the FOA 
office in Entebbe, Uganda. The project to that point had been mostly about data 
collection— measuring flows and so on—and developing “information products” for 
the Nile Basin community. 
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
The purpose of the project changed towards scenarios over time. In discussions 
with the project leader (who was “very much in data collection mode”) he saw 
scenarios would add new insights. Then they (FAO Entebbe) had wanted to look at 
demand for agricultural produce in the Nile Basin; but this changed in first round of 
interviews (with 10 stakeholder countries in the region) where we saw we had to 
broaden the problematic to other factors in order to understand this demand 
variable. Focusing on a single variable turned out not to be the right thing to do. We 
saw we needed to develop a broader view to come to the right insights. But, then, as 
                                                 
55
 The report is available at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/faonile/F4TscenarioBooklet.pdf. Viewed June 5, 
2012. 
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we went broader, the purpose changed again: to “how can we create common 
ground for important people in these 10 countries in order to implement new 
insights and new options for co-operation?” The FAO head office in Rome started 
protesting that we had lost focus on producing agricultural demand outcomes, but 
somehow we prevailed in following the broader mission.  
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
We used an interactive workshop approach, over four workshops. There was a 
group of 25 people from the 10 countries that have a stake in the region (all except 
The People’s Republic of Congo), and this group stayed essentially the same, with 
minor variations, through the whole process. The participants were people in 
government positions, at levels to do with expertise in water and agriculture, which 
in itself represents the original mandate of the project as more closely tied to these 
matters. As the project grew in scope, we tried to broaden the base of participant to 
get important people who could influence decision-making (with limited success). 
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are 
“Governance” (Accountable, Legitimate vs. Unfavourable, Stifling) and 
“International Trade” (Distorted, Uneven vs. Favourable, Fair). To what extent 
were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to be under 
the control or influence of the participants, or the commissioning organisation 
(either in themselves or via broader networks of influence and persuasion)? 
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Figure 4.12 Source: Hilhorst, B., & Schütte, P. (2010) Food for Thought: Discovering Common 
Ground Reflections 10(2). p.5. 
 
 
I would say there was very little sense of influence. We had tried to find variables 
that were “external”, that is, not controllable by people building the scenarios or 
those who would be using them in the future. These variables are external. They 
can’t be changed. If you consider the governance uncertainty, a lot of the countries 
involved are firmly established dictatorships! So I don’t think people in the room 
had any illusions about changing that. The people in the room were not directly in 
governance. They were more water and agriculture specialists. Based on the 
insights from the scenarios, a lot of things can be changed—in terms of the options 
taken by the stakeholder groups—and this is what the scenarios were about. But 
little could be expected in terms of renegotiating the external conditions. Everyone 
wanted to improve the trade or the governance situations, but there was very little 
expectation or hope of this. (Ironically, all this came prior to the “Arab Spring”.)  
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that one of the scenarios, ”Joint 
Effort”, describes a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for the 
sector, or for the world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did this 
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imply for the purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as perceived 
at the time? 
 
We did not aim for developing outcomes that were bad or good: we wanted 
plausible consistent stories that could be used as a reference for decision-making. 
As things turned out, using the most important uncertainties as identified in-
workshop by the participants, some scenarios were clearly more desirable than 
others. Top right is better than bottom left—but this is not what we were aiming for. 
We did meet some of the expected outputs to FAO, in terms of their data 
requirements. But more than this: the group actually developed a whole list of new 
insights. By broadening the solution space, we were moving away from the zero sum 
game on water towards other alternatives where there was more common ground 
that could be used as the basis of cooperation. The other, non-water options, were 
for example in the trade area, or in development of agriculture, were easier to 
implement. We came up with non-water solutions, not allocation, not building dams, 
but about international trade and specialisation. If we had defined the problem as a 
water problem there would have been no way forward. But the scenarios allowed us 
to broaden the solution space. So it was not about driving up the Joint Effort world 
or avoiding the Double Burden world. It was always understood that some scenarios 
were more desirable than others. But the real insight was based on developing the 
understanding we need to look for co-operation in the future (in the face of what 
can happen). 
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
We tried to take on-going use of the scenarios into account going in: we built in 
further use into the first phase. But we didn’t manage it very well. Partly we were 
unlucky that things in Egypt changed dramatically—we were working with the Nile 
Water Centre in Cairo—and suddenly all those people were “lost” to the process. We 
were planning workshops in Cairo, inviting people from other countries. Phase 2 
would have been workshops, bringing together the right (higher up) people from 10 
countries, and offering the scenarios to this different audience, specifically those 
who were closer to power and influencing decisions. For the time being everything 
is on hold. Phase 2 has not happened so far.  But it sill could happen under the Nile 
Basin Initiative (The 10 Nile countries, the World Bank, and various donor 
organisations) which was set up to see if we could develop a shared vision for all 
these countries.  
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Interview 13. World Economic Forum: Future of the Global Financial System 
 
Source Document: World Economic Forum, (2010). The Future of the Global 
Financial System: A Near-Term Outlook and Long-Term Scenarios.56 
 
Date and Place of Project: 2008-2009, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
Interviewee: Nicholas Davis, Associate Director and Deputy Head of Strategic 
Foresight, World Economic Forum. Lead Facilitator of the project. 
 
Date of Interview: June 13, 2012. 
 
1. Who was the commissioning organisation (or sponsor) of the project, and 
what is that organisation’s core mission or key purpose? 
 
The project was commissioned by the World Economic Forum (WEF). Background 
is, any time the WEF commissions a scenario project, it is a multi-stakeholder 
project supported by a steering board consisting of a number of organisations and 
industries that contribute the funding. Internally we had various teams: investors 
and financial services teams based in New York and a strategic foresight team, based 
in Lausanne. Externally, we worked with the Kuwait investment authority, the 
Singapore Investment Corporation, and similar organisations, and we had two 
“knowledge partners”, one being the management consultants Oliver Wyman, the 
other the law firm Clifford Chance. All of these key stakeholder groups gave 
legitimacy and credibility to the project, and provided human resources and in some 
cases financial resources to the project.  
 
2. What was the aim or purpose of this particular scenario project? Why was a 
scenario approach chosen? 
 
The project started prior to the financial crisis. In 2007-2008 the purpose was 
initially to understand the emerging dynamics in debt markets in particular, and the 
outlook for macroeconomic stability—because there were concerns about the 
future. Scenarios were chosen because no one (or not many) was talking about 
downside scenarios for the global economy at the time. There was no mainstream 
analysis of this. Scenarios provided a “safe space” to raise these issues in taking a 
long-term perspective. The project was officially kicked off in January 2008, and by 
                                                 
56
 The report is available at 
https://members.weforum.org/pdf/scenarios/TheFutureoftheGlobalFinancialSystem.pdf . Viewed 
July 5, 2012 
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mid-year things started to look shaky. And everything hit the fan by September 
2008. So the purpose changed significantly during the project. It was no longer 
about whether there could or would be a downside-crisis, but about investigating 
the long-term consequences of financial crisis and potential resolutions. The report 
itself changed: the first half is about short-term dynamics, which was on everyone’s 
minds. Scenarios were kept to address the long-term (post-crisis) perspective. So 
there was a new purpose in the short term (as addressed in Section 2 of the report), 
nevertheless maintaining focus on understanding the broader uncertainty and 
dynamics in financial markets and what that would mean for the evolution of the 
industry—the core purpose— stayed the same. 
 
3. Other than the facilitators, who participated while the scenarios were in 
either (a) the preparation or (b) the construction phase?  
 
There were about five workshops: a couple in London, two in New York, one in 
Davos. Overall there were about 100-150 participants over the life of the project, 
including representatives from the steering committee, the expert group, project 
advisors Oliver Wyman and Clifford Chance. This was augmented by various 
stakeholder groups: senior executives and even sometimes chief executives of big 
private sector investors; the big banks; regulators; and insurers. There were also 
representatives of the IMF and World Bank, and economists from the banking 
community and from academia. There was a mix of international background 
experience: USA, UK, and European and specifically Middle East, that is, Saudi and 
Emirates investors. It should be added that high-level policymakers, that is, 
government ministers, were not directly involved in the process. Also we did not 
have much representation from civil society.  
 
4. The scenarios built around two vectors of uncertainty, which provide a 
matrix structure for scenarios development. In this case, the axes are “Pace of 
Geo-Economic Power Shifts (Rapid vs. Slow) and Degree of International 
Coordination on Financial Policy (Harmonised vs. Discordant). To what extent 
were the real-world outcomes of these uncertainties perceived to be under 
the control or influence of the participants, or the commissioning organisation 
(either in themselves or via broader networks of influence and persuasion)? 
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Figure 4.13 Source: World Economic Forum. (2010). The Future of the Global Financial System:  
A Near-Term Outlook and Long-Term Scenarios. p.11. 
 
The uncertainties were iewed as not at all under the influence of the participants. 
Regulators were hopeful of their ability to play a role and encourage a degree of 
international co-ordination—they were directly engaged in that. But they 
recognised that it was the questions of geopolitics and evolution of national politics 
that would determine the outcomes much more than the action of regulators. 
Generally the scenarios were perceived as incredibly “contextual” scenarios 
(referring to the greater context in which institutions operate, rather than their 
narrower “transactional” environment). It was “outside in” with a clear focus on 
external drivers. In other words, it was understood by participants that they were 
thinking beyond their sphere of influence.  
 
5. With reference to the matrix, it appears that none of the scenarios describes 
a distinctly better outcome for the organisation, or for the sector, or for the 
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world at large. (a) Was this the aim? (b) If so, what did this imply for the 
purpose or constraint conditions of the scenarios, as perceived at the time? 
 
There was no aim to create good or bad scenarios. Nor was there pressure in the 
work to explore more positive or more negative aspects. What we wanted to do was 
to challenge current mental models. In the first six months it was very hard to get 
people to talk about negative scenarios; we introduced negative world states to 
challenge mental models. After July-August 2008 we were in the opposite 
situation—struggling to get people to challenge new mental models as sentiment hit 
the floor. By early 2009 we were struggling to get people to see a way out. Here a 
positive scenario was challenging in the same way—challenging to what was the 
dominant perspective at the time. Fragmented Protectionism was negative in that it 
would be the hardest world for global organisations and international banks etc., to 
operate in. But it would be good for certain national champion banks focused on 
home markets, and also good for safe-haven countries.  
 
Similarly Financial Regionalism was viewed as problematic for global organisations 
but good for regional players. Re-engineered Western-Centralism was seen as the 
“safe” option; business as usual under a supra-national regulator and a not-too-fast 
shift from international models such as Bretton Woods. Rebalanced Multlateralism 
was a path to better. But it is a story of great hardship for a long time—including a 
second financial crisis—which finally pushes legislators and firms into action. So 
people did not look at it and say “I want it.” It is still a challenging path. But this is 
more useful than a smooth, easy picture of recovery and growth, which anyway 
would have been rejected by the group as not realistic and plausible. This suggests 
use of the scenario as a learning tool and change tool. This was our purpose: 
scenarios as a learning and change tool, not a visioning tool. Specifically it was 
intended as a learning tool for CEOs and other senior leadership of stakeholder 
groups such as the investment industry, banks, insurers, and regulators: as 
represented by the steering committee.  
 
6. Once the scenarios were constructed, how were they put to use? How did 
the project further the purpose of the project participants, or the sponsor (or 
not)?  
 
There was a series of follow-up workshops, speeches, and other outreach with the 
scenarios, including “bilaterals” with governments where we made presentations on 
the scenarios and what they imply for both companies and governments, and how 
that relates to specific country-level dynamics. In the context we were in, we were 
always pushing people to think beyond the crisis: to how might this all evolve in the 
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long term; what does this imply for policymaking, human resources, strategy, 
internationalization, etc., right now? We were also addressing specific questions 
from banks, for example: “How risk averse should I be; where should I be placing my 
bets; what long-term structural changes should I be making?” Then there were 
questions from government: “What are the implications for regulation; how does 
this relate to economic growth; what does it mean for government interactions with 
the financial sector?”   
 
Both groups were also asking about implications for public trust of the financial 
sector. There was however no application in terms of trying to shape policy or 
influencing events. Neither the Forum nor the Steering Board were saying: “We hold 
an agenda for, for example, deregulation.  What we were saying was: “Here is an 
interesting series of perspectives on the future given some of the important 
contextual dynamics and drivers. This would be important for you to think about 
now, because it is the long-term dynamics that are going to matter over time. Don’t 
wake up and find yourself in a world you hadn’t anticipated. Lets talk about it now.” 
This was the primary purpose: pushing thinking from short-term to long-term, 
rather than having any specific agenda for long-term change.  
 
 
*** 
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Chapter 5: Research Analysis 
 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter presents the analysis of the research presented in Chapters 4A 
(primary case studies) and 4B (subsidiary project studies, structured interviews). 
It extracts, gathers and organises the key findings that emerge from both research 
phases of the study. The next chapter (Chapter 6) takes the analysis forward into 
the argument of the dissertation and its proposed contribution to knowledge.  
 
5.2. Purpose in Scenario Projects Studied 
The case studies and interviews presented here show that scenario work is done 
for many different purposes, and with the expectation of many and often multiple 
simultaneous benefits. Most interviewees report (in answer to Question 2 of the 
question set presented in Chapter 4B) that their particular scenario project 
originated to fulfil various, compound purposes rather than one simple purpose. 
These purposes include such items as provoking a sense of what might possibly 
occur; combining probabilities in ways not thought of previously; stimulating 
discussion about the challenges ahead; promoting decision robustness and 
innovative intent; facilitating and creating common ground among stakeholders; 
pushing thinking from short-term to long-term, etc.—the various items reflected 
in (and corroborating) the scenario perceived-benefit list, as presented in the 
theoretical survey (Chapter 2, Section 2.2). In addition, the scenario projects under 
study share many other common features and methodological choices: they stress 
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uncertainty about the direction and nature of future developments; examine 
change drivers and resulting trends; narrow the trend field by choosing the most 
important uncertainties as a base for scenario architecture; provide integrated 
stories of future outcomes; and consider the implications thereof. However, 
despite these multi-fold purposes, and apparent commonalities of method, the 
scenarios studies show group characteristics that suggest they are distinctly 
classifiable within larger, summative, purpose platforms. The observations that 
support this are elaborated in the following two sections.  
 
5.2.1 Case Study Findings 
In Chapter 4A, the case studies Arup Foresight: Eco-Resorts of the Future and 
Metropolitan Life Foundation: Live the Future, Scenarios of HIV-Aids are 
presented. The projects are similar in that they are both situated in Africa, 
consider effectively the same 20-year future timeframe, and display at least some 
level of social and developmental preference. Both stress uncertainty about the 
direction and nature of future developments; examine change drivers and 
resulting trends, and provide integrated stories of future outcomes. Further, 
methodologically they follow a very similar scenario preparation (identifying 
important external drivers of change, see for example Chapter 4A, Figure 4.3), and 
use foundational axes of uncertainty in a 2x2 matrix form to provide the basis for 
four alternative scenarios of the future, which they then elaborate in story form.  
It is apparent, however, that the projects are manifestly different when examined 
from a purpose perspective. Eco-Resorts of the Future presents four scenarios: 
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Gated Eco-Resort, Village Green, Nature Niche, and Big Green Brand, (see Chapter 
4A, Section 4.3.6). It is notable that, from the point of view of any of the 
participants in the process, or the organisation that commissioned the study, 
Habitaem, or any of the other stakeholders including the Tanzanian Tourist Board, 
it is not clear which, if any, would be a commonly held preferred outcome. (While 
certain elements of the local or international development agencies may prefer the 
“greener” and-or more community-led outcomes, it is not obvious that this 
outcome is widely preferred among the broad base of stakeholders, or can in any 
sense be presumed to be a widely endorsed “target” outcome.) As no preferred 
outcome emerges from a professionally staged and executed scenario process, it 
may be inferred that the intention was not to create one. What has been created, in 
contrast, is a set of four neither-preferred-nor-dispreferred conceptions of change 
in the eco-resort industry in Tanzania over the 20-year time horizon. What this 
offers is a series of alternative plausible outcomes, each of which is plausible, none 
of which is commonly preferred. The purpose (“use”) of this scenario set is 
apparent in that it (a) allows decision-makers to consider and refine current and 
proposed tourism investments going forward, to ensure that these are robust to 
alternative outcomes; or (b) helps decision-makers stimulate new ideas for 
solutions appropriate to new situations that will plausibly emerge within the 
planning horizon. Both of these responses amount to future-adaptation and 
alignment: recognition of and alignment with the realities and opportunities 
which may come to pass in the alternative iterations of the evolution of the 
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Tanzanian eco-tourism industry, whether the originators of the scenarios pursue 
any specific direct agenda in the external world or not.  
Live the Future: Scenarios of HIV-Aids presents four scenarios, Autumn, Winter, 
Spring, and Summer (Chapter 4A, Section 4.4.6). For the Metropolitan Life 
Foundation, and for any other stakeholders across the HIV-Aids spectrum, or even 
casual observers of the project, it is unequivocal that Summer is the most 
preferable future outcome—the outcome to be strived for. Autumn and Spring are 
comparatively less preferred, while Winter is a holocaust-dystopia to be 
strenuously avoided. In other words, an unambiguously commonly preferred 
future is created as one of the scenarios, which is more than one-among-many 
alternatives about one way the South African environment may evolve. It is a story 
about how things would look if everything went well, that is, if the recommended 
“good” decisions are taken by all stakeholders now, to ensure that the preferred 
future emerges at the end of the time horizon; and it is made more acute by 
placement alongside non-ideal, negative-outcome scenarios. As above, since this is 
the work of professional expert scenario facilitators, it is fair to infer that it was 
their intention to achieve this, that is, to define and depict a scenario that 
represents an widely endorsed ideal. The purpose here may be inferred as seeking 
to influence (via publicisation, education, lobbying, fundraising, leveraging 
contacts and resources, etc.) the evolution of external events—in this case toward 
ameliorating the course of HIV-Aids in South Africa); that is, to shape the evolution 
of external macro-trends and uncertainties towards a preferred outcome.  
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It is therefore proposed that despite the two scenario projects being highly similar 
along many dimensions, including time horizon, location (Africa), and method 
(scenarios derived from foundational uncertainties in a 2x2 matrix), a different 
primary purpose category, or purpose “platform” defines each project, and that 
this platform is to be understood as future-aligning (adaptive intent), in the case of 
Eco-Resorts of the Future and future-influencing (visionary-advocacy intent) in 
the case of Live the Future: Scenarios of HIV-Aids. It is noted that both projects are 
highly successful in achieving their different purposes, as argued in Chapter 6 
(Section 6.3.2). The following section investigates whether the purpose categories 
that manifest in the case studies are manifest in the 13 projects researched by 
structured interview. 
 
5.2.2 Structured Interviews Findings 
In interview questions 1 and 2 (Chapter 4B, Section 4.8.1) interviewees were 
asked about the nature and purpose of the project’s commissioning organisation 
and the specific purpose of the scenario project. The following assessments are 
made from the interviewees’ responses, in terms of the purpose-platform 
categories established above (these are preliminary assessments, further 
corroborated by relationship of scenario purpose to constraint conditions, as 
explained in Section 5.5. below): 
 
Public Library Network, New South Wales: The Bookends Scenarios. Reported 
purpose as described by interviewee: to look at alternative impacts of forces of 
change—funding, technology, demographics, etc.—on public libraries in Australia, 
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to get a sense of what these alternative futures hold and how this might affect the 
provision of pubic library services. No scenario is clearly proposed as preferred. 
Purpose-platform assessment: Adaptive. 
UPS: Migration to Open Source Systems. Reported purpose: to think through if 
UPS’ customers were to demand migration to open systems, how would this affect 
UPS and what would be its best responses across a variety of outcomes. No scenario 
is clearly proposed as preferred. Purpose-platform assessment: Adaptive. 
Bord Bia: The Future of the Irish Food and Drink Market. Reported purpose: In 
the light of rapidly changing food and beverage industry, Bord Bia (the Irish Food 
Board) wanted to step in and do the long-term thinking that small food and 
beverage companies could not do. No scenario is clearly proposed as preferred. 
Purpose-platform assessment: Adaptive. 
Association of Research Libraries (USA): A User’s Guide for Research 
Libraries. Reported purpose: pushing library planners to think about a set of 
alternative futures rather than preferred future or incremental timeline going 
forward. No scenario is clearly proposed as preferred. Purpose-platform 
assessment: Adaptive. 
Conservation International: Sustainable Futures for Milne Bay. Reported 
purpose: exploring alternative future options for ecotourism in Milne Bay. No 
scenario is clearly proposed as preferred. Purpose-platform assessment: Adaptive. 
World Economic Forum: Future of the Global Financial System. Reported 
purpose: focus on understanding the broader uncertainty and dynamics in financial 
markets and what that would mean for the evolution of the global finance industry. 
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No scenario is clearly proposed as preferred. Purpose-platform assessment: 
Adaptive. 
Arctic Council: The Future of Arctic Marine Navigation. Reported purpose: to 
facilitate a dialogue process to lead to Arctic Council policy recommendations to 
achieve common goals in the future. Arctic Saga is clearly identified as the preferred 
outcome. Purpose-platform assessment: Visionary-Advocacy. 
Columbia Basin Trust: Shaping Our Future Together. Reported purpose: to build 
future thinking with the clear input of stakeholders of the Columbia Basin region in 
deciding how resources are to be used, and for these stakeholders to see they have 
been included in the process of deciding paths of future investment of Trust funds, 
therein influencing the future. Blooming Best Basin is clearly identified as the 
preferred outcome. Purpose-platform assessment: Visionary-Advocacy. 
Office of the Presidency: South Africa Scenarios 2014. Reported purpose: a 
vision-making exercise for South Africa in 2014. Shosholoza is clearly identified as 
the preferred outcome. Purpose-platform assessment: Visionary-Advocacy. 
Cofisa: Biotechnology Scenarios for the Eastern Cape (South Africa). Reported 
purpose: to promote the establishment of biotechnology industries in the Eastern 
Cape. Rurbal Balance is clearly identified as the preferred outcome. Purpose-
platform assessment: Visionary-Advocacy. 
Nautilus Institute: Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. 
Reported purpose: to get dialogue going among stakeholders from various 
organisations together to talk about avoiding escalation and nuclear war in the 
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Korea region. There is a clearly identified preferred outcome: Contained Non-
Nuclear Conflict. Purpose-platform assessment: Visionary-Advocacy. 
United Nations (FAO): Agricultural Produce in the Nile Basin. Reported 
purpose: to create common ground for leaders of the 10 Nile countries in order to 
implement new insights and new options for co-operation. There is a clearly 
identified preferred outcome: Joint Effort. Purpose-platform assessment: Visionary-
Advocacy. 
Trade Knowledge Network: Agriculture in Southern Africa. Reported purpose: 
to make sense of complexity in the area of agricultural policy; to have more clarity 
about the interconnected set of topics that affect agricultural trade and how they 
could play out in future. I Believe I Can Fly is identifiable as the preferred outcome, 
along with Chabuda Hapana. Purpose-platform assessment: Ambiguous. 
 
 
5.2.3 Purpose: Interim Conclusions 
Overall, the project interview responses empirically bear out the assessment from 
the two primary case studies: of the 13 projects, 12 show a primary purpose that 
may be unambiguously classified into one of either future-aligning (adaptive 
intent) or future-influencing (visionary-advocacy purpose), as defined above. (As 
with the primary cases, the scenario projects studied by interview similarly 
otherwise share many common practices, for example, identifying important 
trends, or stimulating group discussion of outcomes, or use of the 2x2 matrix.)  
It is noted that some projects (Nautilus Institute; Cofisa; and United Nations FAO) 
present apparent problems, in that some of the apparent elements that—in terms 
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of the analysis—can be said to characterise either purpose platform, are not 
followed, while the Trade Knowledge Network project is ambiguous in terms of 
the purpose platform analysis. These problems are further discussed in the 
argument of this dissertation (Chapter 6), where it is proposed that these 
incongruities are to be understood as errors made by scenario facilitators—
leading to commensurately weakened projects—due to confusions of purpose, or 
misalignment of purpose and method, or inadequate grasp of constraint 
conditions (discussed below), that is, problems this dissertation seeks to resolve. 
 
5.3 Capacity and Constraint 
 
Questions 3, 4 and 5 of the structured interviews, and similar questions in the 
primary case studies, were directed at ascertaining who (what type of participant, 
and how many) was involved in the scenario-creation workshop, and the 
perceived power of this scenario-creation group (and sponsor organisation, where 
applicable) to influence the key external macro-uncertainties they chose to base 
their scenarios on, either in themselves or via broader structures of leverage; and 
how this relates to the de-facto choice of these foundational uncertainties. The 
findings are presented here. Once again results and interpretation of the primary 
case studies (Chapter 4A) are presented first, followed by the supplementary 
project interviews (Chapter 4B). 
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5.3.1 Case Study Findings 
The scenario project Arup Foresight: Eco-Resorts of the Future was constructed by 
participants invited by Arup from its various global offices, from its network who 
served on prior scenario-project events—particularly selecting those with an 
interest or track record in sustainable business in general or eco-tourism in 
particular, or those who could make other specific contributions on themes 
relating to business in Africa. The client, Habitaem, also invited guest participants 
from its network in sustainable business promotion and ecotourism. This 
workshop group developed scenarios based on the foundational uncertainties: 
“Guest Orientation” (Hedonistic vs. Conscientious) and “Property Developer 
Intention” (Short-term Profit vs. Long-term Engagement). On inspection, it is 
apparent that the evolution of both of these uncertainties are well beyond the 
reasonable influence of the participants, or the client, or the scenario-facilitating 
organisation, or any networks they might expect to be able to leverage. It is 
apparent that while “Conscientious” and “Long-term” would be commonly 
interpreted as preferable, it was not expected that any of the scenario originators 
nor sponsors would have much influence towards this outcome. In other words, 
the scenario workshop participants built scenarios on foundational axes of 
uncertainty that are external to their sphere of influence. It is apparent that this 
ties closely and congruently to the purpose of the Eco-Resorts of the Future 
project as discussed in Section 5.2.1 above, where purpose has been defined as 
adaptive: to make product and service offerings to best benefit from the evolution 
of forces over which the scenario builders have negligible control, and so to adapt 
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stakeholders for optimal outcomes no matter which of the plausible outcomes 
plays out. In this it is implied that the scenario-builders’ own assumptions about 
their ability to influence the future are low. They therefore effectively take their 
own influence out of the equation and the analysis does not orient itself to 
exploring and describing which outcomes the scenario-makers prefer. It orients 
itself to exploring the spread of actual outcomes that may pertain, to create 
management readiness to manoeuvre the organisation to be robustly positioned 
for success no matter which outcome comes to pass.  
The Metropolitan Life Foundation: Live the Future scenarios project (Chapter 4A, 
Section 4.4) was produced by a small group of half-a-dozen active participants, 
who then invited a spectrum of business, government and community 
representatives for broader input to check, challenge and expand the scenarios. As 
described in the case study, this wider group was responsible for scenarios based 
on the foundational uncertainties: “Economic Growth” (High vs. Low) and “Social 
Collaboration” (High vs. Low). While the former uncertainty is clearly exogenous 
to the reasonable influence group (or any group), the latter is within the wider 
influence of the scenario-sponsoring organisation and its various networks of 
association (including the South African government). In other words, it is 
apparent that one of the foundational axes upon which the Metropolitan Life 
Foundation based the Live the Future scenarios was “internal” to its sphere of 
influence. In this is implied an assumption about the relationship to the 
foundational axes of uncertainty which is very different from that made by the 
Arup Foresight: Eco-Resorts of the Future project. It is assumed that the 
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uncertainty “Social Collaboration” can be influenced away from “Low” outcome 
and towards “High” outcome. In choosing (at least one, as discussed in Section 
5.2.6 below) foundational axis that is internal to the broader leverage of the 
organisation, the Metropolitan Life Foundation has created scenarios that allow it 
to gather its own resources, and spur allied resources, in a bid to improve real-
world outcomes along the social collaboration dimension, and so improve 
outcomes for HIV-Aids in South Africa. As above, it is apparent that this ties 
congruently to purpose as discussed in Section 5.2.1 above, where the purpose 
here is in identifying an axis of influence, and therein a route to influencing and 
improving external conditions. 
It is therefore posited that the two scenario projects each presuppose a different 
capacity to influence the external forces of change and uncertainty. Where the Eco-
Resorts of the Future scenarios aim to anticipate external macro-uncertainties and 
deduce alternative plausible outcomes and implied challenges and options for the 
organisation, while assuming little power to influence macro-uncertainties, the 
Live the Future scenario project does assume its stakeholders have (collectively in 
this case) the power to influence macro-uncertainties, so the scenarios are created 
to give stakeholders with potential influence the vision, tools, focus and 
motivation to intervene and shape outcomes towards a better outcome.  
In terms of the analysis that follows, the ability of an organisation to influence an 
axis of external macro-uncertainty is referred to as “capacity”; (external, real-
world) limitations on this ability is defined as “constraint”. In Arup Foresight: Eco-
Resorts of the Future, for example, the scenario-builders’ and client organisation’s 
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capacity is perceived to be low while power of external constraints is perceived to 
be high. In the Metropolitan Life Foundation: Live the Future scenarios the 
organisation’s influence capacity is perceived to be high, while power of external 
constraints on it are perceived to be low, and these perceptions are, on the whole, 
justifiable. As will be seen in the next chapter, it is argued that perception of ability 
to influence an axis of uncertainty (perception of high capacity), or reciprocally, 
perception of low constraint, must be valid for a future-influencing form of 
scenario to have coherence, and therein possibility of follow-on implementation. 
Before investigating this issue, it is necessary to view the extent to which the 
structured interviews corroborate the capacity and constraint findings of the case 
studies.  
 
5.3.2 Structured Interview Findings 
 
Public Library Network, New South Wales: The Bookends Scenarios. 
Participants directly involved in the scenario-building process (other than 
facilitators): librarians and allied library policy and planning staff. Participants’ 
perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the 
foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as reported by 
interviewee: nil  
United Parcel Service: Migration to Open Source Systems. Participants directly 
involved in the scenario-building process: UPS staffers and planners, including 
strategy planners based in Atlanta, an Advanced Technology Group team in NJ, and 
representatives from Louisville (where the UPS airline is based). Participants’ 
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perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the 
foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as reported by 
interviewee: nil. 
Bord Bia: The Future of the Irish Food and Drink Market. Participants directly 
involved in the scenario-building process: there were 12-20 participants (depending 
on workshop) who were each representatives of Bord Bia member companies. In 
addition there were various externals—academics, health professionals, a 
nutritionist and a journalist. Participants’ perception of their or their organisations’ 
capacity to influence outcomes in the foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario 
construction, as reported by interviewee: nil.  
Association of Research Libraries (USA): A User’s Guide for Research 
Libraries.  
Participants directly involved in the scenario-building process: the development 
process was implemented by ARL staff, who made provision for wide public input 
that was achieved through focus groups (conducted in-person and online) as well as 
a public online survey and one-on-one interviews. The strategic focus and critical 
uncertainties highlighted in the scenarios were identified through a consultative 
process with the ARL membership and consolidated at a 2-day invitation workshop 
attended by about 50 representative leaders from ARL member institutions, 
augmented by four “project provocateurs.” Participants’ perception of their or their 
organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the foundational uncertainties 
chosen for scenario construction, as reported by interviewee: nil.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
226 
 
Conservation International: Sustainable Futures for Milne Bay. Participants 
directly involved in the scenario-building process: the participants were regional 
stakeholders in Milne Bay, including representatives of the local office of 
Conservation International, the Milne Bay Tourism Board, small environmental and 
conservations NGOs, and local hospitality and tourism operators. Participants’ 
perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the 
foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as reported by 
interviewee: nil.  
World Economic Forum: Future of the Global Financial System. Participants 
directly involved in the scenario-building process: there were about 100-150 
participants over the life of the project, including representatives from the steering 
committee, the WEF expert group, and advisory firms Oliver Wyman and Clifford 
Chance, augmented by various stakeholder groups, including private sector 
investors, the big banks, regulators and insurers. There were also representatives of 
the IMF and World Bank, and banking and academic economists. There was a mix of 
international background and experience (US, UK, and European and specifically 
Middle East—Saudi and Emirates) among investors. Government ministers were 
not directly involved in the process. Participants’ perception of their or their 
organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the foundational uncertainties 
chosen for scenario construction, as reported by interviewee: nil.  
Arctic Council: The Future of Arctic Marine Navigation. Participants directly 
involved in the scenario-building process: the workshops each had about 30 people 
made up of climate change experts, Arctic Council representatives, and shipping and 
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mineral-mining stakeholders from the Arctic region. Participants’ perception of 
their or their organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the foundational 
uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as reported by interviewee: the 
“governance” uncertainty axis was perceived to be within the influence of the Arctic 
Council and its network of associations.  
Columbia Basin Trust: Shaping Our Future Together. Participants directly 
involved in the scenario-building process: there were 300 stakeholders, 
organisations, groups, businesses, and associations based in the Columbia Basin 
region. Participants’ perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to influence 
outcomes in the foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as 
reported by interviewee: both the matrix axes, “Ability to Create Sustainable 
Regional Systems” and “Response to Changing Economic Conditions” were 
perceived to be within the influence of the Arctic Council and its network of 
associations. Uncertainties that were influenceable by the stakeholders were 
specifically chosen, in fulfilling the mandate of the project, which was to 
demonstrate inclusivity in stakeholders (i.e. not just the Trust) determining the 
future of the region.  
Office of the Presidency: South Africa Scenarios 2014. Participants directly 
involved in the scenario-building process: there were about 20 people involved, 
who were all very senior people in the South African community—various Director-
Generals e.g. from Science & Technology, and from Treasury, as well as ex-
Ambassadors and other well-known figures such as Jill Marcus and Sheryl Carolus. 
The process reported directly to the (Thabo Mbeki) Cabinet. Participants’ 
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perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the 
foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as reported by 
interviewee: while the ups and downs of macro-variables such as “Global Economic 
Conditions” were clearly beyond the influence of even this group, the axis “Social 
Cohesion and Equity in South Africa” was seen to be an area that participants could 
influence.  
Cofisa: Biotechnology Scenarios for the Eastern Cape (South Africa). 
Participants directly involved in the scenario-building process: In total there were 
30-40 participants from the private sector, public sector, donor community, farming 
and agriculture, academics, and representatives of SMEs in the region. Participants’ 
perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the 
foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as reported by 
interviewee: there were a few strong “influencers” in the room, particularly people 
in economic development, government policy, and CEOs of SMEs, but overall 
perceived influence over the evolution of the economy (Knowledge Economy vs. 
Neo-industrialisation), and over urbanisation, was understood to be low. 
Nautilus Institute: Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. 
Participants directly involved in the scenario-building process: the group of 16 
included thought leaders, researchers, and academics from US-based think-tanks. It 
was not directly a group of government policy makers or (nuclear war) military 
analysts. Participants’ perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to 
influence outcomes in the foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario 
construction, as reported by interviewee: nil. 
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United Nations (FAO): Agricultural Produce in the Nile Basin. Participants 
directly involved in the scenario-building process: this was a group of 25 people 
from the 10 countries that have a stake in the region (all contiguous countries 
except the People’s Republic of Congo). The participants were mid-level people in 
government posts, in positions to do with expertise in water and agriculture. 
Participants’ perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to influence 
outcomes in the foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as 
reported by interviewee: nil.  
Trade Knowledge Network: Agriculture in Southern Africa. Participants directly 
involved in the scenario-building process: The delegates were trade and agriculture 
analysts and sector stakeholders from the region, both governmental and non-
government. There were Zanu PF representatives in the room. Participants’ 
perception of their or their organisations’ capacity to influence outcomes in the 
foundational uncertainties chosen for scenario construction, as reported by 
interviewee: perception of capacity to influence external investment environment 
(The “Megabucks” vs. “Money Drought” axis) was nil. But while there were no direct 
agricultural policymakers from Namibia or Zambia, there were those from 
Mozambique and from Zimbabwe—people who had a direct say in determining food 
security and trade-policy in the region, therein some influence over the evolution of 
the “Domestic Policy” uncertainty.  
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5.3.3. Capacity and Constraint: Conclusions 
The interviews reveal that some groups saw no influence at all over the evolution 
of external macro-uncertainties, while others perceived external uncertainties to 
be within their sphere of influence. This perception of presence or absence of 
influence was—in most cases, exceptions described below—congruent with the 
purpose of the project as defined above (Section 5.2.2). Where the purpose was 
adaptive, participants’ perception of their capacity to influence external 
uncertainties was minimal, which is to say that external constraint conditions 
were viewed as strong, scenario-structuring 2x2 axes where influence capacity 
was minimal (representing perception of external constraint conditions as not 
subject to influence) were chosen. Where purpose was visionary-advocacy, 
participants’ perception of capacity to affect one or both of the external 
uncertainties in the matrix was significant, which is to say that external constraint 
conditions were viewed as weak, scenario-structuring 2x2 axes where influence 
capacity was strong (representing perception of external constraint conditions as 
subject to influence) were chosen. 
It is observed that this was the situation “in most cases”, and this is because the 
research also captures and reflects scenario-facilitators’ weaknesses of practice, as 
noted in section 5.3 and discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.6), and therefore 
records cases where perception of influence does not align with any reasonable 
measure of real-world influence, that is, capacity to influence external 
uncertainties has been overestimated (or external constraints on such influence 
underestimated). As will be seen in the discussion of the “Capacity-Constraint 
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Audit” in Chapter 6, validation of perceived (or wished-for) influence is a 
fundamental step in assessing purpose and constraint-congruent scenario 
construction choices in the service of this purpose.  
 
5.4 Mechanism of Scenario Purpose Choice Illuminated 
As established above, it is apparent in both the primary case studies and the 
project interviews that the purpose platform of a scenario set is closely associated 
with choice of foundational axes of uncertainty upon which the scenario set is 
built. In fact, in this the research also reveals the direct mechanism in 2x2 scenario 
construction that shifts purpose between adaptive and visionary-advocacy 
purpose modes. This is achieved via the selection of the foundational drivers of 
uncertainty upon which the scenarios are based, as follows: if the scenarios are 
based on a matrix architecture with at least one uncertainty that has a “commonly 
held” good vs. bad polarity (one outcome would be better than the other for the 
vast majority of stakeholders), and the scenario-project creators proceed under 
the assumption that that uncertainty is reasonably under the control of the 
organisation (or its wider influence base), then visionary-advocacy scenarios will 
result. In other words, whether intended or not, a visionary-advocacy purpose 
scenario set is made willy-nilly by choosing at least one axis of external 
uncertainty which has a “commonly held” better vs. worse outcome, where this 
externality is also assessed to be subject to influence. In the Metropolitan Life 
Foundation: Live the Future scenario set, for example, the “Economy” (Good vs. 
Bad) uncertainty axis has a positive-negative dimension, but it is not seen to be 
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under the control of the Metropolitan Life Foundation, or Metropolitan Life itself, 
or the wider life insurance industry, or even the South African government. While 
better or worse economic policy may make a difference, the economy can be 
assumed to be at the mercy of global macro-economic conditions, that is, external 
to reasonable influence. However, the “Social Collaboration” uncertainty (High vs. 
Low) axis, while not directly controllable, is seen by the scenario makers to be 
within the power of policymakers, corporations, community organisations, and 
ordinary individuals to influence towards a positive outcome. This axis therefore 
provides describable outcomes that are (a) commonly held to be preferable vs. 
non-preferable and (b) responsive to the levers of influence; therein the scenarios 
become about illuminating and encouraging the ositive choice, that is, they 
become visionary-advocacy scenarios. In contrast, the axes chosen in the Eco-
Resorts of the Future scenarios, while presenting good vs. bad dimensions, are both 
outside of the control of all stakeholders and policymakers; therefore they lead to 
scenario outcomes that are not subject to influence by stakeholders, that is to 
adaptive scenarios.  
This pattern is corroborated across the interviews presented in Chapter 4B. For 
example, In the Arctic Council: Future of Arctic Marine Navigation (Chapter 4B, 
Section 4.9.4) the axis “Resources and Trade Demand” (More vs. Less) reflects the 
demands of the external world beyond the control of Arctic governments. The 
other axis, “Governance” (Unstable, Ad-hoc vs. Stable, Rule-based) is within the 
influence of the Arctic Council, and it is through the adoption of this axis in 
building the scenarios that the scenarios are made to be of the visionary-advocacy 
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type. By contrast, in the UPS scenarios set (Chapter 4B, Section 4.9.6), when UPS is 
considering scenarios of open-source software, its chosen axes of uncertainty are: 
“Cost of Ownership” (High vs. Low) and “External Push/Acceptance” (High vs. 
Low). Both of these are clearly beyond the company’s power or mission to control, 
and readily acknowledged as such, and the scenarios therefore proceed in 
adaptive form.  
The corollary of this insight is that if the organisation seeks to build visionary-
advocacy scenarios, it must choose at least one uncertainty of good vs. bad 
character, that is reasonably and validly under its influence, or its wider network 
of influence; if it seeks to build adaptive scenarios then it must take care not to do 
this. The implications of this are drawn in the argument in the following chapter.  
It is observed that in the interview responses in Chapter 4B, almost all 
respondents were at pains to stress that they were not building “good and bad” (or 
“heaven and hell”) scenario worlds, which is commonly held by most scenario 
practitioners to be a simple-minded mistake (notwithstanding that outcome 
spreads of this sort are very commonly seen). However, the research suggests that 
the good-bad format is a perfectly valid outcome for scenarios when the wider 
organisational purpose, and purpose in scenario planning, is visionary advocacy—
such a purpose is well-served by the identification of a good-outcome vision that 
motivates and guides action towards influencing vectors of uncertainty in the 
service of a better outcome (or a dystopic vision that develops understanding of 
negative evolution and motivates resistance) and serves to publicise an associated 
agenda for achieving it. 
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5.5 Problems of Scenario Follow-on Use  
 
The final item in recording pertinent observations from the research material 
pertains to Question 6 of the interviews (concerning follow-on use of the scenario 
set after completion of the workshop and workshop-document-writing phase), 
where scenario practitioners reported that many scenario projects did not in fact 
go forward effectively beyond the workshop and write-up stage. That is, a 
common response from interviewees recorded in Chapter 4B was to lament that 
following an apparently good workshop, where participants were suitably 
challenged, had their minds opened, formed scenarios that were instructive and 
wrote them up into a venerable document, there was a failure of a follow-on use.  
The fruits of the project did not go forward into concrete planning, decision-
making and strategy formation.  
Among the 15 projects studied for this dissertation, only seven were reported to 
have had a clear and constructive function after the workshop-document write-up. 
These were Metropolitan Life Foundation: Live the Future; Arup: Eco-Resorts of 
the Future; Arctic Council: The Future of Arctic Marine Navigation; World 
Economic Forum: Future of the Global Financial System; Association of Research 
Libraries (USA): A User’s Guide for Research Libraries; Bord Bia: The Future of the 
Irish Food and Drink Market; United Parcel Service: Migration to Open Source 
Systems; while one other project, Columbia Basin Trust: Shaping Our Future 
Together, is reported to be going into follow-up phase at the time of writing (third-
quarter, 2012). This represents an implementation rate of roughly 50%.  
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In raising a connection between problems in scenario-building and lack of follow-
on implementation, it is necessary to note that to assert a simple causality 
between quality of the work and lack of a follow-on implementation phase would 
be facile. There are cases where the project stalls after the scenario-building stage 
due to lack of funds, or delay in funding allocation (which is particularly the case 
with the Columbia Basin Trust project), or due to other external and situational 
factors. The implementation of the Nile Scenarios set, for example, was stalled by 
the “Arab Spring”, which rendered a complete change of senior government 
personnel in Egypt. Therefore it would be spurious to directly infer the quality of 
the project by the type or amount of follow-on implementation it achieves. 
However, it is apparent from the research that none of the projects identified as 
problematic, above, saw effective implementation, while all of the projects studied 
that did achieve follow-on implementation are methodologically congruent with 
the conditions of success in terms of the argument of this dissertation. The 
implications of this are addressed in the argument in the following chapter 
(Section 6.6). 
 
5.6 Purpose Platforms: Conclusions and Problems 
The argument as to the implications of the research, and its contribution to 
knowledge proceeds in the next chapter. Prior to this, it remains here to examine 
particular observations from the research material thus far that present apparent 
problems in purpose category distinction, and determine to what extent this 
changes the primary analysis of findings, if any.    
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5.6.1 Preference for Legacy Conditions  
 
The findings demonstrate a category distinction between scenario project types 
based on the alternative purpose platforms described. It is apparent however that 
there are situations where an adaptive-scenario purpose format returns a 
distinctly “preferred outcome” for a particular organisation or organisation type—
in other words, a situation arises (despite apparent adaptive intent, and therein an 
expected pursuit of value-neutral scenarios) where the organisation concerned 
views one of the scenario outcomes as “better” or “best” of the set.  This can be 
seen to be the case, for example in United Parcel Service: Migration to Open Source 
Systems, where the scenario Why Bother? is obviously to be preferred by the 
organisation in that it represents no requirement to change service models or 
offerings within the parameters of an industry (logistic systems), where it is 
currently the established industry leader; that is, its easiest path to continued 
success rests with the continuation of this outcome into the future. Another 
example is Conservation International: Sustainable Futures for Milne Bay, where 
the scenario Kula Connections would be preferred by tourist operators over other 
scenarios for the region. A further example in this vein, with a twist, is Bord Bia: 
The Future of the Irish Food and Drink Market, where there is an apparent 
preferred future, but it is different for different stakeholders: Local & Ethical 
would be preferred by organic farmers, while In the Lab would be preferred by 
multinational food corporations.  
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This manifestation of scenario preference is common, and effectively inevitable, 
because all companies or organisations that enter the scenario process do so with 
legacy competencies, that is, areas of advantage in an industry or sector, or 
products or services already established in the market. From the point of view of 
these pre-existing competencies and investments it is very likely that one or other 
of the scenarios will look more attractive—will provide the most advantages or 
the most hospitable climate for the organisation as it currently stands, because the 
scenario outcome accords with what a business or organisation is currently good 
at, or well branded for, such that, were it to come to pass, it would offer continued 
intrinsic advantages, and therefore is preferred. (Or, as in the case of Bord Bia, 
there may be more than one stakeholder group with such legacy preferences, 
based on prior market position.) 
Therefore what we have here is a legacy-based preference; a preference based on 
“found” congruence with a past advantage, not to be confused with a preferred or 
ideal new future, in the sense of the visionary-advocacy scenario formation as 
defined above. In found congruence there is no wide stakeholder concurrence 
around this preference, no sense that all organisations or organisation types in an 
industry would agree that the scenario was preferred (because not all have the 
same past advantages or legacy competencies); nor is there any implication that 
any organisation can significantly influence macro-externalities to achieve their 
preferred outcome. The preferred scenario here is merely the “good luck” future 
for the organisation that currently holds the competencies and advantages which 
would retain their value if that scenario came to pass.  
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The wider implication of the future-adaptive scenario project as a whole is that the 
organisation should nevertheless be prepared to adapt to succeed in any of the 
scenario worlds it sees arising, not just the one where it holds past advantage, 
because it does not have significant say over which future will occur. It may turn 
out that the future evolves in a way that is advantageous with respect to its legacy 
competencies, but the basic purpose of the scenario building process is to force 
the organisation to consider how it would respond if the world evolved in ways 
that are less congruent with past advantages. 
 
5.6.2 Role of Circumstantial Influence 
 
In similar vein, it is necessary to deal with situations where “weak influence” exists 
in adaptive scenario formats. An example is Bord Bia: The Future of the Irish Food 
and Drink Market where, as observed in Chapter 4B (Section 4.9.10), differences in 
anticipation of influence over externalities existed: small companies perceive 
themselves to be completely at the mercy of external forces of change, while large 
entities, for example Tesco Ireland or The Irish Food Board itself, felt they could 
have at least some influence over such external change drivers (including on the 
matrix uncertainty axes: “Attitudes towards Consumption” and “Motivation for 
Eating”.) Similarly, UPS acknowledged (Section 4.9.6) that by virtue of it being so 
large and influential in the logistics industry, it could well have an influence in many 
areas of it, including over the Cost of Ownership (of open source systems) 
uncertainty axis in its scenario matrix, via its power to negotiate price breaks when 
buying equipment or professional services, for example.  
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What we have here is circumstantial influence, where an organisation finds itself 
with some natural influence over the macro-uncertainties it faces, which is 
correlated with the size or power of organisation with reference to the type of 
uncertainty. It is therefore able to exert this influence over its constraint conditions 
and therein, possibly, to some extent shape external forces towards outcomes 
preferential to its legacy profile. However, as above, the fundamental purpose of the 
scenarios remains to spur the organisation to avoid reliance on this (weak) 
influence; rather to consider how the organisation could and should adapt if its 
influence over externalities was to turn out to be ineffective—for example UPS 
forcing itself to consider its responses to the broad adoption of open source 
software in the logistics industry, despite its own industry power. Weak influence of 
this type is therefore also a “found” condition, not to be confused with the influence 
implied in visionary-advocacy scenarios, where a very great deal of influence is 
assumed (or is hoped for, or expected to be created and harnessed via networks of 
leverage) and the preferred scenario is built to motivate and enlarge this influence. 
While the weak influence of adaptive scenario-building assumes an organisation of 
significant size and power even to achieve minor influence over externalities, the 
visionary-advocacy scenario is often the product of an inconsequential NGO, with 
effectively no real influence anywhere, other than the power to motivate and 
harness an alliance of influential parties (via a visionary or dystopic scenario). 
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5.7 Markers of Scenario Purpose Distinction 
Based on the research findings presented in Chapter 4, as analysed in Section 5.2 
above, and despite the potential caveats elaborated in Section 5.6 above, it is 
established that purpose meta-categories exist in scenario planning, and these 
may be fairly represented as future-influencing (visionary-advocacy purpose) and 
future-aligning (adaptive purpose), and that with negligible exception—which it 
will be argued in Chapter 6 (Section 6.6) may be understood as facilitator error in 
project setup—scenario projects fall into one or other of these purpose categories, 
but not both. Observations from the research reveal further additional clear 
markers that identify visionary-advocacy scenarios in purpose-based distinction 
from adaptive scenarios, as follows:  
 
5.7.1 Consensus Building 
Across scenarios projects in the research identified as of visionary-advocacy 
purpose (Metropolitan Life Foundation: Live the Future; Arctic Council: Future of 
Arctic Marine Navigation; Columbia Basin Trust: Shaping Our Future; Cofisa: Bio-
technology Scenarios for the Eastern Cape; Office of the President: South African 
Scenarios 2014, and United Nations FAO: Agricultural Produce in the Nile Basin), a 
common unifying and identifying trait of “consensus-building” is apparent. These 
scenarios are created by groups representing divergent interests (as opposed to a 
single corporation, for example), each of which is asked via the scenario process to 
elicit its preferences, values, priorities, hopes and fears for the future, in order to 
find common ground and develop a consensus outcome by which disparate and 
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potentially competing interests reconcile along points of agreement (and develop 
strategic alignment and “buy-in”) towards the common preferred future they can 
agree on. The scenarios identified in this research as of adaptive purpose, by 
contrast, do not attempt to elicit or promote a consensus of future ideals or 
perspectives in the group, nor do they seek consensus support for any scenario. 
Specifically, they seek the opposite—divergent, iconoclastic thinking to challenge 
consensus which may be a manifestation of “group-think”, that is, a manifestation 
of the management myopia the scenario process seeks to overcome.  
 
5.7.2 Public Dissemination 
Further, the various scenario projects identified as being of visionary-advocacy 
purpose in section 5.2.2 above, all share the identifying characteristic of active 
public and media promotion, while those identified as being of adaptive purpose 
do not. This may be coherently analysed as follows: if visionary-advocacy 
scenarios are defined in part by their intention of influencing the evolution of 
external conditions, but the commissioning organisation is often effectively 
powerless in itself, the process therefore relies on the organisation harnessing and 
leveraging forces beyond itself. This is achieved by raising broad stakeholder and 
public awareness. In other words, broad dispersion of the visionary message is the 
mode of leverage by which an ordinary organisation harnesses forces of influence 
greater than itself to affect and change the evolution of macro-externalities. In this 
it can be understood that the very point of making visionary-advocacy scenarios is 
to publish them, to promote the character of the preferred (or dispreferred) future 
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to all parties that have a stake in the outcome, along with advocated action 
towards the preferred outcome, to enlist and channel broad support towards it.  
As a typical case, the Metropolitan Life Foundation: Live the Future scenario set 
was (and remains) widely disseminated via public presentation, a dedicated Web 
site (livethefuture.co.za) as well as CDs, presenter tools, banners, badges, 
streamers, and allied razzmatazz. The Summer-utopia message, and blueprint for 
moving forward to it, is disseminated far-and-wide in order that the scenarios 
function fully as they are intended to—as a lobbying and rallying device for public 
participation and problem-solving that extends far beyond the obvious reach of 
the Metropolitan Life Foundation itself. In this it can be seen that the Foundation 
creates and uses the scenarios to enter the public debate on HIV-Aids in South 
Africa, to lead and harness the power of public opinion, stimulate a public 
campaign, lobby government, and effect other forms of advocacy, all towards 
creating the social and political context for enhanced funding, better legislation, 
and allied investment to improve future social and economic outcomes, in this 
case the amelioration of HIV-Aids in South Africa.  
By contrast, it is apparent among those scenarios studied that were identified as of 
adaptive purpose, that these are typically not disseminated widely; in fact they are 
proprietary (at least until they go out of date), particularly when they are done in 
corporate settings, for example Arup Foresight: Eco-Resorts of the Future, or the 
United Parcel Service: Migration to Open Source Systems set (where research 
authorisation had to be obtained by the researcher to access and use the material, 
even for strictly academic study). This may be interpreted as follows: in cases such 
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as these, the scenario-sponsoring organisation is not seeking to influence its 
externalities; it is looking for the advantages to be had in adapting itself to 
anticipated changes and surprises in the future it does not greatly control, in 
advance of its competitors. Thus there is no advantage to it releasing its scenarios 
into the public realm and therein to competitors.  
There are apparent exceptions to this general rule, (e.g. Conservation 
International: Sustainable Futures for Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea) where 
adaptive-purpose scenarios are found in the pubic domain. This may be explained 
by wider organisation purpose: where adaptive scenarios are done by academic 
and-or welfare organisations, using public funds, such scenarios are created in the 
public domain, therefore they are publicly available no matter what their purpose. 
However, as adaptive format scenarios, they remain minimally promoted when 
compared to the extent that visionary-advocacy scenarios idenfied here can be 
shown to have been actively promoted in the public realm.  
In another apparently anomalous situation, it is possible to find an adaptive-mode 
scenario set that is acti ely promoted and disseminated, as is the case with the 
World Economic Forum (WEF): Future of the Global Financial System scenarios, 
where the WEF made much publicity of the scenario set, not least at its own 
conference in Davos. Again this may be understood in terms of wider organisation 
purpose: WEF makes the scenarios in adaptive mode, as in terms of the definitions 
above, but does not or cannot in itself create competitive advantage from adapting 
itself in terms of the scenarios. (It is not a bank or a financial institution of any 
kind.) Therefore, instead it seeks advantage (in this case organisational self-
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promotion) for itself as a sponsor of important thought-leading work, which it 
puts into the public domain for any or all organisations in the financial sector, or 
regulators thereof, to adaptively consider their options.  
 
5.7.3 Non-correlation with Public Domain Orientation 
 
It is intuitive to expect that where scenarios are intended for public benefit, 
visionary-advocacy scenarios that illustrate the alternative outcomes from 
different policy choices, and allow the “best” outcome to be identified and 
promoted, would be the scenario mode of choice; alternatively where competitive 
or for-profit situations exist, that the scenario mode would be adaptive, facilitating 
a business’s earlier or more profitable adaptation to future change than its 
competitors. However, observations from the case studies and project interviews 
presented here show that there is no obvious correlation between scenarios done 
in adaptive mode and a corporate or competitive purpose, or those done in 
visionary-advocacy mode and public-benefit purpose, or vice-versa. The public-
benefit Live the Future scenarios are backed by the corporation Metropolitan Life, 
but produced in visionary-advocacy mode. The non-profit Irish Food Board 
scenarios uses adaptive scenario construction to help Irish food companies 
become more competitive in a changing food industry, yet adaptive scenario 
construction is also used by the Public Library Network of New South Wales, 
where the purpose is the general improvement of a public resource. The World 
Economic Forum: Future of the Global Financial System, and Conservation 
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International: Sustainable Futures for Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea scenarios 
both achieve public benefit purpose with construction in adaptive mode. 
  
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
246 
 
Chapter 6: Argument and Conclusion  
 
6.1 Overview 
The following section deals with the theoretical and practical implications of the 
research observations and analysis. It forms the argument for refining various 
theoretical tenets of scenario planning and for augmenting its practice, which 
makes up the contribution to knowledge proposed by the dissertation.  
 
6.2 Introduction 
The research presented in this dissertation emerged from the problem that, while 
scenario planning has become a widely accepted and arguably the pre-eminent 
foresight tool for businesses, governments and social enterprises trying to assess 
and navigate the fast-changing unpredictable operating environments; at the same 
time perceived benefits are unclear to many decision-makers. This is because the 
process often returns results that are not of a type or in a form usable in the real-
world planning needs of the organisation, (for example in creating narratives that 
orient implementation responses towards “changing the world” which may not 
match managers’ intentions at all), therein hampering adoption of scenario methods 
by business or institutional leaders. This means that this potentially effective and 
powerful tool for improving management decision-making is avoided or not used 
correctly, which leads to a significant reduction in an organisation’s ability to 
navigate forward decision-making, and therefore to it becoming vulnerable to 
changing circumstances not anticipated or adequately considered. This may lead to 
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damage to a company or its stakeholders over time, or an inability to grasp and 
leverage the opportunities that a changing world presents, at the same time as the 
popular will of organisational leadership turns against the scenario method (or 
foresight work in general), based on its apparent lack of utility. 
Based on both practice and research experience in the field, the researcher was 
aware of an apparent high-level distinction among foresight purposes, with 
implications for quality assessment in prediction, and so it was suspected that a 
problem in scenario-planning efficacy, and therefore relevance, may have to do 
with a conflation of future-aligning and future-influencing purposes in scenario 
project situations—in other words, management misgivings or confusion over 
applicability of outcomes may be related to the adequacy or inadequacy of 
purpose-based and context-constraint discriminations—and that despite a small, 
but consistent effort to create a typology of scenario practice within the academic 
literature, there has been little academic research that properly tackles the 
existence or implications of a purpose-based distinction in scenario work. 
Visionary “normative” scenario-building, which seeks a “better world” normed to 
consensus aspirations is a fairly well-understood concept, but what this might 
stand in contrast to, or the limits and terrain of each, or the implications of 
inadequately delineating between them, was lacking academic clarity. 
It was therefore anticipated that investigating this matter formally via original 
research would provide an academic basis for improving understanding of the 
issues involved, and therein a basis for intervention in the theory of scenario 
planning, thus improving real-world practices. This dissertation therefore set out 
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by way of focused academic research into scenario planning case experience to 
identify, validate, and draw theoretical and practical implications to advance the 
understanding and use of scenario planning along this dimension, as the basis for 
a significant contribution to theoretical knowledge and practice in the field. 
In order to proceed towards this, the research question formulated, following the 
sceptical format, was whether it could be empirically verified that the array of 
current scenario planning practices be similarly classified into two broad 
categories, based on purpose, and each implying a different necessary relationship 
with external constraint conditions? If so, what was the nature and extent of these 
purposes and constraint-condition situations and how might such a constraint-
based purpose perspective improve understanding of scenario practices and guide 
practitioners to better methodological choices?  
Towards this end, Chapter 1 developed the origination, motivation and scope of the 
research, identified the research choices faced, and described the research methods 
adopted. The research path called for an arc that encompassed both primary case 
studies and project-based structured interviews, as outlined in Chapter 1 and 
presented in Chapters 4A and 4B. This followed a review of academic discourse 
pertinent to the research in Chapter 2, which addressed key theoretical tenets in 
scenario planning relevant to the research terrain, and Chapter 3 which developed 
necessary understanding of the history and origins of the scenario field, with 
particular reference to the emergence and genesis of purpose in scenario work. 
Across both parts of Chapter 4, 15 real-world scenario projects were studied and 
presented. This first involved document study across a broad range of scenario 
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project reports, followed by project selection, and then conducting of both primary 
case studies, and structured qualitative interviews with core facilitators or close 
stakeholders of scenario projects, to establish purpose of the organisation and the 
specific scenario project, and the relationship between purpose and both the context 
of the project and key methodological choices made. Taken together, Chapter 4A, 
Case Studies, and Chapter 4B, Project-based Structured Interviews, describe the full 
terrain of the research as conducted. Chapter 5, Research Analysis, reported the key 
observations and findings from the research, and developed the various strands of 
analysis that were possible to be elaborated from these findings. This concluding 
chapter, Chapter 6, draws together the threads of the argument, provides 
conclusions relevant to the research question, and implications for contribution to 
knowledge. A final section (6.8) deals with directions for further research.  
 
6.3 The Argument 
6.3.1 Adaptive vs. Visionary-Advocacy Purpose 
The research presented and analysed in this study establishes that (a) project 
purpose is a defining consideration in scenario project formation, one which forms 
a demarcation between apparently similar types of project; and (b) verifies that 
scenario planning projects may be defined into two major purpose categories, 
future-aligning (adaptive) and future-influencing (visionary-advocacy), which (c) 
may or may not be congruent with the underlying organisational purpose. As 
demonstrated in the projects studied, scenarios with adaptive purpose are 
designed to tell consolidated narratives about the interactive evolution of external 
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uncertainties over which the organisation has no or minimal influence, to render 
visible important plausible outcomes for management consideration, and therein 
improve the organisation’s competitive alignment with these to improve future 
performance. Such scenarios provide the basis for the organisation changing itself 
(or its products and strategies), where necessary to align as advantageously as 
possible with an external (and possibly changing) environment it cannot greatly 
influence. By contrast, scenarios with visionary-advocacy purpose are designed to 
tell consolidated stories about the interactive evolution of external uncertainties 
over which the organisation (or a wider sphere of resources it can harness) 
perceives potential influence, in order to provide the basis for shaping the 
evolution of the external future situation itself. Here scenarios allow an 
organisation to identify and promote a preferred outcome, that is, leverage its 
resources toward influencing external future conditions towards those it (or 
society as a whole) prefers. 
It is noted, as is elaborated in the section on scenario benefits and purpose in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), that this analytical distinction is not in itself new. 
However, based on the research presented, it is established (beyond the state of 
the literature at present) that this form of purpose classification is not “just one 
among many” lines that can be drawn in understanding types of scenario practice, 
nor two among various benefits that may be gained via scenario planning; but 
rather that these purposes are fundamental meta-categories, the observance or 
lack of observance of which has overwhelming repercussions for the efficacy of 
scenario projects as a whole. This meta-category distinction, when correctly 
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assessed and observed, facilitates effective use of the tool, but proscribes effective 
use when not recognised or not observed, as further demonstrated in the 
problems discussion (Section 6.6) below.  
 
6.3.2 Validity of Both Purpose Approaches 
It follows from the above that it is established (also beyond the state of the 
literature at present) that the meta-categories of scenario purpose are incompatible 
with each other in the sense that the different purpose modes cannot be 
simultaneously met. The two broadly defined purposes each imply a categorically 
different use of the scenario process, with different use of similar processes, and 
failure to recognise the incompatibility implied in this distinction greatly diminishes 
the efficacy of the tool for either purpose. However, it is not argued that either 
adaptive or visionary-advocacy scenario approaches are preferable in themselves 
for scenario building, nor lead to better products. It is argued that each is fit for its 
different purpose; and the scenario approach that is congruent with the 
organisation’s wider underlying purpose of planning, both in general and in the 
particular planning instance, should be applied. The Metropolitan Life Foundation: 
Live the Future scenarios of HIV-Aids in South Africa scenario set is ideal for the 
outcome intended—to mobilise social change and policy intervention (harness and 
increase government and insurance industry influence) to mitigate the future of the 
AIDS epidemic. The Arup Foresight: Eco-Resorts of the Future scenario set is equally 
fit for purpose in preparing a Tanzanian resort developer and allied national 
tourism stakeholders to adapt to important changing facets of the global hospitality 
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industry they have little influence over, and cannot ever hope to have noticeable 
control over (while they do control how far, how well, and how innovatively they 
adapt).  
Further, it is not argued that the visionary-advocacy scenario mode is more oriented 
to bringing about a “preferred future for the organisation” (as is sometimes 
claimed): both adaptive and visionary-advocacy scenario modes seek to bring about 
what may be understood as a preferred future for the organisation. It is the path to a 
preferred future that is different: the former achieves it by aligning the organisation 
with changing external conditions that remain uninfluenced; the latter achieves it by 
influencing external conditions. Furthermore, it is not argued that visionary-
advocacy (future-influencing intent) scenarios are more “pro-active”. Both scenario 
modes are, in theory, equally pro-active and equally oriented to managers setting 
and fulfilling an agenda. In the adaptive case, the organisation is active on itself to 
adapt to external conditions; in the visionary-advocacy case it is active on the 
external conditions.  
 
6.3.3 The Purpose Examination 
 
Further to the argument, the implication of purpose category pre-eminence as 
validated by the research is that a dedicated formative stage becomes necessary to 
ensure validity of the scenario project. That is, when setting up the scenario 
planning project, the research presented here suggests the organisation should 
formally investigate its a-priori purpose in undertaking the scenario project (not 
only in general terms, for generally perceived future-scoping or scenario-practice 
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benefits as elaborated in Chapter 2), but also specifically in terms of the adaptive 
vs. visionary-advocacy purpose divide. In other words, the organisation should 
first identify to itself whether its purpose in constructing scenarios of the future is 
to explore future possibilities in order to become conscious of and ready for as 
wide a range of outcomes as possible, to guide its active adaptation to the external 
world it has little influence over; or whether its purpose in constructing future 
scenarios is to help it (with the help of others) intervene in and influence external 
events to bring a preferred outcome into reality. The purpose decision will 
originate in part from the character of the organisation: whether its on-going 
mission is in any sense to change or improve the external world, or whether it is 
merely to optimise for success in whatever future will pertain in its sector. The 
decision will also derive in part from a judicious view of constraint conditions—
that is, the strength of external uncertainties that frame the decision terrain—and 
the capacity of the organisation, including its wider sphere of leverage, to 
influence these externalities, as argued in the next section.  
 
6.4 Capacity and Constraint 
So far it has been argued from the research that an organisation may validly adopt 
a scenario-planning project within either future-aligning or future-influencing 
purpose structures, and that a fundamental criterion of overall scenario-project 
success is whether this choice is congruent with the pre-existing mission or 
purpose of the organisation, and therefore an a-priori examination of purpose is 
necessary to assess which of the two purpose platforms to adopt. A further 
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consideration arises: does the scenario-building subject (the organisation or 
stakeholder base the scenarios are created for) in fact have enough influence, or 
ability to broadly leverage enough influence, over the external forces in its future 
operating environment so as to justify scenarios based on the assumption that 
such influence exists? If the ratio of influence is small—if external forces are 
overwhelming and thus the external framing constraints that apply cannot 
conceivably be overcome, or if the capacity to overcome them is weak, then the 
congruent option is for the organisation to form scenarios with adaptive 
orientation. However if the ratio of influence is large—if the organisation validly 
sees a way to command external forces of macro-uncertainty towards its will—it 
is coherent to proceed with visionary-advocacy scenarios. This is to say, assuming 
the organisation determines its purpose to be future-influencing, as defined above, 
and therefore correctly and congruently chooses to produce scenarios in 
visionary-advocacy purpose mode, the question remains: has it in fairly assumed 
that the important uncertainties it faces (or at least one of them, around which it 
builds it scenarios, as explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.4) are reasonably under its 
influence, or the wider influence it can muster? The strength of constraint 
conditions—that is, strength of external uncertainties faced—and capacity of the 
organisation (including its wider network of influence) to overcome them, frames 
the valid limits of the organisation’s aspiration with respect to intervening in and 
influencing the evolution of external macro-uncertainties, and thus the valid limits 
of use of visionary-advocacy scenarios. It is therefore argued that, to validly 
proceed in visionary-advocacy purpose mode, the organisation is required to 
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assess and verify that its sphere and extent of influence is considerable when set 
against the external forces shaping its sector; therefore that an acknowledgement 
of the counter-influence of constraint conditions and a reliable accounting of 
capacity to challenge them (if any) is a necessary guiding step prior to adoption of 
either adaptive or visionary-advocacy scenario purpose mode, in order to achieve 
congruence between the constraint conditions an organisation faces and the 
ability to overcome these implied in the scenario purpose mode chosen. Where 
limits of an organisation’s influence are ignored, misjudged, or otherwise 
transgressed, scenarios that defy real-world constraint conditions, that is, which 
are oriented towards influencing external uncertainties beyond the influence 
power of the organisation, may emerge. (This is one of the errors flagged in 
Section 6.6 below, and therein one of the primary problems in application of 
scenarios to real-world planning, as described.) Similarly, there may arise cases 
where ability to influence external constraints is underestimated, with similarly 
problematic outcomes in providing scenarios that are unsuited to the real external 
conditions the organisation will go forward into.  
Observing this capacity constraint conditions implies some form of capacity-
constraint assessment whereby an organisation sets its own power and leverage 
against the broader power of the forces of external change and uncertainty. 
Therefore it is argued, on the basis of the research findings, that another early-
phase step is required in scenario-building practice that currently is not accounted 
for in the literature: a formal investigation or “audit” of the framing situational 
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constraints around the organisation, and the power of the organisation, including 
allied forces at its disposal, to influence these constraints.  
 
6.4.1 The Capacity-Constraint Audit 
As things stand in scenario theory and practice, it is common in a project to spend 
the early part of the first workshop looking at the external world and assessing 
forces of change and uncertainty. The audit proposed would add a further stage to 
this, by which the organisation would determine which of these external forces 
(that is, constraints on the organisation) the organisation might be in a position of 
power to influence, if any? This implies asking questions and conducting 
appropriate research along the lines of: What is our sphere of influence, and what 
is beyond it? How strong are the external conditions and how strong are we? 
Which other forces or players may be stronger, or have more influence? Which are 
the factors or outcomes more pliable to us, and which ones are not? Do we have, or 
can we see, a way to increase control over the key uncertainties that face us, or 
otherwise extend our sphere of influence? Answering these questions with 
appropriate research, where necessary, would determine how strong the shaping 
power of the organisation actually is, and-or which domains it has shaping 
influence over, if any.  
In postulating such an audit, it is readily acknowledged that constraint and 
capacity can be difficult to know. This is sometimes relatively easy for a 
commercial corporation, where most macro-externalities are commonly assumed 
to be “uninfluenceable”. However, governments or large national or international 
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organisations are often genuinely influential players in determining outcomes, and 
therefore may have a vexing time auditing what they can and cannot influence. It 
is noted that determining best practices for this type of audit is a necessary topic 
for future research, as elaborated at the end of this chapter.  
 
6.5 Linking Capacity to Purpose 
 
A capacity-constraint audit will lead the scenario-building organisation to an 
understanding of how strong its influence is over external macro-uncertainties as 
they affect its sector, and where particularly that influence lies. On this basis, the 
organisation would then be empowered to make a valid scenario purpose-
platform choice: adaptive if its influence is low; visionary-advocacy if high (or 
restrict expectations of influence to where it is high). This will, in effect, be the 
second choice made in setting up a scenario study, the first being the outcome of 
the purpose assessment described above (Section 6.3.3) where the organisation 
considers the fit between the purpose implied in the scenario approach and both 
its own pre-established purpose as an organisation and its purpose in undertaking 
scenario planning in the particular instance. Together these steps determine 
congruence between the organisational and scenario purpose, and congruence 
between the scenario purpose and external framing conditions: the correct choice 
of scenario purpose mode being that which produces congruence with both the 
organisational purpose and its real capacity to influence its contextual constraints. 
This implies resultant methodological choices, particularly in determining the 
nature of the foundational uncertainty axes of the scenario matrix which (in the 
2x2 method) determine which purpose mode the scenarios adopt (as explained in 
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Chapter 5, Section 5.4), such that the purpose format of the scenarios aligns with 
both the true planning aspirations and executable possibilities of the organisation.  
 
6.6 Diagnosis and Mitigation of Problems in Scenario Planning 
Based on the research, in summary, it has been argued that binary, alternative 
purpose platforms, as defined, apply in scenario planning; and that (1) the 
purpose implied in the scenario form is required to be congruent with the 
underlying purpose of the organisation, and (2) attitude to constraint conditions 
implied in the scenario form is required to be congruent with real external 
constraint conditions, in order for scenarios to be valid and fit for purpose. Where 
such congruence exists, the scenario set will be fit-for-purpose and therein to be 
implementable into real forward strategic decision-making, and therefore the 
project as a whole will be more likely to be considered valuable. Among the 15 
projects studied it is clear that many of them are considered by interviewees as fit-
for-purposes successes, particularly as judged by follow-on utility, for example the 
projects of Bord Bia, Association of Research Libraries, and the World Economic 
Forum (adaptive purpose), and those of Metropolitan Life, the Arctic Council, and 
the Columbia Basin Trust (visionary-advocacy purpose). In these cases it is clear 
that the congruencies defined above apply. 
The argument further follows from this that it is possible to use these research 
findings and analysis as a diagnostic for situations where scenarios misfire. An 
example of a problematic project of this sort is Nautilus Institute: Peaceful 
Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, where the axes of uncertainty are: 
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“Form of Crisis” (Contained vs. Escalating) and “Presence of Nuclear Weapons” 
(Yes vs. No). This leads to a “vision scenario” (Contained Non-nuclear Conflict) and 
a “dystopic scenario” (Escalating Nuclear Conflict), which is not in itself a problem 
as noted in Section 6.3.2 above—this is indeed the structure that most visionary-
advocacy scenarios manifest, as is the case in the Metropolitan Life Foundation: 
Live the Future project. However, in contrast to Metropolitan Life Foundation 
project where, with Government policy support, scenario-makers’ expectation of 
ability to influence the HIV-Aids “Social Consensus” axis is reasonable, the Nautilus 
Institute does not appear to have any reason to think it has or could realistically 
somehow gain influence over either the form of the Korean crisis, or presence-
absence of nuclear threat within it. In other words, it has adopted a mode of 
scenario work that is coherent for an organisation that has significant influencing 
power over the particular externalities it concerns itself with, but it has effectively 
none, as corroborated by the interviewee himself (Chapter 4B, Section 4.9.8).  
A similar situation applies in Cofisa: Bio-technology Scenarios for the Eastern 
Cape, where scenarios are constructed on the uncertainty axes: “Development 
Focus” (Urban vs. Rural) and “Form of Economy” (Knowledge vs. Neo-Industrial). 
The vision is Rurbal Balance, in which Mdantsane becomes a green biotechnology 
industry leader in African biotechnology within 25 years. The problem is neither 
Cofisa, nor anyone it could possibly reach out to, even including the South African 
Government, has sufficient power to achieve influence over (a) urbanisation, one 
of the most powerful and irrevocable global trends of out time, or (b) 
biotechnology, a technology beset both with scientific questions and social 
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concerns, neither of which Cofisa has not the remotest ability to influence let alone 
drive forward. This is to say, the vision Cofisa proposes is entirely outside of its (or 
any allied organisation’s) ability to achieve. A final example of this problem, 
among the scenarios studied, is the United Nations (FAO): Agricultural Produce in 
the Nile Basin project where the preferred outcome scenario is Joint Effort (Good 
Governance x Favourable Trade conditions). However, while a claim to influence 
the quality of governance was reasonable in projects such as Arctic Council: The 
Future of Arctic Marine Navigation, where the chief participants were in fact Arctic 
nation government representatives; or South Africa 2014: Scenarios for 2025, 
where again the key commissioning body was the South African government itself, 
in the case of the Nile Basin project there was in fact not even a remote capacity to 
influence Nile Basin countries’ governance, as confirmed by the interviewee.  
This problem may be summarised as one of creating visionary-advocacy scenarios 
for organisations that do not have the capacity to overcome external constraint 
conditions and therein influence the future in the way the scenario format implies. 
Scenarios are built as if influence over these uncertainties applies, but this is not a 
valid inference. Formally, in terms of the research and analysis of this dissertation, 
we may observe that there is lack of congruence between the purpose implied in 
the scenario format and influence over the constraint conditions faced: the 
scenarios transgress the capacity-constraint conditions facing the organisation. 
The result of this is that the scenarios tell “pretty stories” of betterment in areas 
the organisation cannot influence; therein the process comes across as idealistic, 
wishful thinking, “Pollyanna handwaving”, and credibility of the scenario planning 
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tool as a whole, particularly among business organisations, suffers accordingly. In 
terms of the research and analysis presented here, the incorrect scenario purpose 
mode is used in these projects, with negative consequences for the utility of 
scenario work in itself or for follow-on use.  
A related problem is one of producing visionary-advocacy scenarios for 
organisations that do not hold any particular agenda of macro-change, nor wish to, 
and which are then presented with scenarios showing utopia-dystopia outcomes 
that are not remotely relevant to the real goals of the organisation, and therefore 
are not implementable ab initio. Here the problem may be understood, in terms of 
the research and analysis presented, as another form of failure to create 
congruence between the purpose of the organisation and the purpose implied in 
the scenario mode. Organisations that have, rightly or wrongly, no external 
change-the-world agenda, are better served by adaptive purpose scenarios which 
embody the real benefit sought: informing adaptive and creative decision-making 
in response to changing external macro-conditions the pro’s and cons of which are 
not of direct concern to the organisation.  
Although none of the scenarios studied manifest it (and no project is known to the 
researcher) it is theoretically also possible to include in the argument an error 
situation where adaptive format scenarios are produced for an organisation that 
has low capacity constraints—that is real future-influencing power—and 
aspirations in this regard, which would lead to similar problems of 
implementation due to the scenario purpose mode choice being incongruent with 
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either the purpose of the organisation or the external constraint conditions it 
faces, or both.  
In Chapter 5 (Section 5.5) it was reflected that 50% of the scenario projects 
studied saw effective follow-on implementation into management decision-
making, and that it is apparent from the research that none of the projects 
identified as being problematic in terms of purpose or constraint conditions, as 
defined above, saw effective implementation, while all of the projects studied that 
did achieve follow-on implementation are methodologically congruent with the 
conditions of success in terms of the argument of this dissertation. Therefore it is 
reasonable (and also consistent with the academic literature, particularly the 
literature critical of scenario planning as reflected in Chapter 2, Section 2.3) to 
conclude that unsatisfactory scenario work of the type specified in the research-
based argument here is a contributor to the lack of an effective follow-on 
implementation phase. It is, of course, recognised that there may be many 
contributors to unsatisfactory scenario-building work in general. Here it is argued 
that one among such contributors is misalignment of scenario meta-purpose 
categories with the underlying planning purpose of the organisation or the 
planning purpose of the scenarios, or with the external constraint conditions that 
pertain, any or all of which will render scenarios of a type that are unhelpful to the 
organisation in terms of its real-world intentions, or which overestimate the 
organisation’s ability to act towards the implied scenario intentions, either or both 
of which will cause the implementation phase of the project to be still-born. 
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6.7 Contribution to Knowledge 
This section summarises the contribution to knowledge proposed by the research 
and analysis of the dissertation. It is divided into two parts; the first deals with 
principles in general, the second with particular contributions to scenario 
planning in Africa. 
 
6.7.1 General Principles 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in the sections on Purpose and Motivatio  of the Study, 
it is intended that the research make an original contribution to the theoretical 
and practical domains of management, particularly in improving managers’ 
forward thinking and decision-making via best use of scenario planning. Based on 
the research presented in this dissertation, the contribution to knowledge is firstly 
in isolating and verifying two different and opposing meta-categories in scenario 
work, described here as “adaptive” (future-aligning intent) and “visionary-
advocacy” (future-influencing intent), each defined by the primary purpose or 
intent of the modality. It is shown that adaptive and visionary-advocacy scenario 
approaches, due to alternative purpose orientations, while both valid in 
themselves, provide for different benefits from the scenario process—despite 
sharing many similar concepts and methods and terms of practice (such that the 
divergent purpose platforms and allied benefits are easy to miss under the weight 
of apparent process similarity.)  
Second, it has been shown that effective use of either purpose platform demands 
congruence with the larger situational purpose it serves, both in terms of the 
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planning purpose of the organisation (which commonly reflects the a-priori nature 
and purpose of the organisation) and the external constraint context that the 
scenario planning applies to. Specifically, adaptive scenario modality is indicated 
in situations where future-adaptive intent is the primary organisational intention, 
and constraints on the organisation’s external influence are high; visionary-
advocacy modality is indicated where future-influencing intent is the primary 
organisational intention, and constraints on the organisation’s external influence 
are low. In this, the research and analysis has demonstrated the need for two new 
steps in scenario project pre-planning: (a) a purpose audit by which an 
organisation determines its a-priori purpose in adopting and commissioning a 
new scenario project, in order to choose the scenario purpose framework 
congruent to its purpose; and (b) a capacity-constraint audit by which the extent 
of the organisation’s power to influence the variables pertaining in or changing its 
sector (existing or potential new context constraints) is assessed, and the areas of 
its scope of influence (if any) are verified and justified. 
Third, it has been demonstrated that a scenario-planning purpose platform choice 
demands follow-through at the methodological level. Where relative influence 
capacity is identified then method, particularly in choosing axes of uncertainty for 
2x2 scenario architecture, must be congruent with it. As described in Chapter 5 
(Section 5.4), at least one axis of uncertainty must be within the organisation’s 
valid (verified via the capacity-constraint audit) sphere of influence. When 
proceeding with adaptive purpose, the entire basis of the scenario matrix 
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uncertainty architecture should be external to the organisation’s sphere of 
influence. 
Fourth, the study contributes a diagnostic tool applicable in the investigation of 
scenario projects that have met with uneven success or failure, where failure can 
be traced to a lack of awareness or observance of the alternative meta-purpose 
platforms that pertain in scenario planning, or a misapprehension of the 
constraint conditions that frame an organisation’s actions, either or both of which 
lead to misalignment of the purpose implied in the scenario method with the 
broader purpose of the organisation, or with the real-world constraint conditions 
faced, which in turn leads to low quality of the work and difficulty of follow-on 
implementation in real-world planning. The research, in demonstrating the need 
to prioritise both purpose platform and constraint conditions as a basis of 
selecting between, and applying, different methodological choices in scenario 
building, shows a route to improving practitioner application, and therein greater 
management success in productive use of this most important business foresight 
tool. Therefore the fifth contribution to knowledge proposed via the research and 
conclusions presented is a pathway to revalidate the place and utility of scenario 
planning in management understanding, towards establishing a solid base for 
productive use of the method in real-world management decision-making.  
 
6.7.2 Scenario Work in Africa  
In Chapter 1 (Section 1.4) it was remarked that this research project was situated in 
Africa, and developed through an African business school, for reasons related to the 
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relative richness of scenario project work in Africa (particularly South Africa) and 
the potential relevance of conclusions for developing better scenario work on the 
continent. It remains to draw these conclusions. It is argued this separation of 
scenario purpose modalities, and maintenance of congruence with organisational 
planning purpose and external constraint conditions is established as good practice 
for African scenario building as it would be anywhere in the world. However it may 
further be observed that in many if not most cases that pertain in Africa, the 
capacity to influence external drivers of macro-change is often weak (constraint on 
influence is high). There are many powerful forces in geopolitics, currency flows, 
energy technology advancement, produce and raw materials market shifts, to name 
just a few, that impact the continent, and will continue to do so, and over which its 
organisations and businesses have no influence, or at best weak and serendipitous 
influence. Determinants of the outcomes of key uncertainties are therefore external 
and mostly beyond reasonable expectation of internal stakeholder influence, no 
matter how fervently this influence is exhorted or evangelised, or however 
passionately the vision of a rosy dawn is painted in a scenario. This is of course not 
to assert that African scenario situations are different in type to any other situation. 
It is merely to observe that, in global terms, African firms or public-service 
organisations, or even African governments, are relatively small and relatively 
constrained in terms of their influence over global forces of macro-change. It is 
noted in Section 6.8.1 below that Biggs et al (2007) argue that constraint conditions 
on a scenario-building organisation are correlated to the scale of the exercise—local, 
national or global—where global scale implies greater constraint. This applies here 
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in that African visions of a better tomorrow often imply the ability to exert influence 
at the global level, when there is none, or at the national level, when the forces and 
finances of the State are weak. A capacity-constraint audit would therefore suggest 
adaptive mode scenarios are applicable in most African situations—other than 
possibly at the local level—whereby scenario planning can help managers to 
creatively and strategically adapt their organisations in a world they do not control; 
and scenario-building projects should be restricted to this mode unless a very clear 
case can be made (via a capacity-constraint audit, as determined by the research) as 
to why an assumption of influence over external macro-change is reasonable, and 
how this influence may be achieved, at which point visionary-advocacy scenarios 
become a justifiable and laudable way to proceed.  
 
6.8 Directions for Further Research 
 
This dissertation has diagnosed and proved a nexus of methodological confusion 
and poor practice in scenario work, which is to be found when purpose platform is 
not adequately assessed, such that the method used for scenario construction 
blurs the necessary separation of adaptive and visionary-advocacy intent, with the 
result that neither is effectively served; or when the modal separation is 
adequately assessed, but overreaches or otherwise disregards capacity-constraint 
conditions. However, there remains a body of work to be done to consolidate the 
implications of this research, as follows: 
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6.8.1 Determining Framework for the Capacity-Constraint Audit 
The capacity-constraint audit is unexplored territory. It is clear what is necessary in 
concept—a process by which a scenario-building organisation is able to assess not 
only the most important external drivers of uncertainty it faces (as is currently 
common is scenario workshops), but also (a) the constraints on it influencing those 
external driving forces, and (b) its capacity to overcome those constraints. Further 
research and experimental work is required to assess how this audit should be 
done; what would be the best process or template for achieving it. Possible early 
success in this endeavour may come from developing Biggs et al (2007), who note 
that constraint conditions on a scenario-building organisation are correlated to the 
scale of the exercise, whether it is local, national or global. In other words the degree 
of control that stakeholders have over the driving forces of change in a system 
decreases with increasing scope of the project. International consumer or 
demographic trends, or legislative-trade agreements are routinely beyond the 
influence of most organisations, while at the national scale, and particularly the local 
scale, there is often a greater degree of influence, and sometimes even control over 
important driving forces. The authors note that an increasing number of scenario 
studies are "multiscale," in that their storylines are developed at several scales, i.e. 
global and national scales, which are linked to one another.  
 
6.8.2. Integration with Scenario Typology Literature 
In Chapter 2 (Section 2.8) the current state of the debate in scenario typology was 
discussed. This dissertation lays out a conceptual framework that rests on that 
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literature, particularly in corroborating “purpose” as a fundamental axis of scenario 
typology, as is partially indicated in the literature. However it also challenges the 
typological frameworks that exist, particularly in prioritising purpose and 
introducing notions of influence capacity and influence constraint, that is, turning 
the typological focus towards the power of the organisation to act on the external 
environment as a basis for classification. This comes close to introducing a “political 
theory” into the scenario typology debate: much work remains however in 
consolidating this theory, and integrating it with existing typology frameworks 
where possible, and thereby extending and consolidating the current understanding 
of scenario typology.  
 
6.8.3. Applicability Beyond the 2x2 Matrix Method  
At various points in this study it has been pointed out that the analysis has been 
confined to scenario studies that use the “2x2 matrix” format. Reasons for this are 
twofold: first this method, despite criticisms (outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.1), 
is far and away the most common method used in scenario construction; second, 
maintaining a set of projects that use a common methodology has allowed for valid 
comparison across projects, and therefore has facilitated the comparative nature of 
the case study analysis, and comparison between the projects studied by case study 
and those studies by document analysis and interview. However, it is recognised 
that other methodologies pertain, and that strong criticisms of the 2x2 method (for 
example, Curry & Shultz, 2009) are pertinent, and it may become the case that the 
evolution of alternative scenario-construction methodologies continues to the point 
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where the dominance of the 2x2 method is eclipsed. It therefore becomes a 
direction for future research to assess how the implications of the research 
presented here applies to and improves other forms of scenario construction, and 
follow-on use, both in theory and in practice. 
 
*** 
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Appendix 1. Interview Schedule 
 
The schedule below records the dates of primary and significant follow-up 
interviews (where applicable) that were conducted by the researcher, following 
scenario project document study and selection, in preparing this dissertation. 
Various ongoing short post-interview calls for additions and clarifications are not 
recorded. 
 
 
Eco-Resorts of the Future 
Date of Interview: April 8, 2010 
Interviewee: Francesca Birks, Arup 
Foresight, New York: Co-Lead Facilitator of 
the project. 
Eco-Resorts of the Future 
Date of Interview: February 10, 2011 
Interviewee: Francesca Birks, Arup 
Foresight, New York: Co-Lead Facilitator of 
the project. 
Live the Future  
Date of Interview: March 22, 2011 
Interviewee: Desiree Daniels, (ex) Project 
Director, Metropolitan Life Foundation, 
Cape Town: Chief Coordinator of the 
project. 
Live the Future  
Date of Interview: April 25, 2012 
Interviewee: Dr. Barbara Heinzen, New 
York: Lead Facilitator of the project. 
Columbia Basin Trust 
Date of Interview: March 12, 2012 
Interviewee: Juliet Fox, Future IQ 
Partners / Innovative Leadership, 
Minneapolis: Lead Facilitator of the 
project. 
Columbia Basin Trust 
Date of Interview: June 13, 2012 
Interviewee: Juliet Fox, Future IQ 
Partners / Innovative Leadership, 
Minneapolis: Lead Facilitator of the project 
The Future of Arctic Marine 
Navigation 
Date of Interview: March 13, 2012 
Interviewee: Dr. Eric Smith, Senior 
Practitioner, Global Business Network (a 
Member of the Monitor Group), San 
Francisco: Lead facilitator of the project. 
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Association of Research Libraries 
(U.S.) 
Date of Interview: March 15, 2012 
Interviewee: Karla Streib, (ex) Assistant 
Director for Transforming Research 
Libraries, Association of Research 
Libraries, Washington D.C.: Client 
Representative for the project. 
Trade and Agriculture in  
Southern Africa 
Date of Interview: March 16, 2012 
Interviewee: Tanja Hichert, Institute for 
Futures Research, Cape Town. Co-lead 
Facilitator for the project. 
South Africa Presidency Scenarios 
2014 
Date of Interview: March 19, 2012 
Interviewee: Dr. Harry Dugmore, Rhodes 
University, Grahamstown: Coordinator and 
Lead Facilitator of the project. 
South Africa Presidency Scenarios 
2014 
Date of Interview: July 9, 2012 
Interviewee: Dr. Harry Dugmore, Rhodes 
University, Grahamstown: Coordinator and 
Lead Facilitator of the project. 
Ecotourism in Milne Bay, Papua 
New Guinea 
Date of Interview: March 21, 2012 
Interviewee: Dr. Erin Bohensky, Research 
Scientist, Ecosystem Sciences Social & 
Economic Science Programme, CSIRO, 
Cairns, Australia. Co-lead Facilitator of the 
project. 
Public Library Network, New South 
Wales 
Date of Interview: March 23, 2012 
Interviewee: Oliver Freeman, Director, 
Neville Freeman Agency, Sydney: Lead 
Facilitator of the project. 
North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
Date of Interview: March 26, 2012 
Interviewee: Doug Randall, Managing 
Partner, Monitor 360, San Francisco: Lead 
Facilitator of the project. 
Biotechnology Scenarios for the 
Eastern Cape 
Date of Interview: March 28, 2012 
Interviewee: Dr. Bob Day, Founder and 
Co-Director, Non-Zero-Sum Development, 
Pretoria. Lead Facilitator of the project. 
Irish Food Board: Bord Bia 
Date of Interview: April 27, 2012 
Interviewee: Rachel Lloyd, (ex) Associate 
Director, Henley Centre Headlight Vision, 
London: Lead Facilitator of the Project. 
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United Parcel Service: Migration to 
Open Source Systems  
Date of Interview: April 30, 2012 
Interviewee: Edward M. Rogers, Global 
Strategy Manager, UPS Corporate Strategy 
Group, Atlanta: Convenor and Client 
Liaison for the project. 
Agricultural Produce in the Nile 
Basin 
Date of Interview: April 30, 2012 
Interviewee: Dr. Peter Schütte, Schütte & 
Company, Amsterdam. Lead Facilitator of 
the project. 
World Economic Forum: Future of 
the Global Financial System 
Date of Interview: June 13, 2012 
Interviewee: Nicholas Davis, Associate 
Director and Deputy-Head of Strategic 
Foresight, World Economic Forum, 
Geneva. Lead Facilitator of the project. 
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